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INTRODUCTION
The human right to freedom of movement has been characterized as a
right of personal self-determination.1 This is a particularly apt characteri-
zation when applied to refugees: those who are forced to flee their country
of origin on account of a well-founded fear of persecution.2 For them, the
right to leave is a prerequisite to securing protection against (anticipated)
persecution and the enjoyment of human rights. Not only departure, but
also finding refuge abroad, stay abroad, and eventual return are elements
of this human right, and that means that the physical span of refugee status
coincides with the scope of the right to freedom of movement, which in-
cludes the right to leave one’s country, liberty of movement within the
host state, external freedom of movement, and the right to enter one’s
country.
This background study focuses on the right to freedom of movement
of refugees. It reviews the law pertaining to this freedom from the per-
spective of the spatial journey of refugees. This focus on the law means
that extralegal considerations will not be taken into consideration. The
analysis will not proceed from any perceived need for limits that should be
accepted as “a product of realism about the strains that migration, espe-
cially high-volume migration or sudden influxes, can bring to a society.”3
The decision to ignore such realism follows from the intention to iden-
tify the state of the law with respect to the right to freedom of movement
of refugees.4 Moreover, the drafters of the 1951 Convention Relating to
1. José Inglés (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities), Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Eve-
ryone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to His Country, at 9, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (Jan. 14, 1964); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR
General Comment No. 27: Article 12, Freedom of Movement, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21Rev.1/Add.9 (1999) (stating that freedom of movement is “an indispensable condition for
the free development of a person”); Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The
Right of Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 218 (1971) (char-
acterizing this right in terms of a right that is fundamental to human opportunity). In the
drafting process of what would become Art. 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the question had nonetheless been raised whether freedom of movement
was as basic or as fundamental as, for example, the right to live. See U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess.,
150th mtg. ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.150 (Apr. 27, 1950); U.N. Secretary-General, Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955).
2. Throughout, use will be made of the masculine gender when referring to refugees,
in line with the predominant usage of the masculine pronoun in the text of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It should not be taken to reflect any norma-
tive position. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
3. David A. Martin, Immigration’s Enigma Principle: Protection and Paradox, U. OF
VA. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 63, at 2 (2015).
4. The focus is hence on positive international law, and particularly on the human
freedom of movement and the restrictions to which it may be subjected by the relevant
human rights instruments. The historical origin of such restrictions or their legitimacy in the
sense of historical injustices are not questioned. For an analysis on freedom of movement
from that angle, see Satvinder Juss, Free Movement and the World Order, 16 INT’L J. OF
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the Status of Refugees5 (the 1951 Convention) were aware of the possibil-
ity of “high-volume migration or sudden influxes,”6 as will be illustrated in
paragraphs 2.5 and 3.4. Calls for realism—the observation that protection
must observe limits in order to preserve the requisite societal commitment
to protection7—may therefore boil down to advocating breaches of the
law, in particular when heeding the proposed “limitation imperative” leads
to the erection of barriers and barbed wire fences, maritime interdiction,
push-backs, and other measures to prevent those who need protection
from finding refuge. Alarming in this respect is that such calls for realism
are only heard when refugees reach the affluent West; no such calls are
heard when they— as eighty-four percent of them do8—seek refuge in the
less affluent regions of the world.
Setting aside such limitation imperatives is not tantamount to ignoring
relevant state practice. On the contrary, it is particular state practice and
actual challenges with respect to the right to freedom of movement of ref-
ugees that gave rise to the specific questions that are addressed in this
background study. The answers to those questions are based on an analy-
sis of the applicable international—rather than domestic—law, and the
analysis thereby proceeds from a single non-hierarchical rule of treaty in-
terpretation as exemplified by article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.9
The travaux préparatoires are, in conformity with article 32 on supplemen-
tary means of interpretation of the same Convention, considered as an
evidentiary source that may be used in the interpretative process, along-
side other relevant sources.
The freedom of movement of refugees is governed by different instru-
ments that may be applicable simultaneously, particularly—but not exclu-
REFUGEE L. 289 (2004); see also REECE JONES, VIOLENT BORDERS: REFUGEES AND THE
RIGHT TO MOVE (2016).
5. 1951 Convention, supra note 2.
6. The possibility of a massive influx induced France to propose to insert in the Pre-
amble to the 1951 Convention recognition of the fact that the “grant of asylum places an
unduly heavy burden on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of
which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot be
achieved without international co-operation” to help to distribute refugees throughout the
world. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Preamble to the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, U.N. Doc. E/L.81 (1950).
7. Martin, supra note 3, at 2, 3.
8. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016, at
2 (2017), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-dis
placement-2016.html. In addition, the least developed countries among those provided asy-
lum to about twenty-eight percent of the global total. Id.
9. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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sively—the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)10 and the 1951 Convention. The analysis will proceed from a
presumption against normative conflict,11 an assumption that is based on
provisions such as article 5(2) of the ICCPR,
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State
Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regu-
lations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does
not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser
extent.12
and article 5 of the 1951 Convention,
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights
and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from
this Convention.13
An early commentator, Nehemiah Robinson, qualified this particular pro-
vision as “a self-evident rule because the purpose of the [1951] Convention
is to grant refugees as many rights as possible, not to restrict them,”14 and
the phrase “apart from”, “obviously includes past, present and further [fu-
ture?] provisions”.15 Robinson refers explicitly to “broader rights than are
prescribed by the Convention” on the basis of, inter alia, international
treaties.16
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
11. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmenta-
tion of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Inter-
national Law, ¶ 37, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, (Apr. 13, 2006) (stating, “In international law,
there is a strong presumption against normative conflict.”).
12. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 5(2). See also MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY, 112 (2d ed. 2005) (noting, “[T]he sav-
ings clause [. . .] gives expression to the principle that the rights of the Covenant merely
represent a minimum standard and that the cumulation of various human rights conventions,
domestic norms and customary international law may not be interpreted to the detriment of
the individual.”).
13. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
14. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION: A COMMENTARY 19 (1955), http://www.unhcr.org/home/
PUBL/3d4ab67f4.pdf; see also JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 109-110 (2005) (stating that the 1951 Convention assumed those rights in-
clude international rights); but see ACHILLES SKORDAS, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 698 (arguing that art. 7, on exemption
from reciprocity, rather than art. 5 governs the relationship between the 1951 Convention
and general human rights law).
15. ROBINSON, supra note 14, 79-80.
16. Id. Reference should also be made to Art. 7 on exemption from reciprocity that
has been referred to as the normative link between the 1951 Convention and international
human rights law. SKORDAS, supra note 14, at 753. Art. 7(1), an omnibus clause, provides that
“Except where this Convention contains more favorable provisions, a Contracting State shall
24 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:19
The analysis of the right to freedom of movement will follow the jour-
ney of the refugee. It is divided into six phases, each of which—with the
exception of the second—corresponds with a particular aspect of the right
to freedom of movement: (1) departure from the country of origin (the
right to leave one’s country); (2) entering a foreign state with a view to
finding refuge; (3) freedom of movement upon arrival (the right to liberty
of movement); (4) freedom of movement in the asylum state (the right to
liberty of movement); (5) external freedom of movement (the right to
leave any country); and (6) return to the country of origin (the right to
enter one’s country). Analyzing these phases from the perspective of the
needs and plight of the refugee may serve to illustrate the extent to which
this right can actually be exercised, and that includes identifying the corre-
sponding obligations of states.
Considering the complexity and breadth of the issues at stake, this
background study will refrain as much as possible from elaborating issues
that have already been dealt with extensively elsewhere, focusing instead
on those that are less clear and perhaps even controversial. Nor will it
address topics that are only peripherally related to the subject of refugees
and the right to freedom of movement, such as bilateral arrangements and
regional regimes that allocate refugees seeking protection among states.17
I. THE RIGHT TO LEAVE ONE’S COUNTRY IN SEARCH OF ASYLUM
A. Introduction
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides,
“[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own.”18 The
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides that
everyone has the right to leave any country. Article 12(2) provides that:
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.19
This right is not, however, an absolute one.20 Article 12(3) ICCPR pro-
vides that:
accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.” See ATLE GRAHL-
MADSEN, COMMENTARY ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 1951, ARTICLES 2–11, 13–37, art. 7
¶ 2 (UNHCR 1997) (1963) (qualifying this provision as one of the most important provisions
of the 1951 Convention that gives refugees the full protection of international law, which
places refugees on an equal footing with persons with an effective nationality).
17. See James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere,
Adopted January 3, 2007, 28 MICH.J. INT’L L. 2, 207 (2007).
18. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13(2) (Dec. 10,
1948).
19. Other universal treaties comprise the same right. See International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(d)(ii), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 10(2), Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Interna-
tional Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families art. 8(1), July 1, 2003, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
20. The complexity of envisaged restrictions was such that it was even suggested to
delete this right from the covenant for consideration in a later convention. U.N. ESCOR, 6th
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The above-mentioned rights [the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose residence within the territory of a state, and
the freedom to leave one’s country] shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
In short, potentially far-reaching restrictions, but the Human Rights Com-
mittee (the HRC) has set a clear limit to restrictions in its General Com-
ment on article 12: restrictions may neither impair the essence of the right
nor nullify it.21
However, the right to leave one’s country is a derogable right: addi-
tional restrictions may be applied in time of public emergency under
ICCPR article 4(1):
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Par-
ties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.22
In practice, the right to leave is not only restricted by countries of
origin, but also stymied by (groups of) other states desirous of, and set on,
preventing (unauthorized) arrivals. In this section, the central question re-
garding the former—countries of origin—is to what extent those practices,
which may have been induced by legitimate international obligations (such
as the duty to prevent human trafficking) are compatible with the right to
leave one’s country as laid down in the ICCPR. With respect to other
states, the first question is to what extent they should refrain from
preventing departure considering the fact that the duty bearer of the right
to leave one’s country is the state within whose territory and jurisdiction
Sess., 151st mtg. at ¶¶ 12, 13, 17, 19, 44, 49, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.150 (Apr. 17, 1950); U.N.
ESCOR, 6th Sess., 151st mtg., Doc. E/CN.4/SR.151 (Apr. 10, 1950).
21. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶¶ 2, 13 (“The relation between right
and restriction . . . must not be reversed.”).
22. See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4:
Derogations During a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1 (Aug. 31,
2001). During the drafting, there was a proposal to exchange the list of non-derogable rights
with a list of rights that may be suspended, including freedom of movement; that proposal
was not adopted. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES” OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 95 (1987). Freedom of
movement is particularly targeted during national emergencies, and nearly all notifications
for derogations mention its suspension. See NOWAK, supra note 12, at 95.
26 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:19
the individual finds himself.23 The second question is when they can be
considered complicit in the commission of applying unlawful restrictions
by the country of origin.
B. Restrictions Imposed by the Country of Origin
Countries of origin impose restrictions on the right to leave one’s
country for various reasons, and different motives.24 Classical restrictions
are those that are induced by ideological considerations or economic rea-
sons. Examples of the former are the prevention of unauthorized depar-
ture by means of (sometimes severe) penalization of departure, as
practiced by closed undemocratic societies such as East Germany in the
past25 (where it was known as Republikflucht) and North Korea in the
present.26 The desire to preclude “brain drain” is an example of an eco-
nomic reason to prevent departure.27 Other motives for restricting travel
include preventing breaches of the immigration laws of other states,28
23. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind
. . .”); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 31: The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.1326 (2004). See infra Section I.E for the extra-territorial application of Art.
12.
24. Sometimes restrictions are encouraged by “aid, trade and other funds.” Eur. Coun-
cil on Refugees and Exiles, European Council adopts migration compact despite NGOs state-
ment, ECRE WEEKLY BULLETIN, July 1, 2016. See generally Eur. Comm’n, Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the
European Investment Bank: on Establishing a new Partnership Framework with third coun-
tries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM (2016) 385 final (June 7, 2016).
25. “Republikflucht,” the exit of nationals without official permission, was considered
a crime; in the German Democratic Republic, unlawful border crossing could be punished
with up to two years’ imprisonment, and severe violations of this crime even with five to eight
years. Ulrike Brandl, Emigration, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 7 (Jan.
2013).
26. See Elim Chan & Andreas Schloenhardt, North Korean Refugees and International
Refugee Law, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 215, 221-22 (2007); Human Rights Watch, “Country
Summary: North Korea”, January 2017, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/northkorea
_2.pdf.
27. See ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREE-
DOM OF MOVEMENT (1987). At present, this is even practiced with respect to refugees who
have been selected for resettlement in a third state. See infra note 346.
28. With a view to reducing the likelihood of those states refusing other nationals of
the state concerned “entry” or “toughening or refusing to relax their visa regime” in respect
of those other nationals. Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 32. Based on
domestic legislation that aimed to discourage and prevent breaches of immigration laws of
other states, a two-year travel ban was imposed on Mr. Stamose who had been expelled from
the United States when he had overstayed his permitted period of stay in that country. Id. ¶¶
32-36. The Court criticized the automatic imposition of the ban, which prevented him from
travelling to any and every foreign country on account of his having committed a breach of
the immigration laws of one country, and qualified the measure as “quite draconian”. Id. ¶¶
33-34.
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jeopardizing visa-free regimes,29 and trafficking and smuggling as de-
scribed by the Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols (also known as the Pa-
lermo Protocols).30
The question is whether such restrictions are compatible with ICCPR
article 12(3), which prescribes that restrictions should be: provided by law
(in the formal sense of the word)31; are necessary to protect national se-
curity, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights
and freedoms of others; and are consistent with the other rights recognized
in the Covenant.32
The requirement of necessity is subject to “proportionality:”33 a re-
striction should be “appropriate to achieve their protective function,” be
the “least intrusive amongst those which might achieve the desired result,”
and be “proportionate to the interest to be protected.”34 All restrictions
should in addition be consistent with the other rights listed in the ICCPR.
The prohibition of discrimination, included in ICCPR article 2(1), seems
to be particularly relevant in this respect.35 In practice this prohibition
29. E.g. Thomas Hammarberg, The right to leave one’s country should be applied with-
out discrimination, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMENT, Nov. 22, 2011 (discussing the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia that decided to criminalize abuse of the European Union visa-
free regime and of the Schengen agreement).
30. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S.
507 [hereinafter Smuggling Protocol]; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Trafficking Pro-
tocol]. Long before the Palermo Protocols were adopted, during the drafting of the ICCPR,
Australia considered that certain restrictions on freedom of movement were desirable, partic-
ularly restrictions involved in legislation to prevent exploitation of, or traffic in, women and
minors. See U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 151st mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/353/Add.10 (Mar. 22,
1950).
31. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 270 (stating that mere administrative provisions are in-
sufficient); BOSSUYT, supra note 22, at 253.
32. Initially an exhaustive list of all grounds for restriction had been envisaged, and
that included restrictions imposed on emigration to assist a neighboring country to control
illegal immigration. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 270.
33. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 14.
34. Id.
35. Each state party to the Covenant “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all indi-
viduals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant
without distinctions of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra note 10, art.
2(1). Although distinctions of “any kind” are prohibited, the protection of members of eth-
nic, religious or linguistic minorities is addressed separately in Art. 27: they have the right,
“in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.” Id. art. 27. See also NOWAK,
supra note 12, at 274 (providing an example that if a person is barred from leaving the coun-
try solely on account of an opinion or his political conviction, this interference may well be
provided for by law and perhaps also be justifiable in the interests of the protection of na-
tional security or public order, but it is not compatible with the prohibition of discrimination,
nor, for that matter, other rights of the ICCPR such as freedom of expression); but see infra,
Section I.C.
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may mean that a non-discriminatory restriction on departure, which is pro-
vided by law and satisfies all other conditions of article 12(3), nonetheless
violates article 2(1) when it is applied in a discriminatory manner, for in-
stance, by means of profiling that may particularly affect members of mi-
norities36 or otherwise only affects particular individuals or groups, since
article 2(1) is not confined to the law but also includes its
implementation.37
The restrictions must be based on specific grounds. With respect to
national security,38 the HRC has addressed limitations on departure with
respect to those who had to perform military service, and those who held
state secrets. With respect to the former, the Committee observed that
restrictions of the freedom of movement of individuals who have not yet
performed their military service are in principle to be considered neces-
sary for the protection of national security and public order.39 However,
the prevention of departure on the grounds of holding state secrets was
considered to fall short of meeting the requirements of clear legal grounds,
necessity and proportionality.40
It is not clear what other acts fall under “national security” since
neither the travaux relating to article 12(3) nor the relevant General Com-
ment sheds light on this particular notion.41 In view of its inherently blan-
36. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and other countries in the region
require persons to “justify the purpose of their travel [to the EU] and to prove they can
finance their stay there as well as their return;” these exit procedures appear to target minori-
ties, in particular the Roma. Hammarberg, supra note 29; see also U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Cove-
nant, ¶ 23 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998); cf. U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, ¶¶ 7, 9, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9
(Nov. 10, 1989).
37. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(2); U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Com-
ment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 13, U.N.
doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); see also NOWAK, supra note 12, at 37-38.
38. That is, in situations that do not warrant or call for the proclamation of a state of
emergency. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4.
39. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lauri Peltonen v. Finland, Communication No.
492/1992, ¶ 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/492/1992 (July 21, 1994). Cf. In re Sepet and Bulbul
[2003] 1 WLR 856 (Eng.) (stating that as yet there is no right in international law to object to
military service on grounds of conscience). It should be added, that penalization for evading
military service may be tantamount to persecution and form the basis for protection needs.
See MST and Others [2016] UKUT 0043 (IAC) (Eng.).
40. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 16.
41. Cf. BOSSUYT, supra note 22 at 252-256; U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1,
¶¶ 11-18. The notion is also included in other provisions of the ICCPR. Cf. ICCPR, supra
note 10, arts. 13, 14(1), 19(3), 21. But as far as could be ascertained, national security was not
defined. Cf. Bossuyt, supra note 22 at 114, 267, 417-18, 430-1; U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., ¶¶
112, 114, 143, 151, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955); Nowak observes that national security is
endangered only in grave cases of political or military threat to the entire nation, and thus
raises the bar very high. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 276. The so-called Siracusa principles
appear to set the bar high too: “National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting
certain rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial
integrity or political independence against force or threat of force”, and: “National security
cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing limitations to prevent merely local or relatively
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ket nature, measures such as preventing departure for ideological or
economic reasons in the sense referred to earlier could probably fall into
this category. However, even when those restrictions would be provided
by law, it is a moot point whether these can be considered necessary to
protect national security, specifically in the sense of being proportionate to
the aim that is pursued, since they in essence result in nullifying the right
to leave one’s country altogether.42
Another ground for restriction, comparable in terms of having the
same blanket nature, is that of public order. Unlike national security, this
particular notion was the subject of extensive debates in the drafting pro-
cess. These are worth recalling here with a view to determining whether
public order should be taken to designate merely domestic concerns or,
beyond that, to include transnational ones such as in particular combating
trafficking and smuggling pursuant to international obligations, and hence
draw in the international public order.
The travaux consist of different phases. The first draft ICCPR was dis-
cussed in 1950. At that time, there were clear hesitations about inserting
“public order” in the text of what would become article 12(3). It was recal-
led that the notion had often been characterized as “vague and indefinite”,
and was therefore not suitable to be included in the covenants.43 In order
to avoid any abuse that dictators or potential dictators might commit
under cover of it, the French representative suggested adopting the
formula “public order in a democratic society,” which would enshrine the
democratic conception of that idea.44 That formula was not adopted.
States remained divided about including the term public order as it, and
comparable restrictions, were considered to be too far-reaching.45 Eventu-
ally the Commission on Human Rights adopted a draft that did not in-
isolated threats to law and order”, “National security cannot be used as a pretext for impos-
ing vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when there exist adequate safe-
guards and effective remedies against abuse”, etc. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, The
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter
Siracusa Principles].
42. In East Germany, the restrictions were moreover applied in a discriminatory man-
ner, and confined to those who were not “politically privileged” or below pensionable age.
RAYMOND YOUNGS, SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAW 653 (2d ed. 2002). Likewise, with re-
spect to present-day North Korea, see MORSE TAN, NORTH KOREA: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE DUAL CRISES, NARRATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT (2015). For more in
general, see DOWTY, supra note 27.
43. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 288th mtg., ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.288 (Oct. 18, 1950).
UN docs. E/L.68, para. 83; A/C.3/SR.956, 13 November 1959, para. 25; cf. U.N. GAOR, 5th
Sess., 289th mtg. ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.289 (Oct. 19,1950). (The Lebanese delegation
thought “public order,” which it considered a wide reservation, would be out of place in the
covenant.).
44. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 290th mtg., ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.290 (Oct. 20, 1950);
see also U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 319th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.319 (June 17, 1952)
(The French delegation stated that “‘Ordre public’ had both material and moral connotations
and embraced the whole of the principles on which the State was built.”).
45. Cf. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 1, at 39.
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clude this term but instead included “national security, public safety,
health or morals” as limiting grounds.46
When the drafting of article 12 was resumed, an amendment had been
proposed that included the expression “ordre public” in the limitation
clause.47 The difficulty of including this expression in the English text was
the fact that the English expression, “public order,” was not considered to
be equivalent to the French expression ordre public (or similar concepts in
other civil law countries, for that matter). In common law countries, the
term “public order” was ordinarily understood as indicating the absence of
disorder.48 The French notion of ordre public meant public security,
health, and peace.49 Since the French notion is much wider than the En-
glish one, the U.K. representative felt that it was essential that the English
text should indicate that the words “public order” did not have their usual
meaning but were intended to have the same range as the French expres-
sion “ordre public.”50 This could be done by adding the French words “or-
dre public” in parentheses after the words “public order.”51 The current
text of article 12(3) reflects this particular amendment.52
On the basis of the travaux, it can hardly be argued that the notion of
public order extends beyond the domestic legal order.53 If the notion of
46. U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 316th mtg. at 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.316 (June 17,
1952).
47. See U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 956th mtg. ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.956 (Nov. 13,
1959). The documents are confusing since the amendment that was discussed — included in
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 954th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.812 (Nov.12, 1959) (suggested by
Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy and the Philippines, referred to as the “five-Power amend-
ment’) — did not include this notion, yet France expressed its gratitude for having the idea of
“ordre public” restored to the text, id., ¶ 5. Only the revised amendment — U.N. GAOR,
14th Sess., 956th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.812/Rev.1 (Nov.13, 1959), — included “public or-
der.” The explanation for this confusion is most likely the fact that the English text of the
relevant amendment, which did not include “public order” but the notion of “public safety,”
had been translated in the Spanish version of the amendment with the words “orden púb-
lico,” see U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 955th mtg. ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.955 (Nov. 12, 1959);
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 956th mtg. ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.956 (Nov. 13,1959).
48. Francisco Cuevas Cancino (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Third Committee, ¶
15, U.N. Doc. A/4299 (Dec. 3, 1959); see also U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.956 (13 Nov. 1959), supra
note 47, ¶ 25.
49. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.956 (Nov. 13, 1959), supra note 47, ¶ 5.
50. U.N. Doc. A.C.3/SR.956 (Nov. 13, 1959), supra note 47, ¶ 25.
51. Id.
52. See U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 957th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.812/Rev.2 (Nov. 16,
1959). A separate vote was taken on the words “public order (ordre public)”, at the request
of Iraq, and adopted, see U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 959th mtg. ¶¶ 11, 15, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.959 (Nov. 17, 1959); Cuevas Cancino, supra note 48, ¶ 18.
53. Even if “public order,” as has been suggested by Nowak, covers universally ac-
cepted fundamental principles on which a democratic society is based (see NOWACK, supra
note 12, at 277), the notion “democratic society” primarily denotes an inclusive society in
which power is held by elected representatives: this or a comparable basic notion of “democ-
racy” does not venture beyond norms that are geared to this particular form of government.
Put differently, there are many international norms that are not inherently related to “de-
mocracy” such as norms regarding international trade and investment, climate change, and
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“public order” is consequently a domestic concern,54 and, similar to “na-
tional security,” geared to an interest of the state invoking the restriction
rather than that of another state, it follows that restricting the right to
leave in order to assist other states in controlling illegal immigration,55
even if carried out pursuant to relevant international obligations,56 cannot
be justified on the basis of this particular ground. This reading is con-
firmed by restrictions, which have been deemed legitimate under this
heading: lawful deprivation of liberty based on criminal law, for safety in
the wake of natural disasters, and in the event of internal unrest or terror-
ist attacks.57
Even if the notion of “public order” would be considered to comprise
transnational concerns, such as preventing child sex abroad, exporting
jihadi brides and fighters, or combating human trafficking and smuggling,
and thus had an international dimension, there remains the question of
whether preventing departure in order to combat human trafficking and
smuggling pursuant to the Palermo Protocols, or to prevent loss of life,
would be lawful.58
Both Palermo Protocols, as part of a comprehensive international ap-
proach, require states parties to strengthen border controls as may be nec-
essary to prevent trafficking and detect smuggling.59 The obligations of
trafficking. As explained in the Siracusa Principles: “The expression “public order (ordre
public)” as used in the Covenant may be defined as the sum of rules which ensure the func-
tioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on which society is founded. Respect
for human rights is part of public order (ordre public).” Siracusa Principles, supra note 41, at
2.
54. Buttressing this interpretation is the view of the Human Rights Committee in the
case Sayad and Vinck v. Belgium, in which the travel ban for persons on the sanctions list
pursuant to UNSC decisions adopted under Ch. VII of the Charter was discussed in terms of
a restriction necessary to protect national security or public order. (The Committee did not
consider these restrictions necessary to protect national security or public order, and con-
cluded that Art. 12 had been violated.). U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayad and Vinck v.
Belgium, Comm’n 1472/2006, ¶ 10.8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (Dec. 29, 2008).
55. Cf. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 279 (qualifying this restriction as doubtful). Worth
mentioning in this respect is that the 1951 Convention exempts refugees from the imposition
of penalties who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened,
enter or are present in the country of refuge without authorization. 1951 Convention, supra
note 2, art. 31(1); see also Section III infra.
56. See Smuggling Protocol, supra note 30.
57. See NOWAK, supra note 12 at 278-79 (stating that restrictions based on considera-
tions of “debts” owed to the state are not justified under this heading nor the manifold legal
and bureaucratic barriers pertaining to departure such as excessive fees and unreasonable
delays in the issuance of travel documents, the requirement of a repatriation deposit and
similar fees, guarantees or financial payments in order to obtain a permit to leave the coun-
try); see also U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra note 1, ¶ 17 (criticizing a number of
practices).
58. As to loss of life in transit in the Mediterranean Sea, see Missing Migrants Project:
Mediterranean, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Aug 7, 2017), https://missingmigrants.iom.int/
mediterranean.
59. Smuggling Protocol, supra note 30, art. 11; Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30, art.
11.
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states under those Protocols are geared toward (prosecuting and punish-
ing) those who engage in trafficking and smuggling rather than those who
attempt to leave.60 The Smuggling Protocol explicitly provides that mi-
grants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution for having been the
object of smuggling activities,61 and the Trafficking Protocol includes pro-
visions that focus on assistance to and protection of victims of traffick-
ing.62 In addition, the Protocols require that anti-smuggling and anti-
trafficking commitments are pursued in a manner that does not affect the
rights, obligations, and responsibilities of states and individuals under in-
ternational law, including international humanitarian law, international
human rights law, and international refugee law.63 Thus, the implementa-
tion of the obligations under the Palermo Protocols cannot be invoked to
justify preventing the departure of those who want to leave; additionally, it
would fail the test of being necessary to protect public order, since it
would not be proportionate and would in fact most likely nullify the right
to leave of the persons concerned. The prevention of loss of life is not part
of the notion of public order, regardless of whether it is taken in the lim-
ited domestic sense or in a more expansive, transnational one.
The right to leave one’s country may not be made dependent on either
the purpose of travel or the duration of stay abroad.64 However, even if
the necessity test would not fail, preventing departure could be barred
under ICCPR article 5(2), which provides that the Covenant may not re-
strict or derogate from any rights pursuant to law, conventions, regulations
or custom, if departure could be considered to constitute the exercise of a
binding right to seek asylum.65 If so, the purpose of departure would mat-
ter from a legal point of view. This question will be addressed in Section
I.D infra.
The two remaining grounds—that of protecting public health or
morals, and the rights and freedoms of others—may seem less relevant in
the present context. With respect to public health, the prevention of the
spread of communicable diseases would most likely be a justifiable reason
to restrict departure. A restriction with a view to protecting public morals
is more difficult to conceive.66 As far as restrictions on the right to leave
based on the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are con-
60. Cf. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30, arts. 5, 9, 11; Smuggling Protocol, supra
note 30, arts. 4, 6, 7, 8.
61. Smuggling Protocol, supra note 30, art. 5.
62. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30, ch. II.
63. Id. at 14(1); Smuggling Protocol, supra note 30, art. 19(1).
64. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 8.
65. Cf. GUY GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 358 (3d ed. 2007) who state that “[S]tates have a duty under international law not to
obstruct the individual’s right to seek asylum”) (emphasis in original); and at 370: “[T]he
right to seek asylum, when read in conjunction with the right to freedom of movement and
the totality of rights protected by the UDHR48 and ICCPR66, implies an obligation on
States to respect the individual’s right to leave his or her country in search of protection.”
66. Id.
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cerned, lastly, restrictions that seek to prevent the departure of those who
are responsible for dependents, such as minors, are considered to be per-
missible.67 However, condoning this restriction on departure appears to be
based on the interests of those who would be left behind, in particular
children, rather than on the decision to take them along. This raises a final
question about the lawfulness of preventing the departure of minors when
their parents or legal guardians decide to leave by unsafe means, such as
rickety boats, thereby exposing the children to grave risks to their life. The
answer depends on what would be in the best interests of the child and
may require balancing an array of factors, including the age and maturity
of the child, his own views, and his fate if prevented from leaving.
C. Derogation: Restrictions Imposed by the Country of Origin Based on
a Public Emergency
Arguably, it is particularly in time of public emergency that people
may need to leave their country of origin.68 Provided it has been pro-
claimed publicly, it is precisely in such a time that further inroads can be
made on the right to leave one’s country.69 The HRC observed that dero-
gation in emergency situations is clearly distinct from restrictions or limita-
tions that are allowed in normal times under several provisions of the
Covenant.70 Nonetheless, derogation in time of public emergency is sub-
ject to limits, too. Measures taken in such circumstances must not be in-
consistent with other international obligations of the state invoking article
4 ICCPR, nor involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, color,
sex, language, religion, or social origin. Moreover, since article 4 subjects
the possibility of derogation to what is required by the exigencies of the
situation, any restrictive measures are also in time of public emergency
constrained by the requirement of necessity.
Article 4 prohibits discrimination on a limited number of grounds.
When those grounds are compared to those included in the 1951 Conven-
tion’s definition of “refugee,” article 4 is distinct in that it omits prohibit-
ing discrimination on account of membership of a particular social group
or political opinion. The relevant General Comment does not include
comments on the grounds that are enumerated in article 4,71 but it does
highlight the state’s other international obligations that may restrict dero-
gation in time of a public emergency.72 The HRC is of the opinion, for
instance, that the international protection of the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities includes elements that must be respected in all circum-
67. Id. at 281.
68. Cf. the judicial crack down—the suspension and detention of over 3,450 judges and
prosecutors—in Turkey following the failed military coup on 15 July 2016.
69. Nearly all notifications for derogations mention its suspension, BOSSUYT, supra
note 22.
70. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 22, ¶ 4.
71. Cf. id. ¶ 8.
72. Id. ¶ 9: particularly the rules of international humanitarian law, those will be re-
viewed in Section V infra in the context of external freedom of movement.
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stances, such as the prohibition against genocide.73 The lack of a reference
to membership of a particular social group among the enumerated
grounds in article 4 thus appears to (at least to some extent) be offset by
the constraint of other international obligations. It may mean that
preventing the departure of a particular minority violates the terms under
which derogation is justified. In practice, of course, the opposite occurs:
minorities are often forced to flee rather than prevented from leaving.
“Political opinion” is not included among the grounds of article 4 ei-
ther, and the right to hold opinions without interference (article 19) is a
derogable human right. The question is whether this internal consonance
may have adverse consequences for those who want to leave their country
of origin in time of public emergency on account of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of the political opinion they (are considered to)
hold, in particular, when this emergency causes the state to impose restric-
tions on the right to leave one’s country. It would seem so,74 unless the
right to seek asylum from persecution can be construed to be part of the
“other international obligations” to which article 4 refers that restrict
derogation.
]D. Does the Purpose of Departure Matter from a Legal Point of View?
The last suggestion could be rephrased in terms of the question
whether the right to seek asylum from persecution would trump restric-
tions of the right to leave one’s country under ICCPR article 5(2), which
prohibits restrictions on or derogation from any of the fundamental
human rights recognized or existing in any state party to the Covenant
pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom, and article 4, which
requires that any measures that derogate from obligations under the
ICCPR in time of public emergency are consistent with the other obliga-
tions the state concerned has under international law. The answer depends
on the legal status of the right to seek—as distinguished from “enjoy”—
asylum.
The right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution as laid down in
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights75 excludes those who are
prosecuted for non-political crimes or acts contrary to the purposes and
73. Id. ¶ 13(c).
74. The Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, adopted on 26
November 1986 by a meeting of experts convened by the International Institute of Human
Rights in Strasbourg, does include political opinion among the prohibited distinctions in Art.
1: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including one’s own [. . .] without distinction
as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, marriage, age [. . .] or other status”. The text of the declaration is included in
HURST HANNAM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 154–58 (1987).
75. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14(1) (Dec. 10,
1948). For a brief overview of the drafting history, see Sibylle Kapferer, Article 14(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Exclusion from International Refugee Protection,
27 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 53, 61-65 (2008); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hans Gammeltoft-
Hansen, The Right to Seek — Revisited. On the UN Human Rights Declaration Article 14 and
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principles of the United Nations76 —an exclusion that is mirrored and ex-
panded in Article 1F of the 1951 Convention—and the question should
therefore be rephrased to accommodate this particular exclusion. What is
the legal status of the right to seek asylum from persecution for those who
may seek asylum?
The Preamble to the Universal Declaration underlines the importance
of the protection of human rights by rule of law “if man is not to be com-
pelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression.”77 Although drafts of the Universal Declaration provided for
the possibility of rebellion,78 the adopted version does not, and arguably
gave way to the right to leave and seek asylum,79 entitling the individual to
renounce the social contract with his country of origin (“[A] State may not
claim to ‘own’ its nationals or residents”).80
As far as the right to seek asylum is concerned, the drafters focused
much more on the implications of the right to seek asylum for the prospec-
tive countries of refuge than those of origin. Their concerns were the rea-
son the right was given very weak wording (“artificial to the point of
flippancy”81) with a view to precluding states from being bound to grant
asylum to those who would exercise the right to seek asylum. From this
point of view, the status of this right is irrelevant: even if binding,82 the
right would only be a mere right to ask for asylum.83 However, when the
right to seek asylum is viewed from the point of view of departure, its legal
Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU, 10 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 439, 442-47 (2008) (but
not in terms of or relating to leaving one’s country of origin).
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 75, art. 14(2).
77. MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 23-26 (1997).
78. See Rep. of the Drafting Comm. on an Int’l Bill of Human Rights Draft Outline of
an Int’l Bill of Human Rights First Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21 Annex A (1947).
79. Cf. the recommendation of the drafting Committee of the Commission on Human
Rights: “Everyone has the right to escape persecution on grounds of political or other beliefs
or on grounds of racial prejudice . . .”, cited in Gammeltoft-Hansen & Gammeltoft-Hansen,
supra note 75, at 442-43 (emphasis added).
80. 2 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ASYLUM, ENTRY AND SOJOURN 26 (1972).
81. H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 354, 373-74 (1948).
82. At the universal level, the right to seek asylum only figures in non-binding instru-
ments. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 75, Preamble; G.A. Res. 2312
(XXII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, Preamble and art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1967); World Con-
ference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, art. I ¶ 23, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993). The binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights com-
prises in Art. 18 a right to asylum but it is wholly cast in terms of the perspective of the
receiving state. 2012 O.J. (C 326/02), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
art. 18.
83. The same desire led in 1967 to the Declaration on Territorial Asylum: “Great pains
were taken to make it clear that asylum was not a right of the individual but the right of
States to grant asylum, first, by deleting the word ‘right’ from the title of the Declaration, and
also by declaring in Article 1(1): Asylum granted by a State in the exercise of its sovereignty to
persons entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration.” Paul Weis, The Draft
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status would arguably be relevant since it could trump restrictions on de-
parture in the sense indicated earlier.
The question is, what is the legal status of the right to seek asylum
from the perspective of departure, rather than from the perspective of
granting asylum? It simply is not clear: as part of the Universal Declara-
tion it may or may not have developed into a rule of customary interna-
tional law.84 Part of the problem is that both seeking and enjoying asylum
are conjoined in the right concerned, while the enjoyment, or rather grant-
ing asylum, was and still is considered to be the prerogative of states.
Nonetheless, the 1951 Convention implies the right to seek asylum
and proceeds from that right. Denying the right to seek asylum would
therefore appear to be incongruous. This incongruity is magnified when
the consequences of denying the existence of this right are taken into con-
sideration, since it could entail, in the language of the Universal Declara-
tion, suffering “tyranny and oppression” for those who have a well-
founded fear of persecution.
When considered in terms of coherency of the relevant international
norms, the right to seek asylum is clearly implied. However, this logic does
not per se carry any implications regarding the legal status of the right
itself. In order to be able to qualify the right to seek asylum as a norm of
customary international law, consistent and general state practice is re-
quired, as well as evidence of the belief on the part of the states concerned
that this practice is legally required (opinio juris) by the norm concerned
State practice pertaining to the right to seek asylum appears to be
Janus-faced. On the one hand, it appears to be geared toward preventing
arrivals, as will be set out in the next paragraph, rather than focus on de-
parture. Although this practice results in impairing, perchance nullifying,
the right to seek asylum of those who attempt to leave, it only serves to
demonstrate that the right to seek asylum is an incomplete right. On the
other hand, once refugees actually seek asylum in those states, the states
generally observe the principle of non-refoulement,85 and accordingly re-
frain from returning them to the frontiers of territories where their lives or
United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 151, 152 (1979)
(emphasis added).
84. A number of scholars argue that it may or has already been developed into a norm
of customary international law. See Subrata Roy Chowdhury, A Response to the Refugee
Problems in Post Cold War Era: Some Exiting and Emerging Norms of International Law, 7
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 100, 105 (1995) (“[A]n important emerging norm of customary interna-
tional law.”); Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right “To Enjoy” Asylum, 17
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 301 (2005) (quoting Chowdhury, recognizing it as an emerging
norm of customary international law); but see GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 65, at
358 (denying this is already or shortly the case); Chowdhury, supra, at 104 (referring to the
fact that the 1994 ILA conference did not identify this right as a norm of customary interna-
tional law); Jane McAdam, Introduction: Asylum and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights”, 27 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 3, 5 (2008) (stating that relevant developments in regional
and national law “may eventually lead to the emergency of a new rule of customary interna-
tional law on the right to asylum”).
85. But see infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and thus
acknowledge the legitimacy of seeking asylum. It is a moot point whether
this practice warrants the inference that the right to seek asylum has devel-
oped into a norm of customary international law.
E. Restrictions Imposed by Other States
Does the right to leave one’s country include obligations for states
other than the country of departure? Does it impose obligations not to act
on the part of other states? Does it more in particular prohibit acts that
intend to prevent people from leaving and reaching those other states?86
States may act with a view to preventing arrivals from within their
own territory (or proceeding from their territory), from outside their own
territory, so extraterritorially,87 or even within the country of origin (or
transit). Their capacity to do so effectively is enhanced by increasingly so-
phisticated technology. Examples of the first category are the relatively
invisible non-entrée88 measures that either contribute to or result in
preventing departure. These include visa requirements,89 the suspension
of visa waiver programs (for instance, in response to rising numbers of
refugees from particular states, or in response to a sudden increase of un-
founded asylum requests from those countries),90 and the more visible im-
position of a travel ban.91 Bilateral readmission agreements may have a
86. Cf. MÉDÉCINS SANS FRONTIÉRES, OBSTACLE COURSE TO EUROPE: A POLICY-
MADE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT EU BORDERS, (2016).
87. Also referred to in terms of “interception,” defined by UNHCR as “all measures
applied by a state, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the
movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international borders by
land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination,” U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Interception of Asylum seekers and Refugees: the International
Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, at 2, U.N. Doc. EC/50/
SC/CRP.17 (2000); see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Conclusion on Protection Safe-
guards in Interception Measures, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/987 (2003).
88. A term that was coined by James Hathaway to describe the array of legalized poli-
cies adopted by states to stymie access by refugees to their territories. James C. Hathaway,
“L’Émergence d’une Politique de Non-Entrée,” in FRONTIÈRES DU DROIT, FRONTIÈRES DES
DROITS: L’INTROUVABLE STATUT DE LA ‘ZONE INTERNATIONALE’ 65 (1993). On the logic
behind non-entrée, see James Hathaway, Crisis in International Refugee Law, 39 INDIAN J.
INT’L L. 4, 9-10 (1999).
89. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 75, at 449 (discussing
the EU visa regime). It appears that the introduction of visa restrictions may follow an in-
crease in asylum applications to thus stop particular refugees from reaching the country con-
cerned. See SILE REYNOLDS & HELEN MUGGERIDGE, REMOTE CONTROLS: HOW UK
BORDER CONTROLS ARE ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF REFUGEES 25-26 (2008).
90. COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., ISSUE PAPER: THE RIGHT TO
LEAVE A COUNTRY 42-43, 54 (2013); Violeta Moreno Lax, Must EU Borders Have Doors for
Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen Visas and Carriers’ Sanctions with EU Member
States Obligations to Provide International Protection for Refugees, 10 EUR. J. MIGRATION
AND L. 315, 322-28, 337, 356-57 (2008).
91. US President Trump’s second executive order of March 6, 2017 directed the entry
of refugees and immigrants from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen from travel-
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comparable barring effect.92 The same applies to the practice of demand-
ing advance passenger information and clearance before boarding an air-
line to travel to the country concerned,93 and the imposition of carrier
sanctions on private airlines that carry passengers without the requisite
travel documents.94
ling to the United States to be suspended for 90 days from that date. After the expiration of
the 90-day period, the Order authorizes Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secre-
tary of State and the Attorney General, to recommend the inclusion of additional countries
to the President, prohibiting the entry of “appropriate categories of foreign nationals.” Exec-
utive Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,213 (Mar. 6, 2017). This (second) order, fol-
lowed Executive Order 13769 of 27 January 2017 which lowered the number of refugees
allowed entry to the US to 50,000 in 2017, suspended the US Refugee Admission Programme
for 120 days, placed an indefinite suspension on the entry of Syrian refugees, and authorized
selected cabinet secretaries to suspend entry of persons from states whose countries did not
meet the standards under US Immigration law for 90 days, which included the following 6
states on the Homeland Security list: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Execu-
tive Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8979 (Jan. 27, 2017).
92. See Carole Billet, EC Readmission Agreements: A Prime Instrument of the External
Dimension of the EU’s Fight Against Irregular Immigration. An Assessment After Ten Years
of Practice, 12 EUR. J. MIGRATION AND L. 45 (2010). The readmission agreement concluded
by Spain and Morocco in 1992 allows Spain to return both Moroccans and third-country
nationals who travelled through Morocco: the agreement does not include protection
against refoulement. AMNESTY INT’L, FEAR AND FENCES, EUROPE’S APPROACH TO KEEPING
REFUGEES AT BAY 20-21 (November 2015). Whilst not all readmission agreements appear to
violate international obligations regarding refugees per se—for example, the readmission
agreement between the EU and Turkey is explicit about the rights of asylum seekers, see
2014 O.J. (L 134) 3, at 3—their implementation may. See Mariagiulia Giuffré, Readmission
Agreements and Refugee Rights: From a Critique to a Proposal, 32 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 79
(2013).
93. Cf. the US ESTA program, an electronic advance information system. See About
the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PRO-
TECTION, (Oct. 5, 2017), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1072/kw/esta/session/
L3RpbWUvMTQ2MjQ1NDkwMy9zaWQvMU5PdWJLUG0%3D; Bureau of Consular Af-
fairs, Visa Waiver Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/
visit/visa-waiver-program.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2017); see also the Advance Passenger
Processing Scheme that was introduced by New Zealand in 2004; following its introduction,
the number of asylum applications dropped significantly. Susan Glazebrook, From Zaoui to
Today: A Review of Recent Developments in New Zealand’s Refugee and Protected Persons
Law, CT. OF  N.Z. (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/From%20
Zaoui%20to%20Today%20a%20Review%20of%20Recent%20Developments%20in%20N
Zs%20Refugee%20and%20Protected%20Persons%20Law.pdf/; see also Council Directive
2004/82, 2004 O.J. (L261) 24 (EC) (discussing the obligation of carriers to communicate pas-
senger data in the European context); OJ L 134/1, May 7, 2014, and particularly the more
intrusive Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecu-
tion of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, 2016  O.J. (L 119) 89.
94. Various states impose carrier sanctions, see, e.g., Tilman Rodenhäuser, Another
Brick in the Wall: Carrier Sanctions and the Privatization of Immigration, 26 INT’L J. OF REF-
UGEE L. 223 (2014); Sophie Scholten & Paul Minderhoud, Regulating Immigration Control:
Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands, 10 EUR. J. OF MIGRATION AND L. 123 (2008). Carrier
sanctions are often based on treaties such as the Palermo Protocols. See Trafficking Protocol,
supra note 30; Smuggling Protocol, supra note 30; Convention Implementing the Schengen
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Examples of extraterritorial acts committed by states are physical
pushbacks and interdiction on the high seas,95 as well as taking all neces-
sary measures against vessels on the high seas suspected of being used for
smuggling or trafficking persons, including capture, rendering them in-
operable, and disposing of them altogether.96
Examples of the third category—acts taking place within the country
of origin, including its territorial waters—are joint patrolling by the coun-
tries of origin and other states in the territorial waters  of the former with
Agreement of June 14, 1985, art. 26, 2000 O.J. (L239), supplemented by Council Directive
(EC) Directive 2001/51, art. 4, 2001 O.J. (L187) 45 (EC).
95. Push-backs occur in many places; e.g. the push-back of Rohingya boat refugees.
See Southeast Asia: End Rohingya Boat Pushbacks. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia Should Act
Urgently to Save Lives, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 14, 2015, 12:00 AM, https://www.hrw.
org/news/2015/05/14/southeast-asia-end-rohingya-boat-pushbacks; Malaysia and Thailand
Turn Away Hundreds of Migrant Boats, THE GUARDIAN (May 14, 2015) http://www.theguar
dian.com/world/2015/may/14/malaysia-turns-back-migrant-boat-with-more-than-500-aboard.
On departure prevention by states in the service of the EU, see Nora Markard, The Right to
Leave by Sea. Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third Countries, 27 EUR. J. OF INT’L
L. 591 (2016). On Australia’s interdiction policy, see Andreas Schloenhardt & Colin Craig,
‘Turning Back the Boats’: Australia’s Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at Sea, 27 INT’L J. OF
REFUGEE L. 536 (2015). Lastly, the US practice regarding the interdiction of Haitian refu-
gees should be mentioned, see David E. Ralph, Haitian Interdiction on the High Seas: The
Continuing Saga of the Rights of Aliens Outside United States Territory, 17 MD. J. INT’L L. 227
(1993); Stephen H. Legomsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program, 18 INT’L J.
OF REFUGEE L. 677 (2006).
96. The EU military operation EUNAVFOR MED was set up to disrupt human smug-
gling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean through the identifica-
tion, capture and disposal of vessels suspected of being used by smugglers. Council Decision
(CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a EU military operation in the Southern Central Medi-
terranean (EUNAVFOR MED), art. 1, 2015 O.J. (L122) 31. It was launched on 22 June 2015
by Council Decision 2015/972 and its mandate consists of three phases: detecting and moni-
toring migration networks by patrolling the high seas and gathering information (Phase I),
boarding, searching, seizing and diverting vessels suspected of being used for human smug-
gling or trafficking on the high seas in accordance with international law, applicable UNSC
Resolutions or consent by the coastal State concerned (Phase II), and finally, taking “all
necessary measures against a vessel . . . including through disposing of them or rendering
them inoperable” in accordance applicable UNSC Resolutions or consent of the concerned
coastal state. Id. at art. 2. The Operation moved into Phase II on October 7, 2015 and was
renamed “Operation Sophia.” On October 9, 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution
2240/2015 in which it authorized the EU to use “all measures commensurate to the specific
circumstances” that are required to inspect, seize and dispose of vessels on the high seas
suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or trafficking from Libya. S.C. Res. 2240/2015,
¶¶ 7, 8, 10. On July 25, 2017, the Council extended the mandate of the operation until De-
cember 31, 2018: The Council amended the mandate. The new mandate sets up a monitoring
mechanism for the Libyan Coastguards that were trained; conducting new surveillance and
information gathering on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya in accordance with S.C.
Res. 2146 (2014) and S.C. Res. 2362 (2017); and enhancing information sharing on human
trafficking member states’ law enforcement agencies, FRONTEX and EUROPOL. See
Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1385 of 25 July 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a
European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR
MED operation SOPHIA), art. 1, 2017 O.J. (L194) 61.
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a view to preventing people from leaving by sea.97 Examples of acts that
take place on the territory of the country of origin are the deployment of
representatives in countries of origin with a view to preventing or reducing
irregular migration; some measures are specifically geared toward
preventing the arrival of refugees, but most of them accomplish that result
only by way of side effect, focused as they are on indiscriminately combat-
ing illegal immigration indiscriminately. An example of the first is the pre-
clearance of passengers boarding flights by foreign immigration officials in
the country of departure and refusing those who are suspected of claiming
asylum upon arrival with the object of stemming the flow of asylum seek-
ers from that country.98 As to the latter type of measures, the deployment
of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) is one illustration. ILOs are repre-
sentatives of EU member states who are posted in third states to contrib-
ute to prevent and combat illegal immigration, return of illegal
immigrants, and the management of legal migration.99 The Canadian Im-
migration Control Officer (ICO) network serves similar purposes: these
officers are located abroad and are an integral part of the screening, iden-
97. An example of this are the Frontex Joint operations “Hera.” There have been 11
Hera operations—Hera I, II and III—in the years 2006-2007, six Hera operations in 2007-
2012, two EPN Hera operations in the years 2013-2014 and one EPN Hera operation in 2015.
All Hera operations aimed to reduce the number of non-identified migrants arriving at the
Canary Islands, conducting joint-patrols and surveillance of the EU’s Atlantic maritime bor-
ders to combat illegal migration from West African countries, prevent loss of life at sea, and
identify the routes taken by criminal networks. Archive of Operations, FRONTEX, http://
frontex.europa.eu/operations/archive-of-operations/?p=3&type=Sea (last visited Nov. 19,
2017). The Hera operations are based on Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establish-
ing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L349) 1 and two subse-
quent Regulations adopted in 2007 and 2011. Art. 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/
2004 grants the Agency the authority to “launch initiatives for joint operations and pilot
projects in cooperation with Member States” on the Member States’ external borders. Id. at
art. 3(1). It should be added that the Agency must carry out these operations in “full compli-
ance with . . . relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees . . . obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the princi-
ple of non-refoulement; and fundamental rights.” Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 amending
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004, art. 1,2011 O.J. (L304) 1. Art. (3)(b) of EU Regula-
tion 1168/2011 further requires that “no person shall be disembarked in, or otherwise handed
over to the authorities of, a country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, or
from which there is a risk of expulsion or return to another country in contravention of that
principle.” Id. art. 3(b).
98. See R v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004]. UKHL 55 (U.K.).
99. The network of ILOs and their role was established by Regulation (EC) No 377/
2004 of February 19, 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network, 2004
O.J. (L64) 1; 2000 O.J. (L 316) (amended in 2011); Regulation (EU) No. 493/2011 of April 5,
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 on the creation of an immigration
liaison officers network 2011 O.J. (L 141) 13. For a general overview of their functions, see
MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM 187-88 (2012). For ex-
amples of ILOs from specific states, see Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and
Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, 21 REFUGE 6, 10-11 (2003);
REYNOLDS & MUGGERIDGE, supra note 89; External Borders Fund, IMMIGRATION AND ASY-
LUM OFFICE (Aug. 26, 2014) (Hung.), http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&
view=item&id=618:external-borders-fund&Itemid=1349&lang=en.
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tification, and interception of undocumented or improperly-documented
persons trying to enter Canada.100 The designation also covers Airline Li-
aison Officers (ALOs), who are posted in international airports abroad,
aiding carriers to prevent the embarkation of improperly-documented pas-
sengers.101 The United Kingdom similarly deploys Migration Delivery Of-
ficers (MDOs) in a number of states.102
The question is whether these acts, all geared toward preventing de-
parture with a view to precluding entry in other states, are lawful. As to
acts originating abroad that may prevent individuals from leaving their
own country, it would be hard to argue that these are per se violations of
the right to leave one’s country. First, the duty bearer of this right is the
country of origin or departure rather than any other state: it is that country
that has to allow and enable the right to leave the country.103 Second, the
acts prevent traveling to a particular third state, as opposed to each and
any other state.104
100. Office of the Auditor General, Citizenship and Immigration Canada — Control
and Enforcement, in 2003 REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA TO THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS, ¶ 5.5 (2003) (Can.), http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/20030405ce.pdf.
101. In 2013, Canada stationed sixty-three ALOs in forty-nine locations world-wide,
intercepting 73,000 persons between 2001-2012. EFRAT ARBEL & ALLETTA BRENNER, BOR-
DERING ON FAILURE: CANADA-US BORDER POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF REFUGEE EXCLU-
SION 4, 29-30, 34 (2013), https://harvardimmigrationclinic.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/
bordering-on-failure-harvard-immigration-and-refugee-law-clinical-program1.pdf (last vis-
ited 4 August 2017. For an overview of the powers of ALOs, see DEPARTMENT OF CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGRATION, INSTRUMENT OF DESIGNATION AND DELEGATION: IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT AND REGULATIONS (June 22, 2016) (Can.), http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/il/il3-eng.pdf. As of November 2014, Canadian Air-
line Liaison Officers have intercepted over 86,000 persons offshore, including potential refu-
gees. Efrat Arbel, Bordering the Constitution, Constituting the Border, 53 OSGOODE HALL L.
J. 824, 839 (2016); STANDING S. COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. AND DEF., VIGILANCE, ACCOUNTA-
BILITY AND SECURITY AT CANADA’S BORDERS (Comm. Print 2015) (Hon. D. Land & Hon.
G. Mitchell) (Can.), https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/Committee/412/secd/rep/rep16jun15a-
e.pdf. Between 2015-2016, the percentage of CBSA Liaison Officer recommendations to air-
lines that lead to the interception of improperly documented travelers prior to their arrival
by air to Canada was 83% (measured against improperly documented arrivals to Canada).
CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY, DEPARTMENTAL PLAN 2017-2018: SUB-PROGRAMS,
(Can.), http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/rpp/2017-2018/subprog-
sousprog-eng.html?wbdisable=true> (last modified Aug. 4, 2017).
102. Migration Delivery Officers (MDOs) are employees of British High Commissions
that operate as “overseas missions” in Commonwealth capitals, employing over 1350 staff
who assist with processing entry clearance applications. British High Commission Informa-
tion, U.K. VISA BUREAU, http://www.visabureau.com/uk/british-high-commission.aspx (last
accessed Aug. 4, 2017). Previously, 20 MDOs were posted to British Embassies overseas
including Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Tur-
key; countries were chosen based on internal intelligence and flow of migrants, and “all ap-
pear to be key countries of origin and transit for irregular migrants.” See REYNOLDS &
MUGGERIDGE, supra note 89, at 39-40.
103. See supra note 23.
104. The Human Rights Committee raised nonetheless concerns regarding carrier sanc-
tions particularly their effect on the right to leave in its observations on Austria. U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 103 (Nov. 19, 1998). It also requested states to
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Even if that would be the case—for instance, if the other state borders
on the country of origin and preventing departure to bar entry would be
tantamount to preventing departure all together—the question is whether
the neighboring state violates the right to leave of those who find them-
selves in their country of origin. Disregarding any other obligation that
may require the third country to open its border in such a situation,105 it
does not: it is the sovereign right of that state to control entry into its
territory, and exercising this control may indeed entail that the right to
leave of inhabitants of the neighboring state is as a result nullified. The
right to leave one’s country is in this respect clearly an incomplete right:
“Article 12 [. . .] confers no right for a person to enter a country other than
his own.”106
A similar conclusion was reached by the European Court of Human
Rights in the case of Xhavara and others v. Italy. The case concerned an
interception of Albanian nationals at sea, at a distance of thirty-five nauti-
cal miles from the Italian coast, following a collision of an Italian naval
vessel with an Albanian boat that carried Albanians who wanted to enter
Italy clandestinely.107 The Court took the view that interception activities
extending into international waters and the territorial waters of Albania—
on the basis of an agreement with Albania—were not aimed at preventing
the Albanians from leaving their country but rather at preventing them
from entering Italian territory.108 Their claim as to a breach of the right to
leave—in casu under article 2(2) of Protocol 4 to the 1950 European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms109—was conse-
quently declared inadmissible.110 It would seem, therefore, that preventing
include information in their reports on measures that impose sanctions on international carri-
ers that bring to their territory persons without required documents, where those measures
affect the right to leave another country. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 10. It
has so far (up until the timing of writing, June 2017) refrained from stating that carrier sanc-
tions would be incompatible with Art. 12(2). See also Martin Scheinin, The Right to Leave
Any Country as a Human Right — Implications for Carrier Sanctions and Other Forms of
Pre-Frontier Control, 2 TURKU L. J. 127, 132 (2000).
105. On which, see infra Section II, fourth paragraph.
106. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Carlos Varela Núñez v. Uruguay, Comm’n No. 108/
1981, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (July 22, 1983); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Samuel
Lichtenstejn v. Uruguay, Comm’n No. 77/1980, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/OP/2 (Mar. 31, 1983).
107. Xhavara et Quinze Autres v. l’Italie et l’Albanie, App. No. 39473/98, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2001). The decision is only available in French; a summary in English of the decision is
included in U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Part 5 — Biannual Updates on Relevant Case
Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in UNHCR Manual on Refugee Protection
and the ECHR, at 9 (2001).
108. “La Cour relève que les mesures mises en cause par les requérants ne visaient pas
à les priver du droit de quitter l’Albanie, mais à les empêcher d’entrer sur le territoire
italien,” Xhavara, supra note 107, at 6.
109. “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.” Protocol No. 4 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2(2),
E.T.S. No. 46 (May 2, 1968).
110. The European Court of Human Rights has in many cases observed that the right of
freedom of movement as guaranteed by Art. 2(1) and (2) of Protocol No. 4 is intended to
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persons from leaving their country would breach their right to leave one’s
country only when the interference is not aimed at preventing the persons
from entering a particular foreign territory.
What would be the outcome if the focus were on effective control ex-
ercised by a foreign state over the persons concerned? As the HRC ob-
served in its General Comment on the Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the ICCPR, state parties
are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory
and to all persons subject to its jurisdiction. This means that a
State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party.111
The various measures another state may take to prevent arrivals were
categorized on the basis of the place where they originated: within its terri-
tory, outside its territory, and within the territory of the country of origin
or departure, arguably a differentiation that corresponds to the likelihood
that the other state exercises effective control over the individuals whom it
prevents from leaving their country of origin.112 In the case of the Albani-
ans, again focusing exclusively on the right to leave one’s country,113 the
exercise of effective control would lead to the same outcome as in the case
of a closed border between two neighboring states: the right to leave one’s
country is frustrated, but it is not violated since the right does not include
entry elsewhere. Are there nonetheless instances in which a state may vio-
late this right?
Arguably, yes. In cases of joint operations of the country of origin or
departure and a foreign state that result in the prevention of departure,
the acts on the part of the country of origin should be provided for by law,
and satisfy all other criteria set by Article 12(3) of the ICCPR. If they do
not satisfy the relevant criteria, the country of origin or departure
breaches Article 12(2) of the ICCPR. By aiding or assisting the country of
origin, the foreign state involved in the joint operations may be held inter-
nationally responsible for the commission of the wrongful act by the coun-
try of origin if it did so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
secure to any person a right to liberty of movement within a territory and to leave that
territory, “which implies a right to leave for such a country of the person’s choice to which he
may be admitted.” Napijalo v. Croatia, App. No. 66485/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68 (2003); Bau-
mann v. France, App. No. 33592/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 61 (2001); Peltonen v. Finland, App. No.
19583/92, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 31 (1995).
111. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 23, ¶ 10.
112. For an analysis of jurisdiction based on the exercise of public powers in third
states, see James C. Hathaway & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-refoulement in a World
of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 235 (2015).
113. Whether other international obligations are breached is addressed below, see infra
Section II.D.
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wrongful act and if the act would be internationally wrongful if committed
by that state.114 It may in addition be in violation of article 12(2) when it is
preventing departure rather than arrival in its own territory.
The overall conclusion is that other states may frustrate the right of
individuals to leave their country of origin, albeit only with a view to con-
trolling entry into their territories, and provided doing so does not involve
complicity in the unlawful prevention of departure on the part of the coun-
try of origin. However, once these individuals have left their country of
origin with a view to seek asylum—and thus satisfy the criterion of alien-
age, part of the definition of refugee115—their legal status changes to “ref-
ugees” (assuming the other criteria of this definition are also met). From
that moment onward, controlling entry gives way to other obligations, as
will be set out in the next section, and that affects the legality of the acts
committed by states outside their own territory with a view to preventing
arrivals in their territories (such as the physical pushbacks and interdiction
on the high seas, as described earlier).116 If, for instance, the interception
of the Albanians of the Xhavara case took place outside Albanian territo-
rial waters—or rather, outside the area of Albanian jurisdiction117—and
the Albanians concerned had been asylum seekers,118 they could not have
been returned upon interception. In short, the right to prevent arrival and
114. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 16, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts] (defining as aid or assistance in the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act). The ILC articles are not formally binding, but
Art. 16 appears to be part of customary international law. See Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and
Montenegro) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 43, ¶¶ 419-20. Other commentators agree. See
Roger Clark, State Obligations Under the Genocide Convention in Light of the ICJ’s Decision
in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 75, 100 (2008); Gammeltoft-Hansen &
Hathaway, supra note 112, at 277-78; HELMUTH PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE ROLE
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 186, 191 (2011); MILES JACKSON, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 149, 151-153 (2015) (considering the rule itself “a sort of primary meta-rule.”).
115. See 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 A(2) (defining the term as someone who
“is outside of his country of nationality”, “or who, not having a nationality and being outside
of his country of his former habitual residence.”)  On the criterion of alienage, see J.C.
Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Alienage, in THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 17 (2nd ed. 2014).
Of relevance in the present context is the delimitation of “territory.” The territory of a state
includes its territorial waters, yet the jurisdiction of the state may extend into adjacent zones
such as the contiguous zone and, if claimed an exclusive economic zone: if the extended
jurisdiction includes the right to regulate the movement of persons in those zones, refugees
within such zones find themselves within the jurisdiction of the territorial state concerned,
and hence do not satisfy the criterion of alienage. Id. at 25, n. 49.
116. It does not affect the legality of the acts geared to preventing arrivals from within
their own territory described at the beginning of this paragraph. The same applies to acts
committed in the country of origin.
117. See Xhavara, supra note 107.
118. The word “asylum-seeker” seems to imply that refugee status is dependent on rec-
ognition, which it is not, see infra note 119, and is used here only to emphasize that the
persons leaving a state are doing so with a view to seeking asylum.
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thus control entry is not absolute when refugees are involved and affected,
regardless of whether their status has been recognized or even claimed.119
II. THE RIGHT TO ENTER AN ASYLUM STATE, OR THE RIGHT TO
ACCESS PROTECTION
A. Introduction
The previous section focused on measures, taken by either a refugee’s
country of origin or other states, designed to prevent refugees from leav-
ing their country of origin to seek asylum. This section proceeds from the
assumption that those measures came to naught and the refugee managed
to leave his country of origin. On his journey, he may nonetheless be pre-
vented from reaching the border of another state: his boat, may, for in-
stance, be pushed back into the sea; he may be intercepted and returned to
his point of departure; or he might reach a state but face a closed border.
The legal issues that are addressed in this section follow the journey of
the refugee. The analysis includes a review of possible exceptions to any
obligations the state of refuge may have vis-à-vis refugees in those
circumstances.
B. The Right to Seek Asylum: Corresponding Obligations?
The right to leave one’s country is an incomplete right; in a world
carved up into nation states—no terra nullius left—leaving one’s country
necessarily requires entry into another. The same applies to departure in
search of asylum120: it is obvious that protection as a refugee requires “ad-
mission, somewhere” “as the first step,”121 and that admission will rarely
be secured preceding departure.122 Assuming that the right to seek asylum
119. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for De-
termining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, ¶ 28, UN Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3 (2011); Hathaway & Foster, supra
note 115, at 25.
120. Worth mentioning are the Bajau refugees who failed to access protection and built
their homes off-shore in the ocean. See Belinda Grant Geary, The Incredible Bajau refugees
who built their homes in the ocean, DAILY MAIL AUSTL., (May 1, 2015), http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/article-3063691/The-incredible-Bajau-refugee-community-told-not-allowed-
live-Malaysian-land-built-homes-ocean.html.
121. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on International Protection, ¶ 10, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.96/728 (Aug. 2, 1989).
122. Refugees sur place, of course, have secured entry already. Switzerland used to
have an embassy procedure that enabled filing an asylum application at Swiss representations
abroad. It was abolished in September 2012, and replaced by that of a humanitarian visa for
foreign nationals located abroad. Humanitarian Visas, SWISS REFUGEE COUNCIL, https://
www.refugeecouncil.ch/asylum-law/asylum-procedure/humanitarian-visas.html (last visited
Aug. 7, 2017). Worth mentioning in this respect is the CJEU Judgement C 638/16 PPU X and
X of 7 March 2017 concerning a visa request of Syrian nationals with a view to making an
asylum application in Belgium upon arrival. The CJEU ruled that the issue fell outside EU
law and within the scope of domestic law, and it in addition observed that concluding other-
wise would be tantamount to allowing third-country nationals to lodge applications for visas
to obtain international protection in the EU member state of their choice. Case C-638/16
PPU, X & X v. État belge, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173. Visas are not always required; disregarding
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does not correspond with a legal obligation to grant asylum—since grant-
ing asylum still is essentially a discretionary power123—the question then
becomes, what obligations, if any, do correspond with the right to seek
asylum?
It is generally accepted that the first and foremost corresponding obli-
gation is the prohibition of (direct and indirect) refoulement.124 From the
point of view of the refugee, this prohibition constitutes an indispensable
form of protection, albeit a negative one, while he is also clearly in need of
positive forms of protection. The former of these protections will be the
subject of this section, and the latter, albeit confined to freedom of move-
ment, of the next.
C. The Principle of Non-refoulement: Extraterrorial Reach
The prohibition of refoulement is laid down in article 33(1), 1951
Convention:
No contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion.125
the fact that Turkey confined its obligations under the 1951 Convention to European refu-
gees, no visas were required for Syrian nationals who could simply fly to Turkey until 8
January 2016 when a new entry visa requirement on Syrian nationals wishing to travel to
Turkey became effective. See Turkish Embassy in Kuwait, Visa Regulation Update for Syrian
Citizens, (Dec. 30, 2015), http://kuwait.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=247840
(last visited on Aug. 27, 2017).
123. See Kay Hailbronner, Comments On: The Right to Leave, the Right to Return and
the Question of a Right to Remain, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CON-
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 109, 113-14 (V. Gowland-Debbas ed., 1996);
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 65, at 358-65. However, this traditional discretion is
frequently coupled to a subjective domestic right to be granted asylum. See Marı́a-Teresa Gil-
Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of International Law, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 3 (2015)
(in terms of “a right of individuals to be granted asylum of constitutional rank.”).
124. According to Hailbronner, this is the only exception to the principle that states
may restrict the admission of foreigners to their territory. See Hailbronner, supra note 123, at
114; see also Walter Kälin et al., Article 33, para. 1, in THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1327, 1335 (Andreas Zimmermann ed.,
2011) (the principle of non-refoulement is an essential corollary to the right to seek asylum).
For the text of the prohibition, see infra Section II.C.
125. Many human rights treaties comprise comparable prohibitions. See, e.g. ICCPR,
supra note 10, art. 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Rights
of the Child art. 22(1), Nov. 20, 1989 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Comparable prohibitions are present at
the regional level. See, e.g. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on
Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica art. 22(8), Nov. 22, 1969,1144 U.N.T.S. 144.
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The principle may have developed into a norm of customary international
law,126 but it is a moot point as to whether state practice—which is not
consistent and uniform—supports this, particularly when breaches are not
justified in terms of a breach of the norm. In view of the lack of consistent
state practice pertaining to its observance, either the principle has not yet
developed into a norm of customary international law or it has.127 If it has,
present-day state practice—which increasingly consists of acts that are in
breach of the principle of non-refoulement128—and the lack of justifica-
tions for those acts in terms of this norm, may be indicative of the modifi-
cation of the principle. Identifying when a norm (assuming there is one)
gives way to a new, possibly contrary norm is complex and not readily
ascertainable.129
126. This is the position of states parties to the 1951 Convention. See Declaration of
States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, ¶ 4, UN Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Dec. 13, 2001). This is also the position of
UNHCR. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, ¶ 15 (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
45f17a1a4.html; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a
Norm of Customary International Law, Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the
Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2
BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, (Jan. 31, 1994) http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html.
This is also the position of most contemporary scholars. See Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel
Bethlehem, Non-Refoulement (Article 33 of the 1951 Convention), in REFUGEE PROTECTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION 87, 143 (Erika Feller et. al eds., 2003); see also Kälin et al., supra note 124, at 1345-46;
but see HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 364-65; James C. Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, 45
TEX. INT’L L.J. 503, 508, 536 (2010) (contesting this position). Some claim the principle has
even evolved into a norm of ius cogens. See Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme,
General Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ (b), U.N. Doc. No. 25 (XXXIII) (Oct. 20,
1982); Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, General Conclusion on International
Protection, General Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ I, U.N. Doc. No. 79 (XLVII)
(Oct. 11, 1996); J. Allain, The jus cogens nature of non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
533 (2001); but see Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in Interna-
tional Law, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 373 (2008) (contending the evidence for this claim is not
convincing.).
127. See supra note 126 (most would maintain it has evolved into a norm of customary
international law).
128. In that respect, reference should in particular be made to the practice of states not
parties to the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol (states parties simply have to com-
ply with Art. 33(1)); see for instance, the practice of Asian states with respect to Rohingya
refugees. See Bangladesh pushes back Rohingya refugees amid collective punishment in My-
anmar, AMNESTY INT’L, (Nov. 24, 2016) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/
bangladesh-pushes-back-rohingya-refugees-amid-collective-punishment-in-myanmar/; South-
east Asia: Accounts from Rohingya Boat People, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 27, 2015), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/27/southeast-asia-accounts-rohingya-boat-people; Pakistan Coer-
cion, UN Complicity. The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb.
13, 2017); see also infra Section II.D.
129. Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, (“The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct
prima facie inconsistent with the principle of [in casu] non-intervention lies in the nature of
the ground offered as justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented
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The analysis will henceforth proceed from the principle of non-
refoulement as laid down in article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, so in
terms of a binding treaty obligation. In view of the stage of the journey of
the refugee—who left his country of origin but has not yet reached an-
other country—the physical reach of the principle of non-refoulement
must be identified first.130
Since measures that states take to prevent refugees from arriving in
their countries continue after the refugees have managed to physically
leave their country of origin - boats are pushed back at sea, and inter-
cepted refugees are returned to countries where their lives and freedom
are threatened, either directly or indirectly, on account of onward re-
moval131 - the main question is whether the principle of non-refoulement
has extraterritorial reach (assuming that those who would be subjected to
forced return would indeed end up in territories where their lives or free-
doms would be threatened in the sense described in article 33(1)). That
question may not have yielded a clear-cut affirmative answer in the
past,132 but developments in international human rights law regarding the
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction have since made themselves felt.
In the previous section, reference was made to the view of the HRC
pertaining to the legal consequences of having effective control over per-
sons regardless of location.133 An early and clear example of this is the
view of the Committee in the case of López Burgos v. Uruguay134 regard-
ing acts undertaken by Uruguayan security and intelligence forces in Ar-
gentina—including kidnapping and secret detention—with respect to a
national who had fled to that country for political reasons (and had been
recognized as a refugee by UNHCR).135 With a reference to the obliga-
tions of states under ICCPR article 2(1),136 the HRC observed that “it
would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2
of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not
perpetrate on its own territory.”137
exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a modifi-
cation of customary international law.”).
130. Throughout assuming that the asylum seeker satisfies the definition of refugee laid
down in the 1951 Convention. Refugee status is not dependent on status determination: an
asylum seeker is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfills
the criteria contained in the definition. U.N. Refugee Agency, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, §1.28, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/Rev.3 (2011).
131. See id. § 1.5; see also supra Section I.E.
132. See id. § 2.4; see also infra Section II.D.
133. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 23, ¶ 10.
134. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Arti-
cle 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
at 176, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (June 6, 1979).
135. Id.
136. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 22.
137. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 134, at 182-83.
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A more recent, regional, example is the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy,
which came before the European Court of Human Rights.138 The case
concerned Somali and Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya who had
been intercepted on the high seas by Italian state agents and were re-
turned to Libya.139 According to the court, “in the period between board-
ing the ships of the Italian armed forces and being handed over to the
Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive
de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities.”140
Accordingly, the acts of the Italian authorities fell within Italy’s juris-
diction in the sense of article 1 of the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), a
provision that is similar to article 2(1) ICCPR.141
The reasoning in those cases that persons fall within the jurisdiction of
a state when they find themselves within the effective control of that state
regardless of physical location has been applied to the prohibition of
refoulement.142 However, the reasoning in these cases mentioned above is
predicated on the explicit obligation included in the ICCPR and the Euro-
pean Convention respectively, to the effect that these instruments apply to
those who find themselves either within the territory and subject to the
jurisdiction of the contracting state (ICCPR)143 or simply within the juris-
diction of the state concerned (European Convention),144 and then pro-
ceed to argue that “jurisdiction” is not necessarily territorially based.
There is no provision to this effect in the 1951 Convention, and the argu-
ment, therefore, cannot simply be replicated.
Whereas most of the rights that are included in the 1951 Convention
are explicitly predicated on the physical presence of the refugee in the
138. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 107.
139. Id.
140. Id., ¶ 81.
141. Id., ¶ 82. Art. 1 runs as follows: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.”
142. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 126 at 111. (“It follows that the principle of
non-refoulement will apply to the conduct of State officials or those acting on behalf of the
State wherever this occurs, whether beyond the national territory of the State in question, at
border posts or other points of entry, in international zones, at transit points, etc.”) (empha-
sis in original).
143. As indicated earlier, in Section I.E, the Human Rights Committee takes this in a
disjunctive sense. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
144. See Eur. Convention for the Prot. of Hum. Rts. and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 125, at 2a. Cf. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 62 (1995) (“the concept of
‘jurisdiction’ under this provision [Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms] is not restricted to the national territory of the High Con-
tracting Parties.”). Nonetheless, the European Court has emphasized more than once that
“jurisdiction” is essentially territorial, and is presumed to be exercised normally throughout
the state’s territory. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 131; see also
Bankoviæ v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 16–18; see also Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 73; see also Assanidze v. Georgia, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 31.
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country of refuge, the principle of non-refoulement is not.145 This has
been adduced as an argument to assume the principle applies whenever a
state has jurisdiction over persons, regardless of location, on the basis of
the default position regarding jurisdiction in public international law.146
Supporting this inference are the object and purpose of the 1951 Conven-
tion—assuring refugees the widest possible exercise of fundamental rights
and freedoms—which would be compromised if a refugee could be
handed over to his persecutors simply because the returning state acted
outside its own territory.147 Recalling the observation of the HRC quoted
earlier, such a consequence would be unconscionable and hard to recon-
cile with the prohibition itself, as it provides that no contracting State shall
expel or return a refugee “in any manner” whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.
As a result, states are not at liberty to ignore the principle of non-
refoulement outside their territory but are bound to observe it whenever
they exercise effective control and hence jurisdiction over refugees.148 It
also means that states cannot evade their obligations by erecting borders
just outside their territory in an attempt to avoid their responsibilities.149
Illustrative of this attempt at evasion is the construction of three parallel
fences by Spain around Melilla, a Spanish enclave situated in North Af-
rica; only those who manage to cross the first two fences will have their
claims heard, while the others will be sent back.150
145. In particular, modes of physical presence govern the entitlements of refugees
under the 1951 Convention; see infra Section 4.B.
146. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 169. UNHCR infers the extraterritorial reach of the
principle of non-refoulement from the text of art. 33(1); UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention re-
lating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, ¶ 26 (Jan. 26, 2007): (“The extraterrito-
rial applicability of the non-refoulement obligation under Article 33(1) is clear from the text
of the provision itself.”).
147. KÄLIN, ET AL., supra note 124, at 1361–62.
148. The United States does not accept extraterritorial application of human rights obli-
gations, including that of non-refoulement. Illustrative for this position is the US practice of
interdicting Haitian refugees, on which see Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); overruled by The
Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 10.675
(Mar. 13, 1997), and supra note 95. For a critical review of this position — “increasingly out-
of-step with the established jurisprudence” — see Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Posi-
tion on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for
Change, 90 INT’L. L. STUD. 20, 20–65 (2014).
149. Pretending parts of the territory are not their territory is to no avail either, on
which see infra Section II.E.
150. JONES, supra note 4, at 14. At the time of writing a complaint has been filed at the
European Court of Human Rights by two refugees; N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, App. Nos. 8675/
15 & 8697/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156743 (a Malian and
Ivorian national who were immediately and summarily arrested and returned to Moroccan
territory after they had crossed all three fences). U.N.H.C.R. has been granted leave to inter-
vene by the Court. In an open letter addressed to the Spanish Minister of Interior, a coalition
of 85 Spanish NGOs demanded clarification over the potential push-backs of over 1000 peo-
ple who tried to climb over the border fence between the second Spanish enclave of Ceuta
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D. Unresponsive Borders and the Principle of Non-refoulement
The finding that the prohibition of refoulement has extraterritorial
reach in case of effective control over a refugee means that returning the
refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened—i.e., exercising jurisdiction—breaches the principle of non-
refoulement, regardless of where it takes place. By implication, this find-
ing would also apply to rejection at the border. This may include failing to
hear, or respond to, a protection claim—not necessarily as an instance of
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, but rather an instance of exercising
territorial jurisdiction. Still there remain questions particularly with re-
spect to the increasingly popular practice of erecting walls and fences.151
For example, does the principle of non-refoulement apply in the case of a
migration barrier—fence, wall or electronic device—that fails to identify
and respond to refugees? That is, does it apply with respect to unrespon-
sive borders?152
For a long time, the answer to the question of whether article 33(1)
also prohibited rejection at the border (when such rejection would result
in return to the frontiers of territories as described in this provision), was
not clear-cut. This lack of clarity is paradoxical considering that the French
verb “refouler” was inserted even into the English text to dispel any
doubts about the scope of the prohibition. At the time of drafting, the
administrative measure of “refoulement” reportedly only existed in
and Morocco earlier this year; Coalition of 85 Spanish NGOs demand clarification of poten-
tial push backs of over thousand people at Spanish-Moroccan border, EUR. COUNCIL ON REF-
UGEES AND EXILES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ecre.org/coalition-of-85-spanish-ngos-de
mand-clarification-of-potential-push-backs-of-over-thousand-people-at-spanish-moroccan-
border/.
151. There are an estimated 63 or 70 barriers located around the world, which are
aimed at stemming migration/refugee flows; cf. Samuel Granados et al., Raising Barriers, A
New Age of Walls (Episode 1), THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/graphics/world/border-barriers/global-illegal-immigration-prevention/; Ann
Simmons, Border walls aren’t unheard of, but today they increasingly divide friends, not ene-
mies, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-border
-barriers-snap-20170131-story.html; both sources cite that at the fall of the Berlin Wall, there
were 15 barriers remaining globally; see also Samuel Granados et al., Fenced Out, A New Age
of Walls (Episode 2), THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/graphics/world/border-barriers/europe-refugee-crisis-border-control/. For an
overview of contemporary fences, see More neighbors make more fences, THE ECONOMIST
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-5. In Eu-
rope, the total length of barriers is estimated to stretch 1200km and is estimated to have cost
570 million euros as of the end of 2016. Gabriela Baczynska & Sara Ledwith, How Europe
Built Fences to Keep People Out, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
europe-migrants-fences-insight-idUSKCN0X10U7. On walls and international law, see
Florian Couveinhes, Les murs et le droit international, 56, 1, ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (Jean-Marc Sorel ed., 2010).
152. By way of illustration, the Israeli West Bank Barrier is made of prefabricated con-
crete sections, 5 meters high with a wire and mesh superstructure. Parts consist of an 8-meter
high solid concrete wall, and when completed the wall will be 400 miles long. Q&A: What is
the West Bank Barrier?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
3111159.stm.
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Belgium and France, and the drafters agreed that it meant either deporta-
tion as a police measure or non-admission at the frontier because the pres-
ence of the person in the country was considered to be undesirable.153 It
would thus seem that the French verb was inserted precisely to include
rejection at the border.154 However, “in view of the fact that Art. 33 does
not deal with admission”155—nor does the Convention, for that matter:
“[t]he Committee had, it was true, decided to delete the chapter on admit-
tance, considering that the convention should not deal with the right of
asylum and that it should merely provide for a certain number of improve-
ments in the position of refugees”156 - Article 33 was considered to con-
cern only refugees who had gained entry into the territory of a contracting
state, not refugees who sought entrance into that territory157:
In other words, Art. 33 lays down the principle that once a refugee
has gained asylum (legally or illegally) from persecution, he can-
not be deprived of it by ordering him to leave for, or by forcibly
returning him to, the place where he was threatened with persecu-
tion, or by sending him to another place where the threat exists,
but that no Contracting State is prevented from refusing entry in
this territory to refugees at the frontier.158
The paradoxical result was summarized as follows: “[I]f a refugee has suc-
ceeded in eluding the frontier guards, he is safe; if he has not, it is his hard
luck.”159
153. ROBINSON, supra note 14 at 162; but see GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 80, at 99;
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 40 (1980).
154. Cf. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct. 28,
1933, 3663 L.N.T.S. 201, by virtue of which: “Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not
to remove or keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or
non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside
there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or public
order. It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their coun-
tries of origin. [. . .]” (emphasis added).
155. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 162.
156. U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., 20th mtg. ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. E/AC.3/SR.20 (Feb. 10, 1950)
(US representative Henkin. The failed conference on territorial asylum in 1977 was meant to
establish an individual right to be granted asylum. See Weis, supra note 83, at 151–71. Beverly
Ann West, The Elusive Convention - A Study of the Issues Involved in the 1977 U.N. Confer-
ence on Territorial Asylum (Spring 1983) (Dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy), http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3375.
157. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 163.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 163. Nonetheless, Hungary amended its Asylum Act and the Act on the
State Border, effective per 5 July 2016, with a view to enabling push-backs of asylum seekers
who are apprehended on Hungarian territory within 8 kilometers from either the Serbian-
Hungarian or the Croatian-Hungarian border. Hungary: Latest amendments legalise extraju-
dicial push-back of asylum seekers, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES (July 8, 2016),
https://www.ecre.org/hungary-latest-amendments-legalise-extrajudicial-push-back-of-asylum
seekers/. On 17 May 2017, the European Commission decided to move forward the infringe-
ment procedure against Hungary concerning its asylum legislation including Hungary’s com-
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Nonetheless, already in 1967, the unanimously adopted Declaration
on Territorial Asylum simply stated that those seeking asylum would not
be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier.160 The reach of
the prohibition was consequently extended to comprise rejection at the
border if such rejection would result in the direct or indirect refoulement
of the refugee. The question is whether this implies responsibility for any
breach of the principle of non-refoulement on account of having unre-
sponsive borders,161 or whether that would be too exacting an obligation.
Having an impenetrable or unresponsive border should be distin-
guished from the situation that was described by Grahl-Madsen in terms
of a state placing its frontier guards right at the frontier and fencing off its
territory, so that no one can set foot in it without permission to do so,162
since that would be tantamount to rejection at the border by those exercis-
ing border control, and should be taken a step further: a sealed-off country
without any frontier guards, which relies solely on border fences.163 It is
the (far from) hypothetical situation that has been described by Grahl-
Madsen in terms of people only seen as shadows or moving figures on the
other side of the fence164—an image evocative of Plato’s Allegory of the
Cave.
Once the principle of non-refoulement includes rejection at the bor-
der, it becomes legally irrelevant how a state would breach this principle,
promising the right to effective access to asylum procedures. Commission follows up on
infringement procedure against Hungary concerning its asylum law, EUR. COMM’N (May 17,
2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1285_en.htm.
160. G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), at art. 3(1), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, (Dec. 14,
1967). See also Weis, supra note 83, passim on the deliberations on the scope of non-refoule-
ment during the drafting of a Convention on Territorial Asylum: only with great difficulty was
rejection at the border was included. See also OAU Convention Governing the Specific As-
pects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. II(3), opened for signature Sept. 10, 1969, 14691
U.N.T.S. (entered into force June 20, 1974).
161. The reference is solely to land borders, since airports are located within the terri-
tory of states, and those who arrive in airports and are kept in transit zones find themselves
both within the territory of the country concerned and within its jurisdiction. KÄLIN, ET AL.,
supra note 124, at 1367; see also infra Section II.E.1.
162. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 33.
163. In case it concerns the border of a neighboring country, those who want to seek
asylum are trapped in their own country (e.g. Syrian refugees who face a 911 km Turkish wall
sealing off the Syrian border, ECRE. Refugees have their backs against the Turkey-Syria bor-
der wall: First phase of construction finalized, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES
(Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.ecre.org/refugees-has-their-backs-against-the-turkey-syria-bor
der-wall-first-phase-of-construction-finalized/. That would in turn mean that the criterion of
alienage is not satisfied. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status ¶ 88 at 18 (2011); HATHAWAY, supra note 14 at 367; HATHAWAY, FOSTER,
supra note 115 at 29 (“the alienage requirement is only met when the at-risk individual physi-
cally departs her country of origin”). But see Kälin, et al., supra note 124, at 1376 (arguing
that “[a] refugee who has approached a border guard at the frontier of the country of refuge
has already left the country of persecution despite the fact that he or she cannot enter the
territory of the country where he or she expects to find safety”). So, what if there are no
border guards, but merely a hermetically sealed-off border?
164. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 33.
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whether it be by physically pushing refugees away or by maintaining her-
metically sealed-off (i.e., unresponsive) borders that accomplish the same
goal.165 Yet it would seem that a strict liability standard would be too ex-
acting,166 especially in view of the fact that the border’s unresponsiveness
may also be caused by natural barriers, such as mountain ranges or rivers.
What, then, can be expected of states without compromising the obligation
of non-refoulement? A due diligence standard—albeit taken as an objec-
tive standard of behavior, in the sense of a strict concept of diligence along
objective international standards (rather than a subjective fault-oriented
standard)167—may be a more appropriate standard by which to measure
compliance with article 33(1) (and hence a good faith implementation of
the 1951 Convention) when taken as the minimum level of efforts that
should be undertaken to ensure compliance with article 33(1).168 The req-
uisite level of efforts would consist of ensuring that the border is a respon-
sive one, in that it both provides for reasonable access to the state’s
territory, measured by the immediacy of the risk, and affords the opportu-
nity for a protection claim to be made.169 Introducing the due diligence
standard does not entail any watering down of the primary rule—that is,
the principle of non-refoulement—but rather serves to identify what is re-
quired by states with respect to their control of their own territorial
borders.170
The obligation to provide reasonable access and opportunity is, more-
over, subject to the principle of non-discrimination as provided in article 3
of the 1951 Convention: “The Contracting States shall apply the provisions
of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion
165. See Fear and Fences: Europe’s Approach to Keeping Refugees at Bay, AMNESTY
INT’L (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur03/2544/2015/en/.
166. Strict liability as too onerous a standard came up during the sessions of the Eighth
Colloquium, on which see supra note 1.
167. Cf. Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the Inter-
national Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 42–44 (1992).
168. “Due diligence” is indicative of what a responsible state ought to do under normal
conditions in a situation with its best practicable and available means with a view to fulfilling
its international obligation. Pierre Dupuy, Due Diligence in the International Law of Liability,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 369-79 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and
Dev., ed. 1977).
169. The fact that a wall or comparable barrier may have been erected for other pur-
poses would not excuse the state concerned from exercising due diligence and ensuring rea-
sonable access and opportunity for a protection claim to be made. If security is a concern,
status determination procedures that include 1F reviews are called for. Hungary was criti-
cized for “automatic rejections of asylum applications at the border” by the Working Group
on the Universal Periodic Review Hungary, see U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC),
Report of Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Hungary, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/33/9 (July 8, 2016).
170. Arming “border hunters” to secure unresponsiveness clearly is in breach of this
obligation. Cf. Krisztina Than, Hungary to arm new ‘border hunters’ after six-month crash
course, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary
-borderhunters/hungary-to-arm-new-border-hunters-after-six-month-crash-course-idUSKBN
16G2ED.
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or country of origin.”171Consequently, the contemporary practice of states
foreclosing reasonable access and opportunity to refugees who come from
particular states is a violation of the prohibition of refoulement.172
E. Exceptions to the Principle of Non-refoulement
Reservations are not allowed to article 33(1),173 but that does not
mean the prohibition is absolute. Article 33(2) provides the following
exception:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as
a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly seri-
ous crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
UNHCR emphasizes that this exception must be interpreted restrictively;
although states have a margin of discretion in applying article 33(2), that
margin is limited.174 Moreover, it appears that the threshold is high: acts
that are considered to endanger national security, such as espionage, sabo-
tage of military installations, and terrorist activities, must be of a particu-
larly serious nature.175 The danger to national security must constitute a
serious danger rather than a danger of some lesser order.176 With respect
171. Art. 3 has, moreover, extraterritorial reach, just like Art. 33(1), see Hathaway,
supra note 14, at 163.
172. Several Balkan states—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia—prevent the en-
try of all refugees except for Syrian and Iraqi refugees, see inter alia Lydia Gall, Dispatches:
Discrimination at Western Balkan Borders Puts People at Risk, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 20,
2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/20/dispatches-discrimination-western-balkan-bor
ders-puts-people-risk; UNHCR, IOM, and UNICEF statement on new border restrictions in
the Balkans, UNICEF (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.unicef.org/media/media_86431.html.
Since February 2016, additional restrictions have been placed on Afghan refugees, who are
banned from entering their territories, see EU/Balkans/Greece: Border Curbs Threaten
Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/01/eu/balkans/
greece-border-curbs-threaten-rights.
173. 1951 Convention supra note 2, art. 42(1).
174. Cf. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the
Scope of the National Security Exception Under Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees (Jan. 6, 2006), http://www.refworld.org/docid/43de2da94.html.
See also ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN & PHILIPP WENNHOLZ, Article 33, para. 2, in THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL, supra note
124, at 1399.
175. Zimmermann & Wennholz, supra note 174, at 1415; Lauterpacht & Bethlehem,
supra note 126 at 136. “The need for the danger to be of some magnitude rather follows from
the ordinary meaning of the provision (‘security of the country’), since anything such as a
minor or trivial danger to national security is hardly imaginable”, Zimmermann & Wennholz,
supra note 174, at 1417.
176. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 126, at 136; “The need for the danger to be
of some magnitude rather follows from the ordinary meaning of the provision (‘security of
the country’), since anything such as a minor or trivial danger to national security is hardly
imaginable”, Zimmermann & Wennholz, in Zimmermann, supra note 174, at 1417.
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to the second reason for denying the protection of non-refoulement to a
refugee, article 33(2) is quite clear in requiring a final judgment of convic-
tion for a particularly serious crime—that is, a crime that justifies the in-
ference that the refugee constitutes a danger to the community of the state
concerned. The level of “danger” should be interpreted in accordance with
the national security exception in the same provision.177
In short, only in clear and extreme cases—either when the refugee is a
danger to national security, or when a refugee who is a serious criminal
poses a danger to the safety of the community of that country—is refoule-
ment permitted.178 However, Robinson cautions that this particular excep-
tion must be read in connection with articles 31 and 32 of the 1951
Convention, which entails that return under article 33(2) is conditioned on
the obligation of the state to grant the refugee a reasonable period of time
and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.
Only if that fails, return to the country of origin may take place.179 This
caution can be justified by the fact that the application of article 33(2)
does not lead to loss of refugee status; it is confined to authorizing the host
state to divest itself of its protective responsibilities.180
The 1951 Convention does not provide any other exception to the pro-
hibition of refoulement, but a number of exceptions have nonetheless
been suggested, including territorially-based and numerically-based excep-
tions, as well as legal constructs that in essence serve to deflect the respon-
sibility for observing the principle of non-refoulement to other states.
These exceptions are discussed below.
1. Territorially-based Exceptions
States have been rather ingenious in their attempts to evade the obli-
gation of article 33(1). For instance, France tried to excise part of its air-
port in Paris, and Australia part of its territory (Christmas Island),181 in
both cases with a view to evading their international obligations with re-
spect to refugees, but to no avail. The European Court of Justice held that
the international zone in the Paris airport did not, despite its name, have
extraterritorial status,182 and the Australian High Court quashed the Aus-
177. Zimmermann & Wennholz, supra note 174, at 1421.
178. See Hathaway, supra note 14, at 353: in such cases, there is no additional propor-
tionality requirement that must be met, i.e. no balancing of an individuated risk of persecu-
tion and the security interests of the state concerned. For a contrary view, see inter alia U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), supra note 174.
179. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 165. See also Zimmermann & Wennholz, supra note
174, at 1401 (recalling the drafting history and referring to the UK representative who inti-
mated that every assistance would have to be provided to enable such a refugee to enter
another country, even to the extent of helping him to obtain an entry permit).
180. Hathaway, supra note 14, at 344.
181. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, supra note 65, at 256 estimate that “around
4,891 places have been excised from Australia’s migration zone.”
182. See Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 533, at ¶ 52 (1996)
(the Court notes that holding the applicants —Somali refugees —in the international zone of
Paris-Orly Airport made them subject to French law). Russia too advanced this particular
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tralian excision attempt.183 Australia nonetheless pressed an earlier, par-
tial excision to its extreme in 2013—after an earlier attempt to do so failed
in 2006—by excising its entire mainland from the reach of its migration
law with respect to refugees arriving in Australia by boat.184 Instead, refu-
gees are moved to offshore processing centers in Nauru and Manus Island
(Papua New Guinea), where they are detained in abysmal conditions.185
In April 2016, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea held that the
detention of the refugees on Manus Island is unconstitutional and there-
fore illegal.186 Australia subsequently announced that the detention center
argument, years later, and argued that the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport in Chimki,
Russian Federation, is not the territory of the Russian Federation and is outside its jurisdic-
tion, an argument that was rejected by the European Court of Human Rights in a case that
concerned the detention of refugees in that transit zone, Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/
92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 533, at ¶ 52 (1996).
183. Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth
(2010) 243 CLR 319 (High Court) (Austl.). On this case, see Hannah Stewart-Weeks, Note,
Out of Sight but Not out of Mind: Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth, 33 SYDNEY L. REV.
831, 831–47 (2011).
184. See Anthea Vogel, Over the Borderline: A Critical Inquiry into the Geography of
Territorial Excision and the Securitsation of the Australian Border, 38 U. NEW S. WALES L. J.
114, 114–45 (2015). On Australia’s interdiction practices from 2001 onwards, see
Schloenhardt & Craig, supra note 95.
185. See with respect to Nauru, see inter alia, Michael Garcia Bochenek, Leaked Naury
Files Show Horrors of Australia’s Refugee Detention System, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 10,
2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/10/leaked-nauru-files-show-horrors-australias-refu
gee-detention-system; Australia: Appalling Abuse, Neglect of Refugees on Nauru. Investiga-
tion on Remote Pacific Island Finds Deliberate Abuse Hidden Behind Wall of Secrecy, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/02/australia-appalling-abuse-
neglect-refugees-nauru. In the summer of 2016, more than 2,000 incident reports from Aus-
tralia’s detention camp on Nauru were leaked. Paul Farrell, Nick Evershed, & Helen David-
son, The Nauru Files: cache of 2,000 leaked reports reveal scale of abuse of children in
Australian offshore detention, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
australia-news/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-files-2000-leaked-reports-reveal-scale-of-abuse-of-chil
dren-in-australian-offshore-detention. With respect to Manus Island, see Australia/Papua
New Guinea: The Pacific Non-Solution, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 15, 2015), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2015/07/15/australia/papua-new-guinea-pacific-non-solution. For a recent overview
of both, see Submission by Human Rights Watch on the Situation in Australia to the Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 2, 2017), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/02/submission-human-rights-watch-australia-committee-econom
ic-social-and-cultural).
186. In Namah v. Pato [2016] PJSC 13, ¶ 39 (Papua N.G.)  between Belden Norman
Namah, MP Leader of the Opposition, applicant, and Rimbink Pato, Minister for Foreign
Affairs & Immigrations, National Executive Council and the Independent state of Papua
New Guinea, “the forceful bringing into and detention of the asylum seekers on MIPC [Ma-
nus Island Processing Centre] is unconstitutional and is therefore illegal”. On 14 June, the
Australian government and its contractors settled a class action suit on behalf of the refugees
held at Manus island by offering 70 million Australian dollars, thus avoiding a trial on the
illegal detention, yet continuing to deny liability. Pia Akerman, Manus Island Class Action
Settled by Government, THE AUSTRALIAN (June 14, 2017), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
national-affairs/immigration/manus-island-class-action-settled/news-story/efc8d2d274442459
f3d90343f16d01c3.
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on Manus Island will be closed, albeit at an unspecified time.187
The recurrent attempts made by states to excise (parts of) territory
from their jurisdiction and thus from the reach of international obligations
are to no avail; they remain part of the territory of a state, and subject to
the jurisdiction of that state.188 Neither the excision of parts nor whole of
an entire country can relieve a state from its responsibilities under interna-
tional law, including international refugee law;189 only cession of territo-
rial sovereignty over (part of) its territory would achieve the desired
result.190
2. A Numerically-based Exception
A categorically different exception consists of denying the applicabil-
ity of non-refoulement in cases of mass influx, and so numbers would defy
the applicability of article 33(1). A preliminary question is what consti-
tutes a “mass influx”?
UNHCR’s Executive Committee defines “mass influx” in terms of
considerable numbers of persons arriving at a rapid pace, to which it adds
inadequate reception capacity, and the impossibility of proceeding with
individual status determination procedures to assess such large num-
bers.191 Therefore, “mass influx” is a variable notion. In the absence of a
187. Australia indicated in August 2016 that it would close its detention center in Papua
New Guinea. Australia agrees to close controversial Papua New Guinea refugee detention cen-
tre, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/17/australia-
agrees-to-close-controversial-papua-new-guinea-refugee/. Apparently, the closure is now set
to start within weeks and be concluded by 31 October 2017. The future of refugees in the
Manus Island detention center remains unclear, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES
(May 19, 2017), https://www.ecre.org/the-future-of-refugees-in-the-manus-island-detention-
centre-remains-unclear/.
188. HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 115, at 27 (“No form of words and no domestic
law can change that”).
189. New “excision” law does not relieve Australia of its responsibilities toward asylum
seekers - UNHCR, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (May 22, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/afr
/news/press/2013/5/519ccec96/new-excision-law-relieve-australia-its-responsibilities-towards-
asylum.html.
190. Venice (Italy), which portrays itself as an “asylum city” (Venezia Cittá dell’asilo),
was once ceded by Austria to France as a gift in 1866. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 679–82 (Robert Y. Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
191. UNHCR Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Conclusion on Interna-
tional Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.96/1003 (Oct. 8, 2004). The last point—the impossibility of proceeding with indi-
vidual status determination procedures—is not convincing. First, the status of most refugees
in the world is assessed on a collective basis (individual status determination is the exception
rather than the rule). See cf. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines
on International Protection No. 11: Prima Facie Recognition of Refugee Status, ¶ 4, HCR/
GIP/15/11 (June 24, 2015). Secondly, a mass influx tends to consist of a single nationality,
which makes collective recognition practicable. In the EU, the issue of a mass influx gave rise
to Council Directive 2001/55/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 212/12) (EC) on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing
the consequences thereof; on the definition of “mass influx” see Council Directive 2001/55/
EC, arts. 2(d), 5, 2001 O.J. (L 212/12) (EC) on the criteria that will be used by the Council
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more precise yardstick, however, the notion appears to be prone to subjec-
tive assessments and, consequently, arbitrariness.192
By way of illustration, reference can be made to two states that intro-
duced restrictions on account of a mass influx of refugees.193 Lebanon
hosts more than one million refugees, which means that a quarter of the
population in Lebanon are refugees.194 It introduced restrictions on the
entry of Syrian refugees at the end of 2014195 and closed its border to
Syrian refugees on January 5, 2015.196 The second state that introduced
restrictions is Austria, a country that is eight times larger than Lebanon,
with a smaller population than Lebanon and a GDP per capita in 2015 of
USD 43,636.8 (Lebanon: USD 8,045.6).197 Austria received nearly 90,000
new asylum applications in 2015—a threefold increase over the previous
with a view to establishing the existence of a mass influx. It has so far never been
implemented.
192. In May 2016, the European commission presented proposals to reform the Com-
mon European Asylum System by creating a fairer system for allocating asylum applications
among EU member states. The new system will automatically establish when a country is
handling a disproportionate number of asylum applications by comparison to the overall
number of asylum claims made in the EU, by reference to a country’s size and wealth in
terms of the total GDP; if one country is receiving disproportionate numbers above that
reference (150% of the reference number), all further new applicants in that country will be
relocated across the EU following an admissibility verification of their claim. If a state de-
cides not to take part in the reallocation, it must make a “solidarity contribution” of C=
250,000 for each applicant for whom it would otherwise have been responsible. Towards a
sustainable and fair Common European Asylum System, EUR. COMM’N (May 4, 2016), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1620_en.htm. Asylum applicants would have the duty to
remain in the member state responsible for their claim, and will only be entitled to material
reception rights in the country where they are required to be present. Id.
193. Another state that took measures based on “mass migration”, or rather “the dan-
gers presented by mass migration” is Hungary which proclaimed a state of emergency. See
inter alia, Hungary maintains “state of emergency” and builds second anti-migrant fence on
border with Serbia —update!, HUNGARY TODAY (Mar. 3, 2017), http://hungarytoday.intra
comp.hu/news/hungary-maintains-state-emergency-builds-second-anti-migrant-fence-border-
serbia-53843.
194. PM Hariri: Lebanon at ‘breaking point’ due to refugees, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 1,
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/saad-al-hariri-lebanon-big-refugee-camp-1704
01045951087.html.
195. Lebanon sharply limits Syrian refugee entry, AL ARABIYA (Oct. 19, 2014), http://
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/18/Lebanon-sharply-limits-Syrian-refugee
-entry-.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
196. Issam Abdallah, Lebanon implements new controls at Syrian border, REUTERS
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-refugees-idUSKBN0
KE10C20150105.
197. Austria is 83,871 square kilometers with a population of approximately 8.6 million,
while Lebanon is 10,452 square kilometers with a population of approximately 5.9 million.
See UNdata: Austria, U.N. STAT. DIVISION (Aug. 5, 2017), http://data.un.org/Coun-
tryProfile.aspx?crName=AUSTRIA; UNdata: Lebanon, U.N. STAT. DIVISION, http://data.un
.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=LEBANON. On their comparative GDPs per capita, see
GDP per Capita (current US $), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY
.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=LB-AT.
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year.198 It thereupon limited the number of refugees allowed to enter the
country as of February 19, 2016: 3,200 per day either to travel to Germany
or apply for asylum in Austria, and a daily limit of eighty asylum claims.199
Does a mass influx, however defined, allow derogating from article
33(1)? The wording of the text is clear in that it does not include an excep-
tion for a mass influx. It has therefore been argued that the principle must
apply unless its application is clearly excluded.200 According to the rules of
treaty interpretation enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of a treaty and the circumstances of its
drafting, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, that is, the general rule of interpretation.201 In this respect, it is
worth noting that the issue of mass influxes was raised by the drafters.202
The next question is whether the travaux support the inference that dero-
gation from article 33(1) would be unlawful.
First, it has been suggested that the French verb “refouler” was added
to article 33(1) to ensure that the duty of non-return would not have a
wider meaning than the French expression “which was agreed not to apply
in the event that national security or public order was genuinely
threatened by a mass influx.”203 Some states were in favor of a general
exemption from article 33(1) in situations of mass influx that would seri-
ously threaten national security or public order,204 but there were others
who considered such an exemption highly undesirable.205 Nonetheless, the
Dutch request “to have it placed on record that the Conference was in
agreement with the interpretation that the possibility of mass migrations
across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by arti-
198. Austria: Drastic, Unjustified Measures Against Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/27/austria-drastic-unjustified-measures-
against-asylum seekers.
199. The Austrian Parliament approved amendments to the Asylum Act that enables
the government to declare a state of emergency in the case of a mass refugee influx, which
could be a threat to national security. Cf. ÄNDERUNG DES ASYLGESETZES 2005, DES
FREMDENPOLIZEIGESETZES 2005 UND DES BFA-VERFAHRENSGESETZES [Amendments to the
Asylum Act 2005, the Aliens Police Act 2005 and the BFA Procedural Law] BUNDESGESETZ-
BLATT [BGBL] No. 24/2016, ¶ 36, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/. . . 2016_I_24/BG-
BLA_2016_I_24.rtf (Austria). Applications made at the border would be subject to a fast-
track admissibility procedure. See Austrian Parliament approves law repudiating right to asy-
lum, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.ecre.org/austri
an-parliament-approves-law-repudiating-right-to-asylum/. See also Wolfgang Benedek, Re-
cent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law: A Race to the Bottom?, 17 GERMAN L. J. 6,
950–65 (2016).
200. LAUTERPACHT & BETHLEHEM, supra note 126, at 119 (adducing the humanitarian
object of the treaty and the fundamental character of the principle).
201. See the introduction, supra, at 22–23.
202. See KÄLIN, ET AL., supra note 124, at 1341.
203. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 357; KÄLIN, ET AL., supra note 124, at 1341.
204. KÄLIN, ET AL., supra note 124, at 1377.
205. Id.
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cle 33” was accommodated.206 As a result, the outcome is a clear text that
does not include an exception for mass influxes,207 but it did not have to,
since the drafters arguably considered it to be already covered by the in-
clusion of the French verb “refouler.”208
In the light of the drafting history of article 33(1), it is not surprising
that the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, which was adopted unani-
mously in 1967, includes the possibility of exception to non-refoulement,
albeit “only for overriding reasons of national security or in order to safe-
guard the population, as in case of a mass influx of persons,”209 since this,
in essence, repeats what had been clear to the drafters of the 1951
Convention.
The next question is whether this understanding of the prohibition of
refoulement is still tenable. It is remarkable that the acknowledgement by
UNHCR, particularly its Executive Committee (which after all consists of
nearly one hundred states), that large influxes of refugees may pose practi-
cal problems to the country of refuge,210 has not resulted in its confirming
this particular understanding. To the contrary, the Executive Committee
does not recommend a watering-down of non-refoulement. In its conclu-
sion on situations of large influx, it explicitly provides that “[i]n all cases
the fundamental principle of non-refoulement—including non-rejection at
the frontier—must be scrupulously observed.”211 The Executive Commit-
tee thus advocates strict compliance with article 33(1), but it simultane-
ously undercuts this compliance by softening the standard of protection
that should be granted those who are admitted, “at least on a temporary
basis”.212 Their entitlements are reduced to “basic minimum standards”
206. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons, 35th mtg. ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.35 (Dec. 3, 1951). Since it is not an official
interpretation, it is nonetheless from a legal point of view meaningless, GOODWIN-GILL &
MACADAM, supra note 65, at 206.
207. But see HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 362, 376; the principle of non-refoulement
does not bind a state faced with a mass influx of refugees insofar as the arrival of refugees
truly threatens its ability to protect its most basic interests.
208. However, on the basis of the travaux, Eggli concludes there is no exception for
mass influxes, ANN VIBEKE EGGLI, MASS REFUGE INFLUX AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, 171 (2002); Gammeltoft-Hansen that there is insufficient evidence that
there was consensus about this issue among the drafters, THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN,
ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRA-
TION CONTROL, 52 (2013); and Durieux & MacAdam that they do not reveal any intention to
exclude collective persecution, Jean-François Durieux & Jane MacAdam, Non-Refoulement
through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx
Emergencies, 16 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 4, 9 (2004).
209. G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), art. 3(2), Declaration on Territorial Asylum (Dec. 14,
1967).
210. UNHCR Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Program, Conclusion on Protection
of Asylum seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, at I(2), U.N. Doc. A/36/12/Add.1 (Oct.
21, 1981) (“Large-scale influxes frequently create serious problems for States”).
211. Id. at II(A)(2).
212. Admittance on a temporary basis is arguably the second way to soften strict com-
pliance with Art. 33(1). “In situations of large-scale influx, asylum seekers should be admit-
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“pending arrangements for a durable solution,”213 which will more often
than not mean indefinitely.214
Leaving aside the watering down of entitlements, can strict compli-
ance with article 33(1) be required of states when faced with a mass influx,
even if article 33(1) would not allow derogation? Returning to the case of
Lebanon mentioned above, the influx of Syrian refugees would, by all pos-
sible definitions, qualify as a mass influx. Lebanon clearly is overwhelmed,
and can hardly cope.215 In this particular case, assuming for sake of argu-
ment that Lebanon is a party to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
(it is party to neither216), Lebanon could invoke the principle of
necessity217:
Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for preclud-
ing the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an interna-
tional obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the only way for
ted to the State in which they first seek asylum and if that State is unable to admit them on a
durable basis, it should always admit them at least on a temporary basis [. . .].” UNHCR
Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Program, supra note 210, at (II)(A)(1).
213. Id. at (I)(3) (“It is therefore imperative to ensure that asylum seekers are fully
protected in large-scale influx situations, to reaffirm the basic minimum standards for their
treatment pending arrangements for a durable solution, and to establish effective arrange-
ments in the context of international solidarity and burden-sharing for assisting countries
which receive large numbers of asylum seekers”). Those minimum standards are enumerated
in the Conclusion —sub II B (2) —and are not cast in terms of the rights listed in the 1951
Convention, see e.g., the last one “all steps should be taken to facilitate voluntary repatria-
tion”. Comparable, and regarding a specific refugee situation—the former Yugoslavia— see
UNHCR Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Program, Conclusion on International Protec-
tion, at (r), U.N. Doc. A/49/12/Add.1 (Oct. 7, 1994). It has been observed that the price states
have demanded in admitting large numbers of refugees is a de facto suspension of 1951 Con-
vention protection; see Durieux & MacAdam, supra note 208, at 4. In that respect, it is worth
adding that 3 of the top 6 refugee hosting countries (Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan) are
not parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol whilst the fourth —Turkey -  is but
confines its obligations to European refugees.
214. The present-day reality is that less than one per cent of all refugees can be reset-
tled, and less than one per cent can voluntary return to their respective countries of origin. In
case of large refugee populations, states rarely if ever naturalize the refugees concerned.
215. It calls for international assistance; see generally HUNGARY TODAY, supra note
193. Neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, whilst acknowledging—Preamble
1951 Convention—that some states may be unduly heavily burdened (cf. supra note 6), com-
prise a mechanism on sharing responsibilities among states. Cf. U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), Mechanisms of International Cooperation to Share Responsibilities
and Burdens in Mass Influx Situations, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/01/7 (Feb. 19, 2001). Recent at-
tempts to share responsibilities in Europe by way of relocation of asylum seekers from Italy
and Greece came to naught: only 16,340 persons out of the target-commitment of 98,255 have
been relocated from Greece and Italy. The target-commitment has been revised to just over
33,000 persons in total. See also Commission report reveals downscaled ambition on reloca-
tion, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.ecre.org/commis
sion-report-reveals-downscaled-ambition-on-relocation/.
216. The same reasoning applies to obligations of customary international law.
217. Recourse to circumstances precluding wrongfulness came up during the sessions of
the Eighth Colloquium, on which see supra note *.
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the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril . . .218
Necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding wrong-
fulness if the state contributed to the situation of necessity.219 It also may
not be invoked if the international obligation—in casu article 33(1) of the
1951 Convention—precludes reliance on necessity.220 In view of the draft-
ing history of article 33(1), article 33(1) likely does not preclude reliance
on necessity.
Unlike the rather fuzzy and variable definition of “mass influx” sug-
gested by UNHCR’s Executive Committee, the possibility of invoking ne-
cessity has the advantage that it is only available in exceptional cases:
It arises where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an es-
sential interest on the one hand and an obligation of the State
invoking necessity on the other. These special features mean that
necessity will only rarely be available to excuse non-performance
of an obligation and that it is subject to strict limitations to safe-
guard against possible abuse.221
Derogation would remain subject to the criterion of necessity, and hence
require a continuous assessment of the grave and imminent peril that justi-
fies derogation from article 33(1) and other rights of the Convention222 yet
not necessarily all other rights.223 However, in the absence of a binding
system of responsibility sharing,224 it cannot be ruled out that a state of
necessity may be a protracted one.
218. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 114, art. 25. The peril must be objectively established and not merely be apprehended or
contingent, id. at 83.
219. Id. art. 25(2)(b), at 84.
220. Id. art. 25(2)(a), at 80.
221. Id.
222. Rather than the suggested indefinite diminishing of entitlements by ExCom, see
id., at 74, 80.
223. The focus of this paragraph was on possible exceptions to the principle of non-
refoulement; the question as to what rights could be “frozen” based on a plea of necessity is
one that is geared to the rights of those who have gained access. Of importance is art. 3, of
the 1951 Convention, supra note 2—non-discrimination—that would remain applicable. But-
tressing this inference is art. 20, of the 1951 Convention, supra note 2 on Rationing: “Where a
rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general
distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as
nationals.” Beyond the rights that accrue to refugees by being within the jurisdiction of the
country of refuge, and being physically present in that state, the next question that would
have to be addressed is what invoking the plea of necessity would entail in terms of the next
levels of attachment and the concomitant rights.
224. See supra note 210. Very little progress is made in this respect. Cf. Towards a
global compact on refugees, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/towards-a-global-compact-
on-refugees.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2017); Volker Türk & Madeline Garlick, From Bur-
dens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
and a Global Compact on Refugees, 28 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 656 (2016). See also  G.A.
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3. Legal Constructs: First Country of Asylum, “Dublin,” Safe Third
Country
States apply quite a few legal constructs to avoid being responsible for
processing asylum claims. These constructs include: “first country of asy-
lum,”225 “Dublin III,”226 and “safe third country.”227 These (predomi-
nantly procedural) legal constructs serve to identify the state responsible
for processing asylum claims, and result, if applicable, in rendering these
claims inadmissible. Leaving their compatibility—and hence lawfulness—
with the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol aside,228 these constructs
Res. 71/1, ¶ 8(f), 11, 68, 69 New York Declaration (Sept. 19, 2016), in which states acknowl-
edged “a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a
humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centered manner” and underlined “the central-
ity of international cooperation to the refugee protection regime” and recognize “the bur-
dens that large movements of refugees place on national resources, especially in the case of
developing countries” and “commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsi-
bility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees [. . .],” resulting in the belief that a
comprehensive refugee response should be developed and initiated by UNHCR for each
situation involving large movements of refugees, but it falls short of even suggesting how
equitable sharing of responsibilities could be realized. The coming years a “global compact
for safe, orderly and regular migration” will be developed —Annex II to the Declaration—
and that compact “could” include “The scope for greater international cooperation, with a
view to improving migration governance” and is scheduled for adoption in 2018.
225. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Background Note on the
Safe Country Concept and Refugees Status, § B, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/68 (July 26, 1991) [here-
inafter Background Note] (in terms of “safe country of asylum’); see also Morten Kjaerum,
The Concept of Country of First Asylum, 4 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 514 (1992). The notion is
also codified in EU Directive 2013/32/EU. See Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Common Procedures for Granting and With-
drawing International Protection (recast) 2013 O.J. (L 180) art. 35.
226. See Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsi-
ble for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member
States by a Third-Country National or Stateless Person (recast) 2013 O.J. (L 180). The Dub-
lin system has been qualified as “dysfunctional”, and its operation in practice as having an
“unacceptably high cost for asylum applicants and resource costs to participating States in
complying with its lengthy and complicated procedures, whilst only aggravating the unfair
repartition of responsibility” by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Reso-
lution 2072: After Dublin – the Urgent Need for a Real European Asylum System, EUR. PARL.
ASS., ¶ 8 (2015).
227. See Directive 2013/32/EU, supra note 225, art. 38.
228. See in particular James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Else-
where, adopted January 3, 2007, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207, n. 2 (2007). The 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol neither expressly authorize nor prohibit reliance on protection elsewhere
policies, and as such protection elsewhere policies are compatible with the 1951 Convention,
provided they ensure that refugees defined in Art. 1 enjoy the rights set by Arts. 2-34 of the
1951 Convention. Reliance on a protection elsewhere policy must be preceded by a good
faith empirical assessment by the state which proposes to affect the transfer (sending state)
that refugees defined by Art. 1 will in practice enjoy the rights set by Arts. 2-34 of the Con-
vention in the receiving state. Formal agreements and assurances are relevant to this inquiry,
but do not amount to a sufficient basis for a lawful transfer under a protection elsewhere
policy. A sending state must rather inform itself of all facts and decisions relevant to the
availability of protection in the receiving state. Id.
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cannot be considered to be exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement.
To the contrary, they merely serve to allocate the responsibility for obser-
vance of the principle to other states and thus confirm the applicability of
the principle of non-refoulement.
The constructs assume that protection elsewhere is available (in par-
ticular “first country of asylum”) and hence justify return to that particular
elsewhere has been inferred from article 31(1) of the 1951 Convention that
exempts refugees from penalization for irregular entry provided they
come directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened
in the sense of article 1.229 Article 31 will be addressed in the next section.
III. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT UPON ARRIVAL
A. Introduction
Assuming the refugee somehow gained entry to a state, is he entitled
to freedom of movement within that state? The answer varies along with
the lawfulness of his presence in the country concerned. The 1951 Conven-
tion differentiates between unlawful and lawful presence with respect to
freedom of movement. The 1951 Convention addresses freedom of move-
ment of refugees who are unlawfully in the country of refuge in article
31(2), and that of refugees who are lawfully in the country of refuge in
article 26. The liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s residence
as set out in article 12(1) of the ICCPR is also predicated on lawful pres-
ence within the territory of the contracting state. This section will discuss
the freedom of movement—or lack thereof—of refugees who are unlaw-
fully in their country of refuge; section 4 will address the freedom of move-
ment of those who are lawfully present in their country of refuge. As to
those who are unlawfully in the country of refuge, the analysis will start
with the lack of freedom of movement because of detention.
As will be set out below, article 31(2) is confined to refugees who are
unlawfully in their country of refuge; come directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1 of the 1951
Convention; present themselves without delay to the authorities; and show
good cause for their illegal entry or presence. Unlike article 31(2) of the
1951 Convention, article 9 of the ICCPR applies to everyone, including
refugees and asylum seekers.230 Article 9(1) provides that:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law.
229. See Background Note, supra note 225, ¶ 12; Kjaerum, supra note 225, at 515.
230. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Se-
curity of Person), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014).
66 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:19
In view of the fact that article 9 applies to everyone, article 9 will be ad-
dressed first; subsequently article 31(2), including the question as to the
added value of this provision in relation to article 9.
B. ICCPR Article 9 and the Detention of Refugees
Article 9(1) addresses both liberty and security of person; this para-
graph discusses only liberty of person—that is, freedom from confinement
of the body.231 Deprivation of liberty includes police custody, remand de-
tention, administrative detention, confinement to a restricted area of an
airport, and imprisonment.232 Actual deprivation of liberty is subject to
the requirements that it is not arbitrary and is authorized by domestic
law.233
The ICCPR does not provide an enumeration of permissible reasons
for depriving a person of liberty, but the HRC addressed detention during
proceedings for the control of immigration in its General Comment on
article 9. It deems such detention not per se arbitrary, but detention “must
be justified as reasonable, necessary and proportionate in the light of the
circumstances and reassessed as it extends in time.”234 As to refugees—
asylum seekers—who unlawfully enter a state’s territory, the HRC ob-
served that they
may be detained for a brief initial period in order to document
their entry, record their claims and determine their identity if it is
in doubt. To detain them further while their claims are being re-
solved would be arbitrary in the absence of particular reasons spe-
cific to the individual, such as an individualized likelihood of
absconding, a danger of crimes against others or a risk of acts
against national security. The decision must consider relevant fac-
tors case by case and not be based on a mandatory rule for a
broad category; must take into account less invasive means of
achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties or
other conditions to prevent absconding; and must be subject to
periodic re-evaluation and judicial review.235
231. Id. (“Security of person concerns freedom from injury to the body and the mind,
or bodily and mental integrity.”).
232. Id., ¶ 5. For an interesting analysis of the difference between deprivation of liberty
and restriction on movement and place of residence, see also Guzzardi v. Italy, 39 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1980) (discussing the difference between deprivation of liberty and restriction
on movement and place of residence). The case concerned the banishment for a period of
three years to the island of Asinara on which the applicant—a terrorist and Mafioso—was
assigned a house and was restricted to an area where he could live a normal life except that
he could not leave it without permission and was for that purpose put under surveillance. Id.
233. The Human Rights Committee cautions that the latter does not automatically en-
tail the former, i.e. detention may be legally permitted yet be arbitrary, U.N. Human Rights
Comm., supra note 230, ¶ 11.
234. Id. ¶ 18.
235. Id. As to the risk of absconding, the CJEU found detention under Dublin III in
order to secure a transfer to a responsible EU member state in the absence of objective
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The HRC reviewed many complaints related to immigration deten-
tion, most of which concerned Australian detention practices.236 It
deemed the Australian blanket policy of detaining unlawful arrivals for
extended periods of time arbitrary.237
By way of conclusion, detention can only take place on an individual
basis; individual circumstances must be examined,238 and group-based de-
tention decisions are prohibited.239 Detention is not inherently arbi-
criteria to determine a risk of absconding is unlawful: any measure on deprivation of liberty
must be accessible, precise and foreseeable as required by Art. 6 of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person”), Case C-528/15
Al Chodor, 2017 E.C.R. 213.
236. See Satvinder Juss, Detention and Delusion in Australia’s Kafkaesque Refugee
Law, 36 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 146 (2017) for an analysis of Australia’s refugee laws.
237. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, Comm. No. 560/1993, ¶ 9.6,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997); U.N. Human Rights Comm., C. v. Austra-
lia, Comm. No. 900/1999, ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (Oct. 28, 2002); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Baban v. Australia, Comm. No. 1014/2001, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
78/D/1014/2003 (Sept. 18, 2003); U.N. Human Rights Comm., D and E v. Australia, Comm.
No. 1050/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/DD/1050/2002 (Aug. 9, 2006); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Shafiq v. Australia, Comm. No. 1324/2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C88/D/1324/2004 (Nov.
13, 2006); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Shams and ors v. Australia, Comm. No. 1255/2004,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1255, 1256, 1259, 1260, 1266, 1268, 1270, 1288/2004 (July 20, 2007);
U.N. Human Rights Comm., F.K.A.G. et al v. Australia, Comm. No. 2094/2011, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/108D/2094/2011 (Oct. 28, 2013); U.N. Human Rights Comm., M.M.M. v. Australia,
Comm. No. 2136/2012, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2136/2012 (Oct. 28, 2013).
238. The Hungarian law that was adopted in March 2017 under which asylum seekers
will automatically be detained in container camps at the borders is consequently unlawful; see
Lizzie Dearden, Hungarian parliament approves law allowing all asylum seekers to be de-
tained, THE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
hungary-parliament-asylum seekers-detain-law-approve-refugees-immigration-crisis-arrests-
border-a7615486.htm. Personal circumstances include taking vulnerable characteristics into
consideration; see O.M. v Hungary, App. No. 9912/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 53 (2016), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-164466”]} (regarding the detention of an Iranian
LGBT asylum seeker: the Court considered that “in the course of placement of asylum seek-
ers who claim to be part of a vulnerable group in the country which they had to leave, the
authorities should exercise particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce
the plight that forced these persons to flee in the first place. In the present case, the authori-
ties failed to do so when they ordered the applicant’s detention without considering the ex-
tent to which vulnerable individuals—for instance, LGBT people like the applicant—were
safe or unsafe in custody among other detained persons, many of whom had come from
countries with widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such persons.”).
239. The Human Rights Committee has consistently affirmed that while immigration
detention is not per se arbitrary, every decision to keep an individual detained must be justi-
fied by the State on grounds to the individual’s case, and open to periodic review. The Com-
mittee has been particularly concerned with blanket detention policies, emphasizing the need
to ensure detained asylum seekers are afforded individual consideration with respect to the
need for their detention. See generally SARAH JOSEPH AND MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMEN-
TARY (Oxford U. Press 3d ed. 2013). See, e.g., A. v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 9.3-9.4; C. v.
Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 8.2; Baban v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 7.2; Shams and ors v.
Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 7.2; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Bakhtiyari v. Australia, Comm.
No. 1069/2002, ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002 (Nov. 6, 2003); D and E v. Austra-
lia, supra note 237, ¶ 6.3.
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trary,240 but it may become arbitrary when factors particular to the
detained individual—such as the likelihood of absconding and the lack of
cooperation—are not considered, and when the decision to detain is not
open to periodic review so that the grounds justifying the detention can be
assessed.241 Lastly, detention should not continue beyond the period for
which the state party can provide appropriate justification.242
C. Freedom of Movement of Unlawfully Present Refugees: Article 31(2),
1951 Convention
Both detention and measures short of detention that nonetheless re-
strict the movement of refugees are covered by article 31(2) of the 1951
Convention:243
The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such
refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and
such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another coun-
try . . .244
A first question concerns the meaning of the reference to “such refugees”:
who are the beneficiaries of the restricted limitations on freedom of move-
ment? The answer is not obvious, since the title of article 31 merely refers
to refugees who are “unlawfully in the country of refuge,” while article
31(1), on the exemption from penalties for illegal entry or presence, in-
cludes a more detailed description of refugees who find themselves unlaw-
fully in the country of refuge:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly
from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to
240. The Committee appears to condemn the blanket policy of detaining unlawful arriv-
als for extended periods of time, see supra note 237, but accept it when it for a short period of
time, see JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 239 at 354, 356.
241. See inter alia A. v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 9.4; see also infra Section III.D. See
also U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 230, ¶¶ 12, 14, 18 (explaining that detention
may be arbitrary if detainee treatment does not correspond with the purpose for detention).
242. See inter alia A. v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 9.4.
243. See infra Section III.D.
244. The 1951 Convention, supra note 2, allows reservations to Art. 31. Few states have
made reservations: Papua New Guinea does not accept the obligations laid down in Art. 31 at
all; Honduras reserved the right to, inter alia, restrict the freedom of movement of “certain
refugees or groups of refugees” when national or international considerations so warrant;
and Mexico reserved the right to establish the conditions for moving within the national
territory.
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the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.245
This particular description of the beneficiaries of the exemption was
inserted by the drafters after article 31(2) had been completed, and it had
been induced by concerns regarding subsequent movements of refugees
once they reached safety.246 It perchance inadvertently limited the benefi-
ciaries of the circumscribed restrictions on freedom of movement ad-
dressed in paragraph 2
Who is entitled to benefit from article 31(2)? The text arguably allows
for two interpretations. The first simply reverts to the title of article 31
“Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge,” inter alia on the basis of
the drafting history of the relevant provisions in the sense described
above,247 while the second one interprets “such refugees” in paragraph 2
as a short-hand reference to the refugees as described in article 31(1).248
The question is, which interpretation should prevail?
Proceeding from the basic rule of treaty interpretation, set out in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,249 the focus should be on
the object and purpose of article 31.250 Article 31 seems to be primarily
focused on providing immunity from penalties for irregular entry and pres-
ence on the one hand, and limiting restrictions to freedom of movement
on the other. UNHCR identifies—or rather confines, since it only refers to
paragraph 1—the “goal” of article 31 as providing an incentive for unau-
thorized entrants, with bona fide reasons for entering unlawfully, to regu-
245. “Penalties” should be taken literally: Art. 31(1) does not exclude practices such as
administrative detention and other restrictions addressed in Art. 31(2); see GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 16, art. 31, ¶ 1.
246. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 80, at 419, 420. Safety is a crucial element in this re-
spect: refugees whose illegal entry or presence is due to the risk of persecution in a country of
asylum also benefit from the exemption of penalties, ROBINSON, supra note 14 at 151;
Hathaway, supra note 14, at 400.
247. Gregor Noll, Article 31, in THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL, supra note 124, at 1268.
248. Global Consultations on International Protection: Summary Conclusions on Article
31 of the 1951 Convention —Revised, ¶ 5, UNHCR (Nov. 8–9, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/
en-us/protection/migration/49632375a/316-global-consultations-international-protection-sum-
mary-conclusions-article.html [hereinafter UNHCR Summary Conclusions on Article 31 of
the 1951 Convention — Revised]; Hathaway supra note 14, at 389.
249. See Section I.D supra for the text of the relevant provision.
250. According to art. 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the travaux
préparatoires of the treaty are a supplementary means of interpretation to which recourse
may be had to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Art. 31 of this Conven-
tion, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Art. 31 leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
See id. This would mean that even if the drafters inadvertently limited the beneficiaries of
Art. 31(2) of the 1951 Convention as suggested earlier, this oversight should be ignored if the
interpretation according to Art. 31 does not result in ambiguity or absurdity.
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larize their status with the officials of the state.251 This particular “goal”
presupposes that refugees have an implausibly intimate knowledge of the
1951 Convention. It would rather seem that article 31 reflects the recogni-
tion of the drafters that most refugees will not be able to gain entry in a
regular manner,252 and that states should therefore refrain from penalizing
all who thus gain entry and are as a result unlawfully in the country.253
Article 31 consequently is a restriction of the usual powers regarding pe-
nalization for illegal entry and limiting freedom of movement. It is not
plausible to expect states to observe such restrictions with respect to those
who are neither lawfully present nor present themselves to the authorities.
Substantive coherence would also favor this interpretation. The first
paragraph— article 31(1)—identifying the beneficiaries of the immunity
from penalties for illegal entry or presence, and the second paragraph —
article 31(2)—continuing to spell out what else states should refrain from
doing regarding the same persons, that is, not applying any other restric-
tions to their movements than those which are strictly necessary. If the
relationship between the two paragraphs is thus taken to be a conjunctive
rather than a disjunctive one, article 31 would, from the perspective of the
refugee, imply presenting himself forthwith to the authorities with a view
to regularizing his status with the officials of the state concerned.254 Al-
though article 31(1) does not impose an obligation on the country of ref-
uge to regularize the refugee who duly presents himself as required,255
article 31(2) sets limits to restrictions the state concerned may apply to the
freedom of movement of those who subjected themselves to the authori-
ties in conformity with article 31(1).
It is remarkable that article 31 is cast in plural terms— “refugees”—
considering that penalties and restriction on freedom of movement are
generally speaking not collective measures.256 Naturally, the plural in this
case singles out a particular defined category of beneficiaries.257 Nonethe-
less, in case of mass influx, individual refugees may not have the opportu-
nity to present themselves forthwith to the authorities; their bona fides in
251. Saadi v. United Kingdom, Written Submissions on Behalf of the U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, 346 Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, ¶ 25 (2007); see also Hathaway, supra note 14,
at 388, 390, 417.
252. See, e.g., Noll, supra note 247, at 1248–49; Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note
65, at 384; Hathaway, supra note 14, at 387-388. It also confirms the incomplete character of
the right to seek asylum, see supra Section II.B.
253. Noll, supra note 247, at 1246, 1269 (“The wording of Art. 31, para. 2, sentence 1 of
the 1951 Convention assumes the perspective of the State implementing the 1951
Convention.”).
254. See Saadi v. United Kingdom, Written Submissions on Behalf of the U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, 346 Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, ¶ 25 (2007).
255. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 153.
256. Cf. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 32, 33 (both cast in terms of an individual
refugee).
257. It would seem the 1951 Convention is not consistent in this respect; Art. 17 on
wage-earning employment, for instance, refers to lawfully staying refugees, Art. 18 on self-
employment, to a lawfully present refugee singular. Id. arts. 17, 18.
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this respect should be assumed. In practice, article 31 requires immediate
application if its purpose is not to be frustrated, and that means it cannot
be made dependent on prior verification as to whether the refugees con-
cerned satisfy the conditions enumerated in article 31(1). It therefore calls
for a presumption of eligibility for the benefits of article 31(2), which can
be rebutted if those who benefit from it are subsequently determined not
to satisfy the conditions of article 31(1).
As to individual refugees, they must satisfy the various qualifying cri-
teria enumerated in article 31(1): coming directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened, presenting themselves to the authori-
ties without delay, and showing good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.
Article 31 was analyzed during UNHCR’s Global Consultations on
International Protection. With respect to the first requirement (that of
“coming directly from”), it was concluded that article 31(1) was intended
to—presumably: also258—apply to persons who have briefly transited
other countries or who are unable to find effective protection in the first
country or countries to which they flee.259 The possibility of a brief transit
implies a degree of choice, albeit a limited one, on the part of the refugee
regarding the prospective country of refuge, and therefore entails that a
refugee is not obliged to seek protection in any such intermediate coun-
try.260 As to the duration of “brief transit,” UNHCR provides that no
strict time limit can be applied, and that each case must be judged on its
specific merits.261
As to the second requirement, that of presenting oneself without delay
to the authorities, the Global Consultations merely addressed the meaning
258. “Coming directly” naturally also covers those who come directly from the country
of origin or another country where their life or freedom were threatened in the sense of Art.
1, of the 1951 Convention. Id. art. 1.
259. Global Consultations on International Protection, supra note 248, ¶ 10(c).
260. See Grahl-Madsen, supra note 80 at 206-207; HATHAWAY, supra note 14 at 394,
396; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra
note 126, at 216 (“no duty is imposed on the asylum seeker travelling irregularly or with false
travel documents to lodge an asylum application at any particular stage of the flight from
danger”). See also R v. Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court, CO/2533/98, ¶ 18 (2001) (UK) (“the
main touchstones by which exclusion from protection should be judged are the length of stay
in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying there [. . .], and whether the refugee
sought or found their protection or de jure from the persecution they were fleeing”, para.
18); R v. Asfaw [2008] UKHL 31; R v. MMH [2008] EWCA Crim 3117, ¶¶ 14, 15.
261. UNHCR’s Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Deten-
tion of Asylum seekers, UNHCR, ¶ 4 (Feb. 1999), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3c2b3f844.html [hereinafter UNHCR Detention Guidelines (1999)]. These Guidelines were
replaced in 2012 by a new set of guidelines, but these new guidelines do not address the issue
of a brief transit; Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Deten-
tion of Asylum seekers and Alternatives to Detention, UNHCR (2012), http://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/505b10ee9/unhcr-detention-guidelines.html [herein-
after UNHCR Detention Guidelines (2012)].
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of “without delay”, which was considered to be a matter of fact and de-
gree, depending on the circumstances of the case, including the availability
of advice.262 Preceding the consultations, UNHCR indicated that “there is
no time limit which can be mechanically applied or associated with the
expression ‘without delay.’ ”263 Similarly, it has been observed that this
particular requirement must not be interpreted as a strict temporal re-
quirement but “will always depend on the refugee’s understanding of to
which authority he or she is to report.”264 This understanding should not
be equated with an obligation to identify the “right authority,” as there is
no such obligation265, an absence that corresponds with the implicit sense
in which article 31(1) is concerned with those who claim asylum in good
faith. In short, it would seem this second requirement is a temporal one,
albeit one that should not be applied mechanically but should rather take
the particular plight of refugees into consideration.266
The last requirement, that of showing good cause, or rather reasons
recognized as valid,267 for illegal entry or presence, buttresses that sense of
good faith. It requires a consideration of the circumstances under which
the refugee fled.268 The Global Consultations considered that having a
well-founded fear of persecution is in itself good cause for illegal entry.269
262. Global Consultations on International Protection, supra note 248, ¶ 10(f).
263. UNHCR’s Guidelines (1999), supra note 261, ¶ 4 (“given the special situation of
asylum seekers, in particular the effects of trauma, language problems, lack of information,
previous experiences which often result in a suspicion of those in authority, feelings of inse-
curity, and the fact that these and other circumstances may vary enormously from one asy-
lum-seeker to another”). In UNHCR’s 2012 Detention Guidelines, the need to take special
circumstances and need for particular asylum seekers into account is addressed but not in the
context of this particular requirement of Art. 31(1) of the 1951 Convention, see UNHCR
Guidelines (2012), supra note 261, Guideline 9. See Jabari v. Turkey, App. No. 40035/98, Eur.
Ct. H.R., ¶ 40 (2000) (regarding a five-day registration requirement: the automatic and
mechanical application of such a short time-limit for submitting an asylum application was a
violation of Art. 3 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms).
264. Noll, supra note 247 at 1259.
265. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 80, at 219 (“Article 31(1) does not require that a
refugee shall present himself to any particular authority”, nor that he does so at the nearest
frontier control point or local authority in the border zone); HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at
390 (referring to a refugee who mistakenly reports to officials of the wrong level or branch of
government, and giving the example of a refugee who advices officials of the city where he is
staying of his situation as having discharged himself of the duty concerned even if only na-
tional authorities have jurisdiction regarding immigration or refugee protection).
266. See supra note 260.
267. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 152 (regarding the French text that speaks of “raisons
reconnues valables”).
268. UNCHR Guidelines (1999), supra note 261, ¶ 4 (this issue is not addressed in
UNCHR Guidelines (2012), supra note 261).
269. Global Consultations on International Protection, supra note 248, ¶ 10(c). This is
exactly what the President of the Conference had observed during the drafting; ROBINSON,
supra note 14, at 153 (statement of the President of the Conference) (“no penalty was justi-
fied if the refugee could prove that his entry was due to the fact that his life or freedom
would otherwise have been in jeopardy.”) See also HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 405 (this
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Beyond this rather obvious good cause, questions arise regarding those
who transited other states before reaching the intended country of asylum.
Although the refugees concerned may still be considered to have come
directly from a territory where their life or freedom were threatened in the
sense of article 1 of the 1951 Convention, their transient presence in a
third state may be taken into consideration when assessing good cause for
illegal entry or presence.270 Such a presence may entail that the refugee
who, following a transient presence in a third state, proceeds to the desired
country of asylum is lawfully penalized for illegal entry or presence in that
state.271 This in turn, explains why refugees, as indicated earlier, only have
a limited degree of choice regarding the country of asylum.272
D. Nature of the Restrictions to Freedom of Movement
Article 31(2) concerns the possibility of restricting the freedom of
movement of refugees defined in article 31(1). Anything that may restrict
the freedom of movement of refugees comes within the scope of this pro-
vision, so not just the most obvious and far-reaching form of restriction,
detention.273
Restrictions are allowed, provided they are “necessary”: “[t]he Con-
tracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restric-
tions other than those which are necessary.”274 Since the text does not
specify anything in this respect, the first question is: necessary for what
purpose?
The drafters contemplated restrictions required to cover considera-
tions of security or special circumstances such as a great and sudden influx
of refugees or any other reason which might necessitate restrictions on the
movement of refugees.275 Detention for the purpose of investigating the
identity of the refugee whose entry or presence is unauthorized has been
cited in this context276, which, incidentally, does not mean detention may
requirement will always be met where the breach of migration control laws is the result of
flight from risk of being persecuted.).
270. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 397–99.
271. Id. at 398–99.
272. Although penalization for illegal entry because of a presence in transit elsewhere
may be justified, that does not mean that the mere possibility of protection in the transit state
justifies refusing asylum: asylum should not be refused solely on the ground that it could be
sought from another state. U.N. High Comissioner for Refugees, Conclusions Adopted by
the Executive Committee on the International Protection of Refugees, 1975-2009 (Conclu-
sion No. 1-109), Conclusion No. 15(h)(iv) (Dec. 2009).
273. Noll, supra note 247, at 1268.
274. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 31(2).
275. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 154.
276. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art. 31, ¶ 10; PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVEN-
TION, 1951. THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES ANALYSED, 357 (stating that: “[i]t results from
the history of the provision that refugees should not be kept behind barbed wire. A short
period of custody may be necessary in order to investigate the identity of the person”); see
also, HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 419-20; 421 (referring to allowing “host states time to
complete a basic inquiry into the identity and circumstances of unauthorized refugees before
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be resorted to just for the convenience of the police or immigration au-
thorities.277 Other examples are restrictions to safeguard national security,
public order, or public health.278 As to public order, UNHCR mentions
detention to prevent absconding or other kinds of refusal to cooperate
with the authorities, and in the case of manifestly unfounded or clearly
abusive asylum claims.279 It should be added that the reference to national
security in this context arguably falls short of national security in time of
war or of other grave circumstances. In such time, article 9 of the 1951
Convention provides that the state may take those provisional measures
which it considers to be essential to the national security of state with re-
gard to a particular person pending a determination that this person is in
fact a refugee and that the continuation of such measures is necessary in
his case in the interests of national security. Those provisional measures
releasing them into the community”). Cf. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note
272, Conclusion No. 44(b) (providing that “detention may be resorted to only on grounds
prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim of refugee
status or asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees have destroyed their travel and/
or identify documents or have used fraudulent documents; or to protect national security or
public order.”).
277. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art. 31, ¶ 10 “[T]the authorities have to accept
inconvenience, as long as it does not prevent them from carrying out their task.”; see also
Helen O’Nions, No Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for Administrative
Convenience, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION AND LAW 149 (2008); Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Refugee Council of N. Z., Inc., (2003) 2 NZLR 577 (CA)  ¶ 284.
278. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art. 31, at ¶ 10.
279. UNHCR Detention Guidelines (2012), supra note 261, ¶¶ 22, 23 (in the context of
accelerated procedures). The question is whether UNHCR does not qualify certain acts and
omissions too facile as falling under the heading of protecting public order; some concerns
had better be addressed under the heading of identification purposes (compare this with
Directive 2013/33, art. 8, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 101, which lays down standards for the reception
of applicants for international protection) rather than grand concepts that, in order not to
turn into catch-all blanket ones, would require a strictly circumscribed framework. The
CJEU in Case C-601/15, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, EU:C:2016:85
(2016) interpreted the notions of “national security” and “public order” in the context of the
detention of asylum seekers on the basis of Directive 2013/33/EU (recast) that prescribes that
detention should be in accordance with, inter alia, Art. 31, 1951 Convention. Regarding the
concept of “public order,” the Court stated that it entails in any event, “the existence of a
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society.” Id. ¶ 65. As far as the concept of “public security” is concerned, the Court provided
that “this concept covers both the internal security of a Member State and its external secur-
ity and that, consequently, a threat to the functioning of institutions and essential public
services and the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to
foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interest, may
affect public security.” Id. ¶ 66. The Court went on to say: “on that point, it can be seen both
from the wording and context of Article 8 of Directive 2013/33 and from its legislative history
that the possibility [. . .] of detaining an applicant for reasons relating to the protection of
national security or public order is subject to compliance with a series of conditions whose
aim is to create a strictly circumscribed framework in which such a measure may be used.” Id.
¶ 57.
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may partake of those envisaged in article 31(2), e.g., internment,280 but the
bar appears to be significantly higher.
Coming back to the question of what purpose renders a restriction
“necessary” in the sense of article 31(2), it is worth noting that the drafters
had suggested restrictions to cover “security” and “special circumstances.”
These are quite indeterminate notions that may consequently cover a vari-
ety of reasons to restrict the movements of unlawfully present refugees as
long as the restrictive measures can be considered necessary to serve the
purpose that is to be served by those restrictions.281 This, in turn, implies
that such restrictions should be proportional to the purpose that needs to
be served.282 Proportionality may thus restrict the nature of any restrictive
measures taken under article 31(2).
Another restriction can be derived from article 31(2), which provides
that any measures taken under article 31(2) may only be applied until the
status of the refugees is regularized or until they obtain admission into
another country. With respect to the latter, the drafters were thinking of
the refugee taking an active role in the process of seeking and obtaining
admission elsewhere.283 This implies that restrictions that would make this
active role impossible would not be in accordance with article 31(2). This
inference is buttressed by the last sentence of article 31(2): “The Con-
tracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.” Robinson
observes that “the necessary facilities” “will as a rule exclude confinement
in a camp or prison or in remote places and require the state to permit the
refugee to travel and to communicate with the outside world and such
bodies or organizations are likely to assist him in obtaining admission into
a country.”284
A third restriction is that any restrictive measures that are taken
should not be of a discriminatory nature: the 1951 Convention prescribes
in article 3 that the provisions of the Convention shall be applied without
discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin. Nonetheless, if re-
strictions are induced by considerations of public health, for instance,
when a group of refugees has been exposed to a contagious disease in their
country of origin, it would seem this requirement would have to yield.
A fourth limitation that has been suggested is of a procedural nature.
Noll observes that the semantic construction of the provision concerned
280. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 9, ¶ 4; Ulrike Davy, Article 9, in ZIMMER-
MANN, supra note 124, 781, at 798. Art. 8 restricts the possibility given in Art. 9 in that the
exceptional measures taken against nationals of a foreign state shall not be applied to a refu-
gee who is formally a national of that state solely on account of that nationality.
281. With a view to enabling assessing whether measures are indeed necessary, Noll has
argued that the purpose that is being served by restrictive measures should be included in
domestic legislation, which would also prevent arbitrariness. Noll, supra note 247, at 1269.
282. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 31, ¶ 10; see also WEIS, supra note 276, at 357
(observing that refugees may be placed in a camp, particularly in cases of mass influx).
283. Noll, supra note 247, at 1273.
284. ROBINSON, supra note 14 at 155.
76 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:19
has as procedural consequence that a decision on restrictions—not just the
most severe one of detention—must be based on the individual case.285
This consequence is difficult to reconcile with the intention of the drafters
to cover special circumstances, such as a mass influx.286 Nonetheless, this
particular intention should not be allowed to function as a pretext for col-
lective detention, which would be contrary to article 9(1) ICCPR. Perhaps
both the intention and the rights of the individuals making up the mass
influx can be reconciled by giving the refugees concerned the right to ob-
tain a review of the decision to detain, or subject them to any other restric-
tive measure.
In case of detention, the right to take proceedings before a court in
order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of deten-
tion is part of the right to liberty of person provided by article 9 of the
ICCPR.287 The HRC does not consider detaining individuals requesting
asylum per se arbitrary,288 but it does consider detention arbitrary when
periodical review of the decision to detain is withheld. For instance, the
detention of a Cambodian refugee who was detained for a period of four
years—on account of unlawful entry and the risk of absconding if left at
liberty—without being afforded individual consideration of the reasons for
his detention was considered to be arbitrary:289 “[E]very decision to keep
a person in detention should be open to review periodically so that the
grounds justifying the detention can be assessed.”290Article 9 thus supple-
ments the measures states may take under article 31(2) with judicial re-
view, and may thus restrict the application of article 31(2). Since the
safeguards provided by article 9 are confined to deprivation of lib-
erty,291less intrusive restrictive measures regarding the freedom of move-
285. Noll, supra note 247 at 1268 (stating that “[a]utomatic detention on a collective
basis would be hard to reconcile with the exceptional nature of restrictions on movements.”).
286. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 419-420 (the primary objective of Art. 31(2)).
287. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 9: (for the text of paragraph 1, see supra)
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. [. . .] [this provision only applies in connection with criminal charges]
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforcea-
ble right to compensation.
288. The Committee appears to condemn the blanket policy of detaining unlawful arriv-
als for extended periods of time but accept it when it for a short period of time. See Joseph &
Castan, supra note 239 at 354, 356.
289. A. v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 9.4. See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra
note 230, ¶¶ 12, 18; see also id., ¶ 14 (“Although conditions of detention are addressed pri-
marily by Arts. 7 and 10 [ICCPR], detention may also be arbitrary if the way the detainees
are treated does not relate to the purpose for which they are ostensibly being detained.”).
290. A. v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 9.4.
291. Art. 9 does not apply to “mere interference with liberty of movement under article
12.” U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 230, ¶ 5.
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ment of unlawfully present refugees taken under article 31(2) are not
supplemented by the procedural safeguards provided by article 9.
Apart from ICCPR article 9, other human rights law obligations may
affect the application of article 31(2),292 particularly with respect to deten-
tion, the most intrusive form of restriction. For example, detention is a
measure that is unlikely to be in the best interest of a refugee child and
would therefore be incompatible with the 1989 Convention on the Rights
of the Child.293
E. Duration of Restrictions to Freedom of Movement
Any measure taken to restrict the freedom of movement of refugees
under article 31(2) can only be of a temporary nature since “restrictions
shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they
obtain admission into another country” (emphasis added). The restric-
tions, in other words, end when a particular result has been realized, albeit
without subjecting the realization thereof to a particular time limit.294 But
what does regularization mean? What does admission into another coun-
try mean? And, is there a timeframe within which either one of those two
options should be realized?
Robinson recalls that the drafters intended “regularized” to mean “ac-
ceptance of a refugee for permanent settlement” and not the mere issue of
a document prior to a final decision as to the duration of his stay.295 How-
ever, he adds that this interpretation is unnecessarily restrictive because of
the wording of article 26, which deals with refugees who are lawfully in the
country296 (on which, see Section IV infra). The better view, therefore,
appears to be that “regularization” is confined to lifting the unlawfulness
of the illegal entry or presence of the refugee concerned,297 exchanging
the unauthorized presence for an authorized one, rather than a full-
fledged and completed status determination procedure.298 This would en-
292. Noll, supra note 247, at 1269.
293. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 22, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
see also, G.S. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 260, at 232 (suggesting “guarantor requirements,
supervised group accommodation, quality extra-familial care services through fostering or
residential care arrangements” as appropriate alternatives).
294. Hathaway refers nonetheless to Art. 31(2) authorizing the provisional detention of
refugees who arrive in the context of a mass influx “for a period of days”, HATHAWAY, supra
note 14, at 707.
295. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 154; see also GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art.
31(2), at ¶ 11.
296. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 154.
297. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art 31(2), at ¶ 11. If regularization is not ad-
dressed, the presence of refugees may be rendered lawful by the mere passage of time (“after
a reasonable period of time has passed”). HATHAWAY, supra note 14 at 420.
298. Noll, supra note 247, at 1272; see also UNHCR Detention Guidelines (2012), supra
note 261, at ¶ 24 (referring in this context to minimal periods in detention); see also U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, Written Submissions on Behalf of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, 47 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 17, ¶ 30 (2007) (referring to UNHCR Detention Guidelines (2012), supra note
78 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:19
tail that the institutionalized practice of detaining asylum seekers during
an initial determination of the validity of their asylum claims is, in the
absence of other valid reasons, not lawful.299 The HRC observed in its
General Comment on ICCPR article 9 that detention of refugees beyond a
brief initial period in order to document their entry, record their claims,
and determine their identity “would be arbitrary in the absence of particu-
lar reasons specific to the individual, such as an individualized likelihood
of absconding, a danger of crimes against others, or a risk of acts against
national security.”300 As to the “initial brief period” referred to, UNHCR
cautioned that strict time limits should be imposed— after all, article 31
does not set a time limit—on detention for the purposes of identity verifi-
cation, as lack of documentation is one of the main causes of indefinite or
prolonged detention.301
The alternative end to any restrictive measures taken under article
31(2) consists of refugees obtaining admission into another country. It has
been suggested that this phrase should be taken to mean the actual mo-
ment of departure for the third state302, and it is a moot point whether this
position can be sustained. The issue was at any rate explicitly discussed in
the drafting process, and the present wording should be taken to reflect
the fear that refugees would seize the mere fact of admission in a third
state—and an end to restrictive measures—to stay illegally in the country
of refuge.303 However, earlier it was observed that granting refugees the
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country, as article
31(2) requires from states, as a rule excludes detention.304 This, in turn,
implies that restrictions would only be allowed for the purpose of regulari-
zation taken in the sense described earlier that is, as lifting the unlawful-
ness of illegal entry or presence by means of submission to the laws of the
host state, including the investigation of the identity of the refugee and his
261). This point is repeated in the present 2012 Guidelines on Detention. UNHCR Detention
Guidelines (2012), supra note 261, ¶ 28 (detention for a limited initial period for recording,
within the context of a preliminary interview, the elements of their claim to international
protection; “However, such detention can only be justified where that information could not
be obtained in the absence of detention”.). Cf. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 416-17.
299. On this practice, see Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Matter? Judicial
Responses to the Detention of Asylum Seekers in the United States and the United Kingdom,
48 NYU J. OF INT’L L. AND POL. 209 (2015); see Michael Welch & Liza Schuster, Detention of
Asylum Seekers in the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy: A Critical View of the Globaliz-
ing Culture of Control, 5 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 331 (2005). See UNHCR Detention Guidelines
(2012), supra note 261, ¶ 28 (concerning an unjustifiable practice).
300. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 230, ¶ 18. See also Bakhtiyari v. Australia,
supra note 239, ¶¶  9.2-9.3; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Tarlue v. Canada, Comm. No. 1551/
2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1551/2007, ¶¶ 3.3, 7.6 (Apr. 28, 2009); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Ahani v. Canada, Comm. No. 1051/2002, UN Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002, ¶ 10.2
(Mar. 29, 2004); see A. v. Australia, supra note 237, ¶ 9.4 (“Detention, first, should not con-
tinue beyond the period for which the state party can provide appropriate justification.”).
301. UNHCR Detention Guidelines (2012), supra note 261, ¶ 26.
302. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art 31(2), ¶ 11.
303. Id.
304. See supra Section III.C.
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circumstances. If regularization would indeed be confined to, in short, re-
gistration, the duration of any restrictive measure would need to end im-
mediately upon registration, regardless of whether the refugee has found
admission elsewhere.
As to admission into another country, it is likely that the drafters con-
templated the possibility of resettlement in a third state—after all, the
IRO had just resettled over a million refugees at the time305—rather than
any other options, such as the contemporary phenomenon of removal to a
third state deemed responsible for processing the refugee’s asylum
claim.306 The position of a refugee subject to such removal would most
likely justify restrictions on the basis of public order considerations—in
particular, to prevent absconding.307
IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY OF ASYLUM
A. Introduction
This section too focuses on the refugee’s freedom of movement within
the country of asylum. Unlike the previous section, this section focuses on
refugees who are lawfully in the country of refuge. Lawfully present refu-
gees are entitled to freedom of movement in that country under article 26
of the 1951 Convention and article 12(1) of the ICCPR. Article 26 pro-
vides that
[e]ach Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its
territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move
freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to
aliens generally in the same circumstances,308
305. See W.H. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, A SPECIAL-
IZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS HISTORY AND WORK 1946-1952 (1956).
306. Noll, supra note 247, at 1273, ventures that if the refugee wishes this removal to
take place, the removal does not decisively differ from resettlement for the purposes of Art.
31(2), and would thus signal the end of restrictive measures. Since the refugee decided not to
apply for asylum in the country of arrival but proceeded to another state, it is far from likely
that the refugee would want this removal.
307. See supra Section III.B.
308. Per art. 42, states may make reservation to this Article and quite a few have done
so, inter alia, to restrict the freedom of movement of refugees when “national or international
order make it advisable to do so” or for reasons of “public security (ordre public). These
include: Angola, Latvia, Malawi, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia and Rwanda. Sudan,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe have made unconditional reservations to Art. 26, and Iran considers
it to be merely recommendations. Two states have also made declarations, formulated akin to
a reservation. The Netherlands “reserves the right to designate a place of principal residence
for certain refugees or groups of refugees in the public interest”, while Spain requires Art. 26
to be interpreted as “not precluding the adoption of special measures concerning the place of
residence of particular refugees, in accordance with Spanish law”. Honduras reserved the
right, inter alia, to restrict the freedom of movement of “certain refugees or groups of refu-
gees” when national or international considerations so warrant. Mexico has reserved the
right to establish conditions for moving within the national territory. Papua New Guinea
does not accept the obligations stipulated in Art. 26. Botswana also made a reservation to
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and article 12(1) of the ICCPR that
[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.
The first question pertains to the requirement of lawful presence:
when exactly is a refugee lawfully present, thus entitled to choose his place
of residence and move freely within the country of refuge? Does lawful
presence follow seamlessly upon regularization of status in the sense of
article 31(2), so that any restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by
virtue of that provision immediately give way to the freedoms set out in
article 26? Does “lawful presence” on which freedom of movement is
predicated in both the 1951 Convention and the ICCPR mean the same?
To what extent may the freedom of movement of lawfully present refugees
nonetheless be restricted? Can this freedom be restricted beyond regula-
tions that apply to aliens generally in the same circumstances? For in-
stance, can it be restricted to ensure that refugees do not stay too close to
the border of their country of origin, or to ensure that responsibilities re-
garding refugees, for instance pertaining to social benefits, are spread
evenly in the country of refuge, or to facilitate their integration?
B. The Beneficiaries of Articles 26 of the 1951 Convention, and Article
12 of the ICCPR: Lawfully Present Refugees
The 1951 Convention distinguishes between, albeit fails to define, dif-
ferent modes of attachment to the country of refuge, each of which corre-
sponds to particular entitlements. Confined to those who are physically
present in the country of refuge,309 the Convention predicates entitle-
ments on simple presence, lawful presence, lawful stay, and durable resi-
dence.310 Apart from article 26, article 18 on self-employment and article
32 on expulsion are also predicated on “lawful presence.”
Various interpretations of the meaning of “lawful presence” have been
offered: the first, in essence, qualifies presence as any presence that is not
unlawful311; the second suggests presence on “a more or less indefinite
basis”312; and the third points to that “what is to be treated as lawful ac-
Art. 26 but it is not clear what it consists of. U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties
.un.org/pages/Home.aspx?clang=_En (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
309. The first mode of attachment is not necessarily territorially based. See supra Sec-
tion II (third paragraph on the prohibition of refoulement).
310. See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 156-92.
311. Id. at 174 (“if admitted to a state party’s territory for a fixed period of time . . . so
long as it is officially sanctioned”); Id. at 175 (“the stage between ‘irregular’ presence and the
recognition or denial of refugee status, including the time required for exhaustion of any
appeals or reviews”); Id. at 178 (those who seek “recognition of refugee status and meet the
requirements of Art. 31”); Id. at 183 (“an intermediate category . . . between illegal presence
on the one hand, and a right to stay on the other”).
312. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 65, at 525 (expressed in relation to Art.
32 which too is predicated on lawful presence). But see id. at 524, (“[L]awful presence” is
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cording to the domestic laws of the contracting state regardless of the 1951
Convention.”313
Taking resort to the text of article 26 is to no avail, while its con-
text314—in particular, provisions that include other modes of attach-
ment—merely suggests that the meaning attached to each mode should
keep the fact of differentiation of levels in the Convention intact—assum-
ing that the drafters did differentiate those levels of attachment on pur-
pose. There is no reason to assume this is not the case.315
Robinson suggests that wherever the Convention requires “lawful
presence,” “the mere fact of lawfully being in the territory, even without
intention of permanence, must suffice.”316 Grahl-Madsen similarly in-
cludes those who are temporary present:
A refugee may be “lawfully in the territory of a Contracting
State,” even if he is not “lawfully staying there.” The expression
used in the present Article [18], and also in Articles 26 and 32,
comprises all refugees who are physically present in the territory,
provided that their presence is not unlawful. It includes short-time
visitors and even persons merely travelling through the
country.317
In a later publication, Grahl-Madsen explains this understanding of lawful
presence by taking recourse to municipal laws dealing with the status of
aliens, since those laws were the background the drafters took for
granted.318 A background that seems to buttress the first interpretation of
“lawful presence” is mentioned earlier319: it is simply about presence that
is not unlawful.
This condition can be realized in various ways, varying along with the
particular the case at hand; formal admission to a refugee status determi-
nation procedure, or regularization of status in the sense of article
31(2),320 provided the relevant domestic laws that govern the lawfulness of
presence in the territory are constrained by the presence the 1951 Conven-
stated to “impl[y] admission in accordance with the applicable immigration law, for a tempo-
rary purpose.” The examples that are subsequently given do not include refugees.).
313. See, e.g., R v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKSC 12, ¶ 40.
314. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), supra note 9 (“A treaty
should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”) (emphasis added).
315. See ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 117, who refers to the fact that the drafters used
the expression “lawful stay” rather than “lawful presence” wherever higher requirements
regarding the presence of refugees in the country were made.
316. Id., at 117, 133.
317. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art.18, ¶ 2.
318. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 80, at 344-57.
319. See note 306 and its accompanying text; see also Reinhard Marx, Article 26, in
Zimmermann, supra note 124, 1147, 1158-59.
320. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 298, ¶ 27. But see Grahl-Mad-
sen, supra note 16, Art. 26, ¶ 3, and GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 80, at 363-64.
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tion deems lawful.321 The last-mentioned condition should, in order to
avoid circular reasoning, be taken to require that the layered structure in
terms of levels of attachment of the Convention is observed (rather than
obliterated).322
The right to freedom of movement guaranteed in article 12(1) of the
ICCPR is also predicated on lawful presence, and the question is what
“lawful presence” should be taken to mean under the ICCPR? Presence is
lawful when an alien has entered a state’s territory in accordance with its
legal system and/or is in possession of a valid residence permit; the pres-
ence of an alien who entered the state illegally,323 but whose status is regu-
larized, is lawful too.324 The HRC explicitly stated that the question of
whether an alien is “lawfully” within the territory of a state is a matter
governed by domestic law, which may subject the entry of an alien to re-
strictions, which need to be in compliance with the state’s international
obligations,325 such as for instance the 1951 Convention. The notion of
“lawful presence” in article 12 appears consequently to be identical to that
used in the 1951 Convention: a presence that is not unlawful.
The next question is whether the scope of the right to freedom of
movement under both instruments is the same, in particular—since both
provide freedom of movement and the freedom to choose residence—
whether the restrictions under both instruments are of a similar scope and
nature (to be addressed in Section IV.D infra).
C. Restrictions to the Rights Granted in Article 26 of the 1951
Convention
Article 26 provides two rights—the right to freedom of movement and
the right to choose one’s place of residence, and subjects both rights to
“any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”
A first question pertains to the puzzling phrase “aliens generally in the
same circumstances,” for who find themselves in the same circumstances
as refugees?
The use of the yardstick “in the same circumstances” is the subject of
article 6 of the 1951 Convention, which defines this recurring phrase as
follows:
321. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 177 (“in most cases a minimalist constraint on the
scope of domestic discretion”).
322. Which is what the British Supreme Court did in R v. Sec. of State for the Home
Dep’t, [2012] UKSC 12 (blending “lawful presence” and “lawful stay” predominantly to
avoid incurring the obligations regarding expulsion (Art. 32) and freedom of movement (Art.
26) to those who have not formally been admitted, as a result, a refugee who is given tempo-
rary admission to stay in the country pending determination of her status is not lawfully
present in the UK).
323. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 264.
324. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 4 (referring to U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Celepli v. Sweden, Comm. No. 456/1991, UN doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991 (Jul.
26,1994)).
325. Id.
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For the purposes of this Convention, the term “in the same cir-
cumstances” implies that any requirements (including require-
ments as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which
the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment of
the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by
him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a
refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Although article 6 does not refer to aliens,
[t]he net result is a fair balance between a general principle of
assimilating refugees to other aliens . . . and the equally obvious
need to render substantive justice to refugees in the application of
those principles.326
As far as the exception is concerned, the reference is to such requirements
as producing a certificate of nationality or a diploma acquired in the coun-
try of origin.327 It is a moot point whether this exception is applicable in
the context of article 26; it is hard to see why it would be, and, as Robinson
explains the intent of article 26 as assimilating refugees to aliens in general
without making observation regarding the possibility of exceptions that
would apply to refugees in this particular respect.328
The conclusion is therefore that refugees and other aliens are to be
treated on par with respect to freedom of movement and choice of resi-
dence. Article 26 prescribes equal treatment as aliens; in case particular
restrictions apply to “certain classes of aliens,” these may apply to refu-
gees as well, provided they find themselves in the same circumstances as
those aliens.329 From the perspective of refugees: article 26 grants freedom
of movement and choice of residence to refugees, but allows restrictions
provided these also apply to other aliens in the country of refuge. It does
not, in other words, indicate whether particular restrictions are compatible
with the rights granted in article 26 as long as they apply, in essence, in a
non-discriminatory manner to refugees and other aliens alike, if their pres-
ence in the country is lawful. (This is quite unlike paragraphs 1 and 3 of
326. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 208; repeated by Reinhard Marx & Felix Machts,
Article 6, in Zimmermann, supra note 124, 707-08.
327. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art. 6, ¶ 3.
328. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 133 explaining that Art. 26 is in substance a reproduc-
tion of the corresponding article in the 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees
coming from Germany. It concerns Art. 2: “Without prejudice to the power of the High
Contracting Party to regulate the right of sojourn and residence, a refugee shall be entitled to
move about freely, to sojourn or reside in the territory to which the present Convention
applies, in accordance with the laws and internal regulations applying therein.”. The right to
freedom of movement in the latter is, however, not subject to regulations applicable to aliens
generally in the same circumstances, and hence not checked by the contemporary non-dis-
crimination safeguard.
329. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art. 26, ¶ 6. Cf. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art.
7(1) (“Except where this Convention contains more favorable provisions, a Contracting State
shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.”).
84 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:19
article 12 of the ICCPR, which provide conditions that must be met before
any restrictions on the rights granted are deemed permissible.)
The regulations that may restrict freedom of movement under article
26 appear to have been drafted particularly with “frontier or strategic
zones” in mind, “access to which is forbidden to aliens.”330 This restriction
has been qualified by Grahl-Madsen as “entirely reasonable” and:
The same seems to apply if admission to an area is forbidden for
some other reason, e.g. because of a natural catastrophe, or be-
cause of a rebellion, civil war or large-scale police operations, that
is to say, areas where strangers may be in the way, or where their
safety cannot be guaranteed.331
As to restrictions regarding residence, reference is made to the practice of
admission of “immigrant workers” to specified occupations or specified
regions of the country,332 and if these are applied by the country to aliens,
these may be applied to refugees in the same circumstances, provided they
are not applied in a discriminatory manner.333 Robinson nonetheless ob-
serves that article 26
would [. . .] not conflict with special situations where refugees
have to be accommodated in special camps or in special areas
even if this does not apply to aliens generally.334
It would conflict with article 26, both with respect to freedom of move-
ment and to securing identical treatment with other aliens since article 26
requires equal treatment with aliens regarding restrictive measures. The
travaux are equally clear: refugee-specific constraints, including indirect
ones such as terms and conditions of admission (e.g., residence in return
for work in a specific location and for a specific amount of time), were
explicitly rejected by the drafters since such constraints would provide few
safeguards for refugees unless they are generally applied to all non-
citizens.335
330. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Art. 26, ¶ 6. See also ROBINSON, supra note 14, at
133.
331. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 26, ¶ 6. A related example would be the prohi-
bition of admission or settlement close to the border with the country of origin—provided it
would apply to all aliens—with a view to preventing the use of such settlements as rear bases
for attacks on the country of origin—compromising the civilian nature of those settlements—
and for recruitment purposes. Cf. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refu-
gee Problems in Africa art. III(2), Jun. 20, 1974, CAB/LEG/24.3 (“Signatory States under-
take to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from attacking any State
Member of the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in
particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio”).
332. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 26, ¶ 6. See also ROBINSON, supra note 14, at
133.
333. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 26, ¶ 6.
334. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 133 (emphasis added).
335. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 709-10. See also infra.
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A comparable exception to article 26, which has been suggested by a
contemporary commentator, is to confine the freedom of movement of
asylum seekers to an assigned area if it is restricted to “situations of mass
influx, or to the procedural situation of investigating the identity of, and
possibly security threat posed by an individual seeking recognition of refu-
gee status.”336 This—and the same applies ipso facto to the unsettling ex-
ample given by Robinson on the confinement of refugees in camps—
seems plainly wrong, since these two specific concerns were addressed by
the drafters and accommodated in article 31(2).337
The issue of taking up residence in an allotted area was the subject of
a ruling by the European Court of Justice.338 The Court was requested to
give a preliminary ruling on the question of whether requiring a refugee to
take up residence in a geographically limited area (such as a municipality,
district, or region) constituted an unlawful restriction of freedom of move-
ment under article 33 of the Qualification Directive on the freedom of
movement of refugees and persons who have been granted subsidiary pro-
tection status, under the same conditions and restrictions as those pro-
vided for other third-country nationals legally residing in the territories of
member states.339 The Court ruled that this was indeed the case, with a
reference to article 26 of the 1951 Convention.340
336. Marx, supra note 319, at 1164. Marx refers to EU law—the Reception Directive
(of 2003)—that entitles EU member states to restrict the right to move freely within their
territory. The relevant Directive has been superseded by a recast version: Directive 2013/33/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for the reception
of applicants for international protection (recast) of 26 June 2013. Directive 2013/33, supra
note 279. Art. 7 thereof—on Residence and Freedom of Movement—allows for several
restrictions:
“1. Applicants may move freely within the territory of the host Member State or
within an area assigned to them by that Member State. [. . .]
2. Member States may decide on the residence of the applicant for reasons of
public interest, public order or, when necessary, for the swift processing and
effective monitoring of his or her application for international protection. [. . .]
3. >Member States may make provision of the material reception conditions sub-
ject to actual residence by the applicants in a specific place, to be determined
by the Member States. [. . .]”. Id.
337. Compellingly set out by HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 707; see also id., 705–06
regarding these two specific concerns of the drafters.
338. Joined Cases C-443/14 & C-444/14, Warendorf v Ibrahim Alo v. Region Hannover,
EU:C:2016:127 (2016). The case concerned the entitlements of persons granted subsidiary
protection status rather than refugees, see infra.
339. Art. 33 of the Qualification Directive provides that: “Member States shall allow
freedom of movement within their territory to beneficiaries of international protection,
under the same conditions and restrictions as those provided for other third-country nation-
als legally resident in their territories.” Directive 2011/95, art. 33, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9. The
beneficiaries of international protection are defined in Art. 2 sub (b) as “a person who has
been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status [. . .]”.
340. Joined Cases C-443/14 and C-444/14, supra note 338, ¶¶ 35-40. In addition, it ruled
that the Directive precludes the imposition of a residence condition exclusively on benefi-
ciaries of subsidiary protection status for the purpose of achieving an appropriate distribution
of the burden connected with the benefits in question. Id. ¶ 56. However, the Court did not
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In short, article 26 does not exclude restrictions to refugees lawfully in
its territory regarding choice of place of residence and ability to move
freely within its territory, provided these restrictions affect refugees and
other aliens in the country alike. Beyond that, any whim regarding restric-
tions, provided it is applied in a non-discriminatory manner, would go,
unless, of course, the restrictions would violate article12 paragraphs (1)
and (3) of the ICCPR.
D. Restrictions on Freedom of Movement Based on ICCPR Article 12
The main question is how any restrictions on the right of liberty of
movement and the freedom to choose residence that are justified under
article 12(3) and, in times of a public emergency, under article 4 ICCPR,
would affect the scope of the same rights given in article 26 of the 1951
Convention.
Article 12(3) allows states to restrict internal freedom of movement
and the freedom to choose residence when necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals, or the rights
or freedoms of others, provided these restrictions are consistent with the
other rights recognized in the Covenant. With respect to those other
rights, of particular relevance in the present context is ICCPR article 2(1),
which prohibits discrimination on virtually any ground including national
origin.341 The HRC explicitly addressed the issue of freedom of movement
in this respect:
Once an alien is lawfully within a territory, his freedom of move-
ment within the territory and his right to leave that territory may
only be restricted in accordance with article 12, paragraph 3. Dif-
ferences in treatment in this regard between aliens and nationals,
or between different categories of aliens, need to be justified
under article 12, paragraph 3.342
preclude subjecting beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status to a residence condition for
the purpose of facilitating their integration if they are not in a situation that is objectively
comparable, in so far as that objective is concerned, with the situation of third-country na-
tionals legally resident in the member state concerned. Id. ¶ 64.
341. Cf. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under
the Covenant, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 140, ¶ 2 (1986); see also NOWAK, supra note
12, at 54. (“Unequal treatment of aliens is permissible only with respect to rights limited to
nationals.”). See also ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 26 and U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra
note 36, ¶ 12 (“[T]he application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26
is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.”).
342. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 36, ¶ 8. In U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Karker v. France, Comm. No. 833/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/833/1998, ¶ 9.2 (2000),
Karker, a refugee from Tunisia, was ordered to compulsory residence in the department of
Finistère for reasons of public security (on account of suspicion that he actively supported a
terrorist movement) after an expulsion order proved impossible to implement. The Human
Rights Committee did not elaborate these issues beyond reviewing the circumstances and the
materials before it, which “do not allow it to conclude that the State Party has misapplied the
restrictions in article 12, paragraph 3.” Id. ¶ 9.2.
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Any such differences in treatment would, however, be incompatible with
article 26. In the absence of a substantive bar against restrictions to the
rights concerned in article 26, any measure that restricts the freedoms
granted in ICCPR article 12(1) that can be considered to be lawful in the
sense of article 12(3) would also be lawful under article 26 unless the mea-
sure taken is refugee-specific in which case the measure could be deemed
lawful under the ICCPR but not under the 1951 Convention.
Article 26 may thus ward off any measure that does not treat refugees
and aliens alike, but in the absence of any other delimitation, in principle
virtually any restrictive measure short of denying rights altogether could
be taken, provided it affects aliens and refugees alike. The absence of a
substantive delimitation may be countered by the safeguards comprised in
article 12(3), which requires that any restriction should be provided by
law, and satisfy a number of other conditions.343 The same applies to the
more intrusive restrictions that would be allowed in times of public emer-
gency under ICCPR article 4. These too are strictly delimited.
V. EXTERNAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
A. Introduction
Besides having freedom of movement within the country of asylum,
the refugee may wish to leave the country of asylum to visit family in other
states, to resettle in a third state, or achieve any other purpose. The 1951
Convention does not address the right to external movement as such. It is
confined to the issuing of travel documents for refugees who are lawfully
staying in the country and thus assumes their right to external freedom of
movement.344
Article 12(2) of the ICCPR provides the right to leave any country. A
first question is whether this right is likewise predicated on a particular
mode of attachment with the country concerned. A second one is whether
“any country” includes the country of refuge. If so, does the right to leave
impose positive obligations to enable the refugee to leave the country? As
discussed above, the right to leave is not absolute; it is subject to the re-
strictions of article 12(3) and, beyond that, to derogation in time of public
emergency in the sense of ICCPR article 4. If that public emergency is a
non-international or international armed conflict in the country of refuge,
what does that signify for the refugees residing there in terms of their right
to leave the country concerned? What if the country of refuge is occupied
territory? These questions are regulated by international humanitarian law
and will be addressed below.
This section will first focus on the right to leave one’s country as pro-
vided in article 12(2) of the ICCPR, both in time of peace, and during a
public emergency, which may involve non-international and international
armed conflicts, with a view to identifying the scope of the right to leave
343. See supra Section I.B.
344. See Art. 28 and the provisions of the Schedule to the 1951 Convention, supra note
2.
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one’s country. Subsequently, this section will address article 28 of the 1951
Convention with a view to identifying those who are entitled to a Conven-
tion Travel Document (CTD). Entitlement to a CTD is predicated on a
“lawful stay” and this invites the question as to what constitutes “lawful
stay”. In addition, article 28 calls on states parties to give sympathetic con-
sideration to the issue of travel documents to other refugees in their terri-
tory who are unable to obtain travel documents from the country of their
lawful residence, which requires identification of those other refugees. The
right to be issued a CTD is not an absolute right, and another question
pertains to the limitations given in article 28: compelling reasons of na-
tional security or public order may bar the issue of a CTD and hence,
travel. The nature of this restriction will be analyzed, also in relation to
ICCPR article 12.
B. The Beneficiaries of ICCPR article 12(2): The Right to Leave
“any Country”
ICCPR article 12(2) provides that “everyone” has the right to leave
“any” country including his own; this should indeed be taken to literally
mean everyone, nationals and aliens alike, without conditions of lawful
residency: “the scope of article 12, paragraph 2, is not restricted to persons
lawfully within the territory of a State.”345 It therefore applies to refugees
too, regardless of their legal status in their country of refuge.
In order to be able to exercise this right - in a regular manner - travel
documents are required.346 The HRC has addressed this issue in a number
of cases, most notably in the so-called “passport cases,” and has recog-
nized that the right to leave includes the positive obligation to issue travel
documents, so that the right to leave can actually be exercised.347 In its
345. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 8.
346. Sometimes even an exit visa is required. Turkey requires that all refugees who
have been selected for resettlement in third countries obtain an exit visa. Temporary Protec-
tion Regulation, enacted Oct. 22, 2014, Art. 44(1) (Turk.) (“Temporary or permanent depar-
ture of the foreigners under this Regulation to a third country shall be subject to the
permission of the Directorate General”). See also Refugee Rights Turkey, Resettlement and
Family Reunification, Departures of Beneficiaries: Turkey, ASYLUM INFO. DATABASE (2015),
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/resettlement-and-family-reunification
-departures-beneficiaries. 2016 saw a change in practice, under which some refugees were
denied exit visas based on their levels of academic qualification. Refugees with university
qualifications in particular found their cases rejected or left pending for unusual periods of
time. Turkey ‘Denying Educated Syrians’ Travel to Germany, THE LOCAL, Jun. 21, 2016,
https://www.thelocal.de/20160621/turkey-wont-let-syrians-travel-even-with-german-visas;
Patrick Kingsley, Turkey Blocks Syrian Refugees from Resettlement in the US — for Having
University Degrees, THE GUARDIAN, Sep. 19, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
sep/19/turkey-syrian-refugees-resettlement-blocked-us-degrees. Statements of politicians re-
ferred to the importance of preventing brain drain among the refugee population as a justifi-
cation for this approach, Emily Feldman. Emily Feldman, Turkey Hoards Well-Educated
Syrians, POLITICO, Mar. 10, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-prevent-well-educated
-syrian-refugees-from-leaving-migration/.
347. Many views could be mentioned, but see, for instance, U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Martins v. Uruguay, Comm. No 57/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/57/1979; U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Montero v. Uruguay, Comm. No 106/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/
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General Comment regarding article 12, the HRC phrased it as follows:
“Since international travel usually requires appropriate documents, in par-
ticular a passport, the right to leave a country must include the right to
obtain the necessary travel documents.”348
However, none of the considerable number of communications of the
HRC regarding the refusal to issue passports addressed the right to travel
documents of anyone other than nationals and habitual residents. The rel-
evant General Comment consequently only mentions the state of national-
ity and the state of residence as having a positive obligation to issue travel
documents under article 12(2),349 and does not specifically mention the
country of refuge. The question is, therefore, whether states are obligated,
under article 12(2) and the implied obligation to issue travel documents, to
issue travel documents to refugees and other aliens within their territories.
In view of the fact that the right to leave as set out in article 12(2) is
not confined to nationals of the state concerned but accrues to anyone -
not even restricted to those who are lawfully present -, the obligations to
issue travel documents to aliens must be considered to be part of this
right.350 It would consequently seem that the only requirement for estab-
lishing the right to a travel document under ICCPR article 12(2) is that the
person finds himself within the territory and the jurisdiction of the state
concerned.351 Since the right to leave must include the right to obtain the
necessary travel documents, to argue otherwise would be to argue that the
right to leave as set out in article 12(2) is, after all, not a right that accrues
to anyone. For refugees, it means they make invoke article 12(2) to obtain
a travel document, regardless of the nature of their stay in the country of
refuge.
This entitlement is vital for refugees, since they are barred from re-
questing a travel document—passport—from their country of origin (or,
rather, nationality) because doing so, would signify that they are volunta-
rily re-availing themselves of the protection of that country and that, in
106/1981; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Bwalya v. Zambia, Comm. No 314/1988, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Kalenga v. Zambia, Comm. No 326/
1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/1988; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay,
supra note 106; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Dernawi v. Libya, Comm. No 1143/2000, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1143/2002; U.N. Human Rights Comm., El Ghar v. Libya, Comm. No
1107/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/104/D/1782/2008.
348. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 9. Presumably also the granting of exit
visa if required by the country. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 342.
349. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 9.
350. This inference corresponds with the practice of states to issue so-called “aliens
passports” to stateless persons, those of undefined citizenship, and those with a residence
permit in the country. See JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE,
CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 161(2000) (states offering passports to “denizens,” i.e. non-
citizen nationals such as resident aliens, refugees, asylees, non-citizen populations over which
they hold dominion). Those who are entitled to subsidiary protection in the EU are entitled
to be issued travel documents when they are unable to obtain a national passport unless
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require it. Directive 2011/
95, supra note 339, art. 25(2).
351. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(1).
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turn, would justify loss of refugee status under article 1C(1) of the 1951
Convention.352
C. The Right to Leave in Time of Peace and During a State of
Emergency
The right to leave the country may, under article 12(3) of the ICCPR,
be restricted by measures provided by law, which are necessary to protect
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals, or
the rights and freedoms of others. Those restrictions were addressed ear-
lier, and a final question that needs to be raised is whether such restric-
tions affect refugees in the same way they would affect nationals and
habitual residents, or anyone else for that matter, in the relevant country.
Arguably so by virtue of ICCPR article 2(1), which prescribes that each
state party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant without distinction of any kind, including “national origin,”
which covers alienage.353
However, additional restrictions may apply in times of public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the nation provided its existence is offi-
cially proclaimed.354 ICCPR article 4 is invoked by states with a disturbing
frequency—and states of emergency may in addition last an equally dis-
turbingly long time355 —in situations which vary from a hazardous situa-
tion caused by a hurricane, the spread of bird flu, acts of subversion and
armed uprising, acts of violence, civil unrest, terrorism, criminality, strikes
and economic crises, non-international and international armed con-
flict.356 A recent example is Turkey, a state that hosts millions of predomi-
nantly Syrian refugees, which proclaimed a state of emergency following
an aborted coup d’état on 15 July 2016. The state of emergency has since
been extended several times, and continues at the time of this writing.357
352. Art. 1C(1) refers to refugees who retained the nationality of the country of origin:
the Convention shall cease to apply when the refugee “has voluntarily re-availed himself of
the protection of his country of nationality.”. in the absence of proof to the contrary). U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 119, ¶¶ 100, 121.
353. See supra note 341.
354. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4; U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 22, ¶ 2.
355. Israel, for instance, proclaimed a state of emergency in May 1948, and has main-
tained it ever since: once it acceded to the ICCPR in 1991, it notified the U.N.S.G. of its
invoking Art. 4 UNTC, accessed on 17 January 2017.
356. See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 308.
357. Following the aborted coup, Turkey invoked Art. 4 ICCPR. Cf. U.N. Experts Urge
Turkey to Adhere to its Human Rights Obligations Even in Time of Declared Emergency,
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (Aug. 19, 2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20394; see also
Başak Bağlayan, The Turkish State of Emergency Under Turkish Constitutional Law and In-
ternational Human Rights Law, ASIL INSIGHT (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/21/issue/1/turkish-state-emergency-under-turkish-constitutional-law-and. On 17 July
2017, the state of emergency was extended for the fourth time, for another 3 months. Turkish
Government Extends State of Emergency Rule for Another 3 Months, REUTERS (Jul. 17,
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-emergency-idUSKBN1A212S?il=0.
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Another example is France, which proclaimed a state of emergency after
terrorist attacks were committed in Paris on 13 November 2015, a state of
emergency that has also been extended several times and continues too at
the time of writing.358
Provided the public emergency has officially been proclaimed, the
right to leave may be curtailed by virtue of ICCPR article 4.359 To a cer-
tain extent, that is: states parties may take measures derogating from their
obligations under the Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation, “provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with their other obligations under international law, and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin.”360 In other words, the extensive prohibition on discrimi-
nation provided in ICCPR article 2(1) gives way to a more limited one in
time of public emergency.361 The exclusion of “national origin” was inten-
tional362, and as a result, refugees and other foreigners may be specifically
affected by measures that derogate from article 12, provided those mea-
sures are not inconsistent with other obligations under international law.
One such obligation is article 8 of the 1951 Convention addressing possible
exceptional measures—which may besides many other restrictions include
restrictions on freedom of movement363—that may be taken against the
person, property, or interests of nationals of a foreign state but exempts
refugees who are formally nationals of that foreign state from such mea-
sures:364 the formal legal bond between a refugee and his country of na-
358. France declared a state of emergency following the November 13, 2015 terrorist
attacks in Paris. It amended and expanded its 1955 state of emergency law in an accelerated
procedure on 20 November. The new law grants the French government broad grounds to
restrict liberty of movement. France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights, Human Rights
Watch (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/france-new-emergency-powers-
threaten-rights. The state of emergency in France has been renewed several times and ex-
tended until November 2017. See INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM
MEASURES & HUMAN RIGHTS: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE NORM (2016); Yas-
meen Serhan, Will France’s State of Emergency Become Permanent?, THE ATLANTIC (Jul.
11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/will-frances-state-of-
emergency-become-permanent/532848/.
359. France notified the U.N.S.G. of its invoking Art. 4 ICCPR in accordance with Art.
4(3) ICCPR on 25 November 2015 (including the possibility of derogation from Art. 12
ICCPR), and of its extending the state of emergency on 26 February 2016, and again on 22
July 2016, on 21 December 2016, and on 14 July 2017. U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note
308. Turkey too notified the U.N.S.G. of its invoking Art. 4 ICCPR in accordance with Art.
4(3) ICCPR on 2 August 2016 (including the possibility of derogation from Art. 12 ICCPR),
and of its extending the state of emergency on 14 October 2016, and again on 9 January 2017,
and on 19 April 2017. U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 308.
360. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4(1).
361. Art. 26, ICCPR, supra note 10, on non-discrimination, does include “national ori-
gin” but is to no avail since that right may be derogated from by Art. 4(2).
362. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 99–100 (“[S]ince in time of war, nationals of enemy
States are often discriminated against.”).
363. Davy, supra note 280, at 772.
364. But see infra Section V.E.
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tionality “does not sufficiently legitimize measures intrinsically based on
the supposition that there is, in addition to the legal bond, also a strong
bond of loyalty” with the country concerned.365 Put differently, article 8
acknowledges that the formal nationality of the refugee is de facto an inef-
fective one (as a result of which any such exceptional measures would not
be able to achieve the intended effect of enhancing national security or
pressuring the foreign state concerned to act or refrain from acting in a
certain way either).366
A public emergency may involve an armed conflict.367 The HRC ob-
served about this type of emergency that “[d]uring armed conflict, whether
international or non-international, rules of international humanitarian law
become applicable and help, in addition to the provisions in article 4 and
article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant to prevent the abuse of a State’s
emergency powers.”368 The next two paragraphs will address those addi-
tional safeguards provided by international humanitarian law.
D. The Right to Leave in Time of a Non-international Armed Conflict
In a situation of a non-international armed conflict,369 when the
state’s armed forces are confronted with armed opposition groups within
its territory,370 international humanitarian law applies, more in particular,
365. Davy, supra note 280, at 757.
366. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 272; Davy, supra note 280, at 758.
367. See General Comment No. 29, supra note 22, at ¶¶ 2, 3. Art. 4 itself does not refer
to “war” to prevent the impression that the U.N., established to prevent war, accepted war.
NOWAK, supra note 12, at 89.
368. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 22, ¶ 3. Art. 5(1) ICCPR provides
that: “Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the present Covenant.” ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 5(1). Art. 4 also
applies when the public emergency consists of an international armed conflict, “the prototype
of a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation.” NOWAK, supra note 12, at 89.
General Comment No. 31, supra note 23, with a reference to General Comment No. 22, ¶ 11
reiterates this: “the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of
international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights,
more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be especially relevant for the pur-
poses of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres are complementary, not mutu-
ally exclusive.” For more in general about the relation between international human rights
law and international humanitarian law, see HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY OPERATIONS 57 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2d ed. 2015) (“When applicable
simultaneously, international humanitarian law and human rights law are complemen-
tary . . .”). See also Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law
and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310
(2007).
369. A synonym for “civil war.” Cf. PIETRO VERRI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 35 (Edward Markee & Susan Mutti trans., 1992).
370. This is a very simple and short summary. For the complexities involved, see in
particular  OSCAR UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION: RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR  25-45 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958); IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION
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common article 3, the provision that is identical in each of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949,371 and rules of customary international humanita-
rian law apply.
Common article 3(1) provides that:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all cir-
cumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or
any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person . . .
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment . . .
The question is whether common article 3 affords additional safeguards
regarding the right to leave in particular with respect to refugees who are
no longer safe in their country of refuge. Illustrative for such a situation
are the African refugees who were living in or transiting through Libya,
and found themselves caught in the civil war in Libya in 2011.372 They not
only found themselves in a war zone, but even became targets themselves -
sub-Saharan refugees were suspected and accused of being mercenaries
OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD COMMEN-
TARY OF 2016: ARTICLE 3 ¶ 393 (2016) (“[A]rmed conflicts not of an international character
are first of all armed conflicts which oppose the government of a State Party and one or more
non-State Parties”); Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 605 (Dieter Fleck eds., 3rd ed., 2013);
see also Noëlle Quénivet, Applicability Test of Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3
for Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES 31 (D. Jinks et al. eds., 2014).
371. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Conven-
tion (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
372. See generally Sybella Wilkes, Sub-Saharan Africans Fleeing Libya Report Serious
Intimidation, Violence, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Mar. 8, 2011), http://
www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2011/3/4d7658719/sub-saharan-africans-fleeing-libya-report-seri-
ous-intimidation-violence.html; AMNESTY INT’L, EUROPE, NOW IT IS YOUR TURN TO ACT.
REFUGEES FORCED OUT OF LIBYA URGENTLY NEED RESETTLEMENT (2011); AL-JAZEERA,
African Migrants Targeted in Libya Rights Groups Fear Dozens Killed in Violent Backlash
Against Supposed Gaddafi-Hired Mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa (Feb. 28, 2011), http:/
/www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122865814378541.html.
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hired by ousted leader Muammar Gaddafi373 - and were thus compelled to
leave Libya in search of asylum elsewhere.374
Common article 3 does not include nationality or national origin
among the prohibited distinctions,375 nor does it address freedom of
movement. Yet it “does prohibit humiliating and degrading treatment,
which may arguably be violated if civilians are prevented from leaving a
territory where they may face ill-treatment.”376 Protocol II,377 which de-
velops and supplements common article 3, is confined to protecting civil-
ians against forced departure from their own territory for reasons
connected to the conflict378, and does not address voluntary departure.
It would therefore seem that the ICCPR, that is article 12(2) and (3)
jo. article 4, provides, also in a time of non-international armed conflict,
the best safeguard for refugees with respect to the right to leave, subject to
the extent to which restrictive measures may be discriminatory vis-à-vis
refugees.379 The ICCPR is simply much more specific regarding both the
right to external movement and the restrictions to which this right may be
subjected, restrictions that must be consistent with other obligations states
have under international law, which include the exemption from excep-
373. African Migrants Targeted in Libya, supra note.
374. Their right to leave the country turned, once more, into the right to seek asylum,
and they were, thus, back at square one. See Chapter 1, supra. On their fate, see IRIN, Hun-
dreds in limbo at camp on the Tunisian-Libyan border, (Jan. 16, 2013), http://
www.irinnews.org/report/97254/hundreds-limbo-camp-tunisian-libyan-border; Dalia Al
Aichi, UNHCR Closes Camp in South Tunisia, Moves Services to Urban Areas, U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Jul. 2,2013), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/7/
51d2a40e9/unhcr-closes-camp-south-tunisia-moves-services-urban-areas.html. But see Lamia
Ledrisi, Tunisia, the Humanitarian Emergency of the Choucha Refugee Camp, MEDITERRA-
NEAN AFFAIRS (Jun. 15, 2015), http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/tunisia-the-humanitarian-
emergency-of-the-choucha-refugee-camp/.
375. In his Commentary, Pictet refers to other articles that elaborate aspects of Art. 3,
such as Art. 27 that does not include nationality either. Pictet says that this “does not in any
way mean that people of a given nationality may be treated in an arbitrary manner; everyone,
whatever his nationality, is entitled to humane treatment. On the other hand, it is quite possi-
ble that special security measures may be taken in the case of civilians of a given national-
ity . . .” UHLER, supra note 370, at 40. The omission of nationality in Art. 27 is a conscious
one, “and the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference make it clear that it cannot be re-
garded as implicitly included.” Id. at 206.
376. Pamela Hylton, The Right to Leave, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COM-
MENTARY 1173, ¶ 31 (Andrew Clapham et. al. eds., 2015). A similar prohibition is included in
the ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 7, from which derogation is not allowed provides that: “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
[. . .].” (cf. id. art. 4(2)).
377. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
378. Id. art. 17(2) (“Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for
reasons connected with the conflict.”).
379. See infra Section V.D on Art. 9 of the 1951 Convention.
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tional measures comprised in article 8 of the 1951 Convention,380 and
“particularly the rules of international humanitarian law.”381
E. The Right to Leave in Time of International Armed Conflict
In time of war, that is, declared war or any other armed conflict that
may arise between states, or partial or total occupation, yet other restric-
tions to the freedom of movement may become applicable. Both the
Fourth Geneva Convention382 and the 1951 Convention383 protect foreign
nationals and refugees respectively from being treated as “enemy aliens”
exclusively based on their nationality of an enemy state. Unlike non-refu-
gee foreign nationals, treating refugees from the country concerned as en-
emy aliens does not, as indicated earlier, make much sense in view of their
wholly ineffective nationality.384 The question is whether refugees would
nonetheless, in cases of an international armed conflict, be subject to re-
strictions on the right to leave the country concerned.
Article 73 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I)385 provides that persons who before the beginning of
hostilities were considered as stateless persons or refugees under the rele-
vant international instruments, shall be protected persons within the
meaning of Parts I and III of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in all circum-
stances and without any adverse distinction. Article 48 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, which is included in Part III, provides that “[p]rotected
persons who are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied,
may avail themselves of the right to leave the territory subject to the pro-
visions of article 35 . . .”.386
380. On which, art. 8 also applies in time of non-international armed conflict and inter-
national armed conflict. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 271–72.
381. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 22, ¶ 9; NOWAK, supra note 12, at 99
(“One is particularly reminded in this context of the minimum guarantees of the rule of law
contained in Art. 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 as well as in the two Additional
Protocols of 1977.”).
382. Article 44 of the Geneva Convention (IV) states: “In applying the measures of
control in the present Convention, the Detaining Power shall not treat as enemy aliens exclu-
sively based on their nationality “de jure” of an enemy State, refugees who do not, in fact,
enjoy the protection of any government.” Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 371, art. 44.
383. Article 8 of the1951 Convention: “With regard to exceptional measures which may
be taken against the person, property or interests of nationals of a foreign State, the Con-
tracting States shall not apply such measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the
said State solely on account of such nationality. [. . .].” 1951 Convention, supra note 2. See
also supra note 366 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Section V.C.
385. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 73, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
386. Art. 48 addresses repatriation (its title is Special cases of repatriation). However,
the specific reference to Part III in Art. 73 “reveals a willingness to grant refugees the best
possible protection and allows each article of the Convention to be interpreted in the most
favorable light for refugees. This means, for example, that refugees . . . may also avail them-
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By virtue of Protocol I, this right also applies to protected persons,
and hence to refugees, when the occupying state is the country of origin of
the refugees concerned: “[t]his Section in particular gives them the right to
leave occupied territory (article 48).”387 As indicated, the right of depar-
ture outlined in article 48 is subject to article 35, which provides that “[a]ll
protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or
during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so, unless their departure is con-
trary to the national interests of the State . . .”. Thus, national interests
may prevent departure.
The question then becomes when departure can properly be deemed
to be contrary to the national interests of the state. The 1958 Commentary
to the Fourth Geneva Convention refers in this respect to in particular
men at an age to bear arms who are thus likely to be mobilized (by the
country origin), and persons whose departure is regarded as dangerous to
the security of the state where they have been residing.388 The possibility
of mobilization of refugees is highly unlikely since they would, upon de-
parture, not return to their country of origin. However, article 35 may also
be invoked to object to someone’s departure when the national economy
would suffer as a result; “[t]he Conference had in mind, in particular, the
case of countries of immigration, where the departure of too large a pro-
portion of aliens might prejudice national interests by creating manpower
or economic problems.”389 This is quite an extensive, and rather utilita-
rian, interpretation.390 In a situation of international armed conflict, dur-
ing which, presumably, ICCPR article 4 has been invoked and hence
allows derogation from article 12(2),391 it would seem there is no legal bar
to prevent a state from invoking such national interests. Article 8 of the
1951 Convention does not apply when such interests are invoked with re-
spect to aliens without discrimination.392
selves of the right to leave the territory as set out in Article 48 in order to go to a third
country, despite the heading of that article, which refers to repatriation.” COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 ¶ 2982 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarksi & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). The
headings of the Conventions have in any case no official character. They were added by the
Secretariat of the 1949 Conference and were not adopted by the Diplomatic Conference
itself. Id.
387. Id., ¶ 2985.
388. UHLER, supra note 370, at 234–36; see also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS
CONVENTIONS 36–7 (1958).
389. UHLER, supra note 370, at 236.
390. Robert Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention
and Protocol I, 90 MIL. L. R. 49, 84 (1980) (“‘National interest’ is so broad, in fact, that
virtually any action resulting from governmental policy, other than bureaucratic whimsy, can
be justified by its terms.”). See also id. at 85.
391. See supra Section V.C.
392. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 14, art. 8, ¶ 3.
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F. Article 28 of the 1951 Convention
So far, this section has focused on the right to leave every country
under the ICCPR, both in times of peace and in times of, to summarize it
thus, serious upheaval. The ICCPR implies that departure requires the is-
sue of a travel document,393 and the 1951 Convention instead focuses on
the issuance of a travel document. Article 28(1) provides that “[t]he Con-
tracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory
travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require
. . .” Article 28, in other words, proceeds from a travel document, and thus
implies external movement. This right is predicated on “lawful stay,” and
the obvious first question pertains to this requirement: when is a refugee
lawfully staying in the country of refuge?
Lawful stay is, at any rate, a more demanding level of attachment to
the host state than lawful presence.394 Robinson points to the fact that the
notion should be taken to mean the equivalent of the French phrase, “rési-
dant régulièrement,”395 which, in turn, means living in the country of ref-
uge “on a more or less permanent basis” that may nonetheless signify a
“temporary” kind of residence.396 Vedsted-Hansen observes that this par-
ticular requirement does not depend on formal recognition of refugee sta-
tus.397 It appears the notion “lawful stay” is explained predominantly by
what it is not or does not require; it cannot be identified by determining a
specific minimum length of stay but should be determined in the light of
the protected activity and circumstances of the stay of the refugee in the
host country: it is more than a short period of stay but merely passing
through or temporary visit do not qualify False398 Since the French desig-
nation was considered to be the authoritative one,399 the qualification of
“lawful stay” consequently refers to “officially sanctioned, ongoing pres-
ence in a state party, whether or not there has been a formal declaration of
refugee status, which grants of the right of permanent residence, or estab-
lishment of domicile there.”400
393. See supra Section V.B.
394. See supra Section IV.B.
395. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 111.
396. Id. at 111–12.
397. Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Article 28/Schedule, in Zimmermann, supra note 124, 1177,
1204.
398. Michael Teichmann, Article 15, in Zimmermann, supra note 124, 909, 923; see also
HATHAWAY supra note 14, at 186.
399. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 5, UN doc. A/CONF.2/102 (Jul.
24, 1951).
400. HATHAWAY supra note 14, at 189. This explanation has the advantage that it is
consistent with the idea that the 1951 Convention does not per se require status determina-
tion and that the lack of status determination procedures cannot stand in the way of refugees
acquiring more rights along with the passage of time, on which, see id. at 180–81.
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The responsibility to issue a new CTD shifts to another state (that is
also a party to the 1951 Convention) once the refugee has “lawfully taken
up residence” in that state.401 Although “lawful residence” may seem to
be more demanding than “lawful stay,” a “commonsensical interpreta-
tion” has been suggested by Grahl-Madsen, which will be adopted here, to
the effect that it would signify a shift of lawful stay from one state to
another.402
The travel documents are issued “for the purpose of travel.”403 A
state may not refuse to issue a travel document merely because it regards
the proposed travel as inappropriate.404 Nor does the refugee have to jus-
tify the proposed travel to receive a travel document.405
The article 28 right to a CTD is not absolute in that “compelling rea-
sons of national security or public order” may bar the issue of travel docu-
ments. These “compelling reasons” should be taken to mean a temporary
restriction with respect to “reasons of national security and public order,”
so that “not every case that would ordinarily fall under the latter concept
could be used to refuse a document but only very serious cases.”406 The
adjective “compelling” was added by the drafters precisely to prevent
abuse of this restriction, and thus prevent that, for instance, “the holding
of extremist views was accepted as a valid ground for not issuing travel
documents”.407
401. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 11 (the same term figures in paragraph
6). Cf. Council of Europe Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees, of Oct.16,
1980, ETS No. 107 (aims to secure the adoption of minimum standards to determine which
state is to assume responsibility for a refugee, in particular in connection with the issue of
travel documents).
402. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Schedule, ¶ 11; GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 80,
at 351-352 (“[I]t seems justified . . . not to ponder too much over the difference between the
expressions ‘lawfully staying’ and ‘lawfully resident’ used in the English texts. Both expres-
sions apparently mean the same thing.”). The Council of Europe, with a view to facilitating
the application of Art. 28 of the 1951 Convention, and ¶¶ 6, 11 of the Schedule in particular
regarding the situation where a refugee has lawfully taken up residence in another state, has
provided in Art. 2, European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees, supra
note 401 that: “Responsibility shall be considered to be transferred on the expiry of a period
of two years of actual and continuous stay in the second State with the agreement of its
authorities or earlier if the second State has permitted the refugee to remain in its territory
either on a permanent basis or for a period exceeding the validity of the travel document.”
On the validity of the Convention Travel Document, see infra.
403. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 28(1).
404. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: Division of Internal Protection, Note on
Convention Travel Documents and ICAO Standards, 23 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 133, ¶ 5
(2011).
405. Id. at 134, n.5.
406. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 136.
407. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 28 ¶ 5 (The original adjective had been “im-
perative” but that was changed to “compelling” by the style committee.). See also infra.
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In order to determine eligibility for a CTD, the national authorities
will need to verify the identity of the applicant,408 and the question of
whether uncertain identity may be considered to fall under the categories
of “national security” and “public order” was addressed in 2017 by the
Borgarting Court of Appeal in Norway. The Court did not consider gen-
eral doubt regarding identity to qualify as compelling reasons in the sense
of article 28 of the 1951 Convention, but it added that it could not be
excluded it would when issuing a CTD to refugees whose identity is being
doubted would entail that the Norwegian CTD would no longer be ap-
proved by the authorities of other states.409
The relevant restrictions to which departure (including the means to
enable departure) may be subjected to by virtue of different treaties—the
ICCPR and the 1951 Convention—should be considered in terms of their
either being or not being interrelated. It has been contended that since the
refusal to issue a CTD constitutes interference with the right to leave the
country, it must comply with the criteria that apply to any restriction set
out in article 12(3) of the ICCPR.410 It would seem, as will be set out
below, that this contention is correct when no other travel document is
issued, and hence actual departure is frustrated.
The question of restrictions under both provisions is complex, not in
the least because the two rights are not identical. Whereas the ICCPR
grants the right to leave one’s country in article 12(2), regardless of mode
of presence in the country concerned (subject to specific restrictive mea-
sures provided in article 12(3)) and implies the issue of the requisite travel
documents, the 1951 Convention confines itself to the issue of travel docu-
ments, albeit only to those who lawfully stay in the territory of the state
concerned (on other refugees who may be issued a CTD, see Section V.G
infra) subject only to compelling reasons of national security or public or-
der, and implies departure.411 Strictly speaking therefore, the denial of a
CTD is only by implication denying the right to leave (and more impor-
tantly, the right to return).
The right granted in article 12(2) is subject to, in theory, more restric-
tions than the right granted in article 28. However, the former must com-
ply with an objective minimum standard,412 whilst the latter has a more
408. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guide for Issuing Machine Readable Con-
vention Travel Documents for Refugees and Stateless Persons 11 (Feb. 2017), http://www.ref
world.org/docid/52b166a34.html.
409. Aron & Others v. The Immigration Appeals Board, Borgarting Court of Appeal
Feb. 13, 2017, No. LB-2016-3734, ¶ 64 (Nor.), https://www.udiregelverk.no/no/rettskilder/un
derrettsavgjorelser/lb-2016-3734.
410. Vedsted-Hansen, supra note 397, at 1207.
411. But see, GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Schedule, ¶ 13(2) under which the state
may require the holder of the travel document to comply with formalities as may be pre-
scribed regarding exit from its territory. Grahl-Madsen explains that this does not allow the
issuing state to refuse the holder of a valid travel document to leave the country except in
such cases where the issue of a travel document could be refused. Id. ¶ 2. The same provision
refers to cases in where the refugee’s stay is authorized for a specific period.
412. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 274–75.
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subjective ring to it in the sense that what is “compelling”, although in
itself a high bar, is determined in light of particularized circumstances,413
and is in that sense inherently prone to arbitrariness. Although the right
given in article 28 should not be subject to more and other restrictions
than those set out in article 28 itself, the denial of a CTD, and conse-
quently travel, may constitute a violation of ICCPR article 12(2) if no
other travel document is issued. Whether that actually will be the case is
dependent on whether or not the resulting denial of departure is in con-
formity with the criteria regarding restrictive measures set out in article
12(3). However, the mere fact that the implicit denial of departure may be
challenged in the context of article 12(3) may in itself counterbalance any
arbitrariness in the application of article 28 of the 1951 Convention.414
G. Travel Documents for any Other Refugee: Freedom of Onward
Movement
Article 28 of the 1951 Convention is not confined to issuing travel
documents to refugees who are lawfully staying in their territory; it also
includes the rather surprising suggestion that states issue travel documents
to any other refugee in their territory, that is, a discretionary power to
issue CTDs to other refugees, in particular those who lawfully reside
elsewhere:
The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any
other refugee in their territory: they shall in particular give sympa-
thetic consideration to the issue of such travel documents to refu-
gees in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document
from the country of their lawful residence.
It would seem that any other refugee, besides those who qualify for the
issuance of a CTD by virtue of lawful stay in the country concerned, may
be eligible for a CTD at the discretion of the state in whose territory he
413. Cf. Case C-373/13, H. T. v Land Baden-Württemberg, 2014 E.C.L.I. 2014-2218, ¶
86 (Advocate General Sharpston explains the phrase “compelling reasons of national secur-
ity or public order” as included in Art. 24(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC regarding residence
permits in the CJEU Case C-373/13., “‘[C]ompelling reasons of national security and public
order’ must always include an objective element. There must be plausible evidence demon-
strating that the reason invoked can fairly be ‘compelling.’ At the same time, the use of the
term ‘compelling’ suggests a degree of subjectivity, inasmuch as those reasons are considered
to be compelling by the Member State concerned at the point when it takes action. It follows
that the same reasons will not necessarily be ‘compelling’ in each and every case”); Directive
2004/38, of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. (L 158) (“As
soon as possible after their status has been granted, Member States shall issue to benefi-
ciaries of refugee status a residence permit which must be valid for at least three years and
renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require,
and without prejudice to Article 21(3)”) (emphasis added).
414. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 12(3), at 176. (on an effective remedy and beyond
that, to the possibility of communications from individuals claiming to be victims of viola-
tions of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant under the (First) Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR. As at 30 July 2017, 116 states are parties to this Protocol.).
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finds himself by simply being present, even if illegally.415 Robinson ex-
plains the remarkable suggestion to issue travel documents to illegally pre-
sent refugees by observing that previous agreements provided for the
issuance of documents to refugees not staying lawfully in the country, al-
beit only as a transitional measure.416
However, the Schedule to which article 28 refers, appears to retract
from this largesse in defining the category of the relevant beneficiaries in a
more limited manner in paragraph 6(3). Paragraph 6(3) of the Schedule
states that “[t]he Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration
to renewing or extending the validity of travel documents or issuing new
documents to refugees no longer lawfully resident in their territory who are
unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful resi-
dence.”417 The Schedule appears to qualify those referred to in article 28
by requiring a past form of attachment with the issuing country, and hence
reduce the number of beneficiaries. This particular qualification corre-
sponds with the fear expressed by the delegate of the United Kingdom
that article 28 would permit contracting states to issue travel documents to
refugees who were in no way connected with them.418 Grahl-Madsen,
therefore, considers the adoption of paragraph 6(3) as a - conscious -
compromise.419
It is an unsatisfactory outcome in the sense that the text of article 28 is
clear, and reading this particular limitation into article 28 merely on ac-
count of an annex that focuses on the Convention travel document itself is
from the point of view of treaty interpretation hardly sustainable. First,
article 28 clearly states that the provisions of the Schedule shall apply to
the travel document, i.e. the Schedule has no bearing on the obligation to
issue travel documents. Second, the 1951 Convention does not indicate
that the attachment is an integral component of it.420 Lastly, this interpre-
tation is difficult to reconcile with the intention to ensure the external
freedom of—onward—movement of refugees.
The question is whether the limitation implied in the Schedule matters
from a legal point of view. First of all, the issuance of CTDs to “any other
refugee” is phrased in terms of a discretionary power. States are merely
asked to give sympathetic consideration on the issue of CTDs to those
who otherwise would have difficulty obtaining one. Another question is
whether this discretion has not given way to an obligation on the part of
415. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 136; GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, art. 28, § 8. This
is quite extraordinary since the Convention Travel Document entitles the holder to be
readmitted to the state that issued it, at any time during the period of its validity, 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 13(1), on which see Section VI infra.
416. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 136.
417. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 6(3) (emphasis added).
418. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Schedule, ¶¶ 3, 6.
419. Id; but see ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 142 (contending that the relevant phrase
should be taken to refer to refugees who had been residing lawfully in the country, forfeited
their lawful residence, and continue to reside there unlawfully).
420. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 377 (3rd ed. 2013).
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states that are parties to both the 1951 Convention and the ICCPR to issue
travel documents.421 After all, article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each
state to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the ICCPR, including the right to
leave one’s country—which, in turn, as set out above, implies the issuance
of travel documents. It moreover carries the benefit of an effective rem-
edy—lacking in article 28 and the 1951 Convention at large—that is re-
quired by article 2(3) of the ICCPR since even if the requirement to give
sympathetic consideration to a travel document request is interpreted to
require a duty of process (in the sense of taking a request to that end into
favorable consideration), it cannot be extended to encompass giving rea-
sons for a denial, let alone a remedy to contest the negative decision made.
The value of the CTD is not confined to the possibility of travel as
departure only. The value of the CTD is that it entitles the holder to re-
turn to the country that has issued it. The right of return to the country of
refuge will be addressed in the next section.
H. Readmission to the Country of Refuge
The CTD entitles the holder to return, as follows: “Each Contracting
State undertakes that the holder of a travel document issued by it in accor-
dance with article 28 of this Convention shall be readmitted to its territory
at any time during the period of its validity.”422 Readmission is hence
predicated on the possession of a travel document that is usually issued to
lawfully staying refugees, but may be issued to other refugees who are not
necessarily lawfully staying in the country as well,423 and related to the
period of validity of the CTD. The validity of a CTD is one or two years,
at the discretion of the issuing authority.424 However, this period may be
limited by the issuing state. The Schedule provides in Paragraph 13(3) that
“[t]he Contracting States reserve the right, in exceptional cases, or in cases
where the refugee’s stay is authorized for a specific period, when issuing
the document, to limit the period during which the refugee may return to a
period of not less than three months.”425
421. All states parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol are party to the
ICCPR except for Antigua and Barbuda, Fiji, Holy See, St Kitts and Nevis, Solomon Islands,
and Tuvalu; St Lucia signed but not ratified the ICCPR. U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra
note 308.
422. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 13(1); see also European Council on
Refugees and Exiles, Unravelling Travelling: Travel Documents for Beneficiaries of Interna-
tional Protection 5 (Oct. 2016), https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/AIDA-
Brief-Travel-Documents.pdf.
423. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 5(7).
424. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 5. In practice, the actual duration of
validity appears to vary greatly, for an overview of a number of European states that issue
CTDs, see Annex 1 to AIDA (Asylum Information Database), Unravelling Travelling, supra
note 422, at 12.
425. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, Schedule, ¶ 13(3). The Schedule requires the
holder, in Paragraph 13(2), to comply with such formalities the state may prescribe regarding
return to its territory. Robinson gives the example of visa: the refugee must be admitted
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However, the period of re-entry may be shortened if the refugee’s stay
in the country of refuge had been authorized only for a specific period426,
and in —not defined—exceptional cases. Examples of such exceptional
cases include refugees who have been expelled but nonetheless received a
CTD with a view to resettling elsewhere; refugees whose movements the
issuing state chooses to control more closely than others; and the return of
refugees who were resettled in a third state but could not smoothly inte-
grate in the country of resettlement.427 It is a moot point whether the last
instance still exists; it belongs to the time, still tangible when the 1951 Con-
vention was drafted, when the IRO resettled a million refugees in the
wake of the Second World War: the agreements the IRO concluded with
resettlement states included return clauses precisely to accommodate the
eventuality that the resettled refugees could not be absorbed in the econ-
omy of the resettlement state,428 that is, could not provide for themselves
in that state. Grahl-Madsen appears to confine this possibility to the return
of “vast” and “important numbers of refugees who for some reason or
other could not be smoothly integrated in the country of resettlement.”429
In short, a numerical exception to protect the state from which the refu-
gees resettled against a massive return influx. Apart from the fact that it is
not logical to shorten the possibility of return to the state that issued the
CTD in case integration upon resettlement does not work out, since that
conclusion one can presumably only reach after the passage of a consider-
able period of time, it is a moot point whether this particular exceptional
case has not been outdated. First of all, the number of annually available
resettlement places is relatively small—less than one percent of the
without visa unless a visa is required from own nationals, yet the state may not refuse to
grant an entry visa as long as return is permitted because otherwise the purpose of Paragraph
13(1) would be defeated, ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 144. The requirement of Paragraph
13(2) does not in any way limit the obligation of the issuing state to readmit the holder of the
CTD, Grahl-Madsen, supra note 16, Schedule, ¶ 13, § 2.
426. Grahl-Madsen gives the example of refugees whose status has not yet been regu-
larized in the country of refuge and who are advised to seek admission to another country,
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Schedule, ¶ 13, § 3.
427. See id.; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Travel Documents for
Refugees, ¶ 22, U.N. Soc. EC/SCP/10 (Aug. 30, 1978) (emphasizing that the right to restrict
the period during which a refugee may return “should be limited to cases where there are
very special reasons for restricting the validity of the return clause to a period of less than
that of the validity of the travel document”).
428. Those who could not be “absorbed into the economic structure” of the resettle-
ment country could be returned (not to their country of origin but the country from which
they were resettled) within a set period. Cf. Additional Protocol to the Supplementary
Agreement Between the Italian Government and the IRO art. IX (29), Dec. 31, 1952; HOL-
BORN, supra note 305 at 737. Another example is included in Art. 10 of the Agreement Be-
tween the Government of the French Republic and the PCIRO Concerning the Selection of
Refugees and Displaced Persons for France (Home Territory) and Algeria of 13 January
1948, text included in id. at 613: refugees who prove unsuited to any work in France may be
returned (provided it takes place within 15 months from the date of their admission into
French territory).
429. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 16, Schedule, ¶ 13, § 3.
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world’s refugees can be resettled.430 Second, resettlement is nowadays not
so much used in the classical sense of a permanent solution—which is
geared to integration in the resettlement state—but rather consists of sub-
stituting the country of asylum that is not capable of providing the requi-
site protection for another state,431 in which case integration is not an
issue, that is, not more or other than it would be for any other refugee
regardless of mode of entry.
VI. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE’S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
A. Introduction
At some point in time, the refugee may wish to return to his country
of origin.432 Article 12(4) of the ICCPR provides that “[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” Can the refugee
simply invoke this right and return? Does the notion of “one’s own coun-
try” include both the country of nationality and that of former habitual
residence? Refugee status is meant to be a temporary status, and from that
perspective, return to the country of nationality or former habitual resi-
dence is probably not problematic per se. But what about those whose ties
to that country have become tangential, and hence tenuous along with the
passage of time?
A large percentage of the world’s refugees—an estimated number of
11.6 million, that is two-thirds of all refugees (as of the end of 2016), and in
addition, the 5.3 million Palestinian refugees in the care of the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA),433live in so-called “protracted refugee situations.”434 A pro-
tracted refugee situation has been defined by UNHCR as a situation in
which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in
exile for five or more years in a given asylum country.435
430. On average 80,000 refugees can be resettled per year. As to the number of resettle-
ment places required, see U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Projected Resettlement
Needs 2018, at 9 (June 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettlement/593a88f27/
unhcr-projected-global-resettlement-needs-2018.html (stating that 1.2 million places are
needed. The U.N. study finds the number of people in need of resettlement far surpasses the
opportunities for placement in a third country.).
431. Only those whose protection cannot be secured in the country of refuge are reset-
tled, cf. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Resettlement, 9 (2d ed. 2011),
http://www.unhcr/org/46f7c0ee2.pdf; see also id. Chapter 6.
432. Country of origin” here means either the country of nationality or the country of
former habitual residence. Cf. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1A(2).
433. On UNRWA, see generally BENJAMIN SCHIFF, REFUGEES UNTO THE THIRD GEN-
ERATION: U.N. AID TO PALESTINIANS; ALEX TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-33 (1997).
434. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACE-
MENT IN 2016, 22 (2017).
435. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION UNIT, GLOBAL PROTRACTED
REFUGEE SITUATIONS, (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/266018.pdf; see
also Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r Programme, Protracted Refugee Situations, U.N. Doc.
EC/54/SC/CRP.14, ¶ 5. UNHCR now considers that definition too limited: “This criterion
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Quite a number, far too many, of those protracted refugee situations
exist already for decades. For 9.4 million (or fifty-six percent) of the 16.9
million refugees caught in protracted refugee situations, this protracted
situation already lasts for twenty years or more,436 and some refugees live
in such situations for considerably more time. Palestinian refugees in the
Middle East, Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and Western Saharan
refugees in Algeria are cases in point.437 Such extreme protracted situa-
tions mean that children and grandchildren are born as refugees, as if it is
a hereditary trait. If they want to return to their country of origin, does
that country—i.e., the country of their ancestors—still qualify as such?
Even more complex is the comparable question regarding those who were
not nationals of the country of origin but former habitual residents with-
out the formal nationality of the state concerned: does that country still
“count” as “one’s own country,” or has the country of refuge meanwhile
become their country of habitual residence? And what about the children
of those who were habitual residents of the country of origin? Do they
have any relevant legal connection to that country?
Even if a right of return can be established, the right itself is not abso-
lute. It may be denied, provided the denial is not of an arbitrary nature,
and it may be derogated from in time of a public emergency and that
raises two final questions: when can return actually, lawfully, be denied?
And is the country of origin entitled to delay returns and require phased
returns with a view to be able to accommodate the return of large num-
bers of returnees?
B. Return to the Country of Origin.
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his right to enter his own country. As far as the meaning of
“one’s own country” is concerned, the HRC, in its General Comment on
Freedom of Movement, provided that
[the phrase “his own country”] is not limited to nationality in a
formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral;
it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or
her special ties to or claims in relation to a given country, cannot
be considered to be a mere alien.438
clearly has limitations, as displacement situations are dynamic: Refugee populations change
due to new arrivals and returns that are not captured under this definition. Furthermore,
smaller refugee situations might not be included even if the displacement is prolonged, espe-
cially if refugees from one nationality are in various countries of asylum,” UNHCR, Global
Trends Forced Displacement in 2016 at 22.
436. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 435 at 22.
437. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION UNIT, supra note
435.
438. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 20. General Comment No. 27, supra
note 1, incorporates the minority decision of U.N. Human Rights Comm., Stewart v. Canada,
Comm. No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996), at para. 6. Dissenting Judges
Evatt, Quiroga, and Aguilar Urbina observed that “there are factors other than nationality
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Moreover, [t]he language of article 12, paragraph 4 [. . .] permits a broader
interpretation that may embrace other categories of long-term residents,
including but not limited to stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the
right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence.439 Focus-
ing first on those who have the nationality of the country of origin, regard-
less of whether they are first-, second-, or even third-generation refugees,
it is submitted that all those who retained (or acquired at birth) the formal
nationality of their country of origin while in exile may be presumed to
have the right of entry;440 it is, even apart from article 12(4), inherent to
having a nationality. Put differently, it is an incident of citizenship.441
The concept of nationality is—still—cast somewhat archaically, true to
its historic origin, in the notion of allegiance owed by the subject to his
king,442 in terms of
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genu-
ine connection of existence, interests and sentiments [. . .] It may
be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the
individual upon whom it is conferred [. . .] is in fact more closely
connected with the population of the State conferring nationality
than with than of any other State.443
which may establish close and enduring connections between a person and a country, connec-
tions which may be stronger than those of nationality. After all, a person may have several
nationalities, and yet have only the slightest or no actual connections of home and family
with one or more of the States in question. The words “his own country” on the face of it
invite consideration of such matters as long standing residence, close personal and family ties
and intentions to remain (as well as to the absence of such ties elsewhere).”.
439. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 20. In his commentary, Nowak favors
a comparable broad interpretation: applying the concept of “one’s own country” “to nation-
als and to those aliens (stateless persons, recognized refugees and foreign nationals) who, as
long-term residents, have acquired such a strong personal and emotional relationship to their
country of residence that it has become their “home country’,” NOWAK, 2005, supra note 12,
at 287.
440. The right to enter one’s country includes not only the right to return after having
left one’s own country, but also entitle a person to come to the country for the first time if he
or she was born outside the country, U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 19; cf. U.N.
ESCOR, 6th Sess., 150th mtg. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.150, ¶ 2 (Apr. 10, 1950)  (“[T]he United
States amendment was intended to extend the right accorded by guaranteeing to persons
born abroad the right to enter the country of which they were nationals”).
441. Inglès, supra note 1, at 1-5; PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, 45-49 (1956); HANNUM, supra note 74 at 60-61; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
The Right to Leave, Return and Remain in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN LIGHT OF CON-
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES, 93-108 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1994); GUY S.
GOODWIN-GILL, The Right to Leave, Return and Remain in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN
LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES, 93-108 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas
ed., 1994); Oliver Dörr, Nationality, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., supra
note 25, ¶¶ 50, 51; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THEMES AND THEORIES, 447-48 (Oxford Univ. Press;
1st ed. 2009) (explaining a right to re-entry to nationals “normally resident”).
442. JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 190, at 854.
443. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 23 (Apr. 6).
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The question must therefore be raised whether this legal bond, which is
based on such a genuine connection, may be superseded by a similar genu-
ine connection that was forged with the country of refuge during exile
(short of naturalization)?
The question whether a genuine connection may trump formal nation-
ality has come before the HRC in a number of cases concerning expulsion
to a mere formal country of nationality.444 The HRC decided that strong
ties to a country of habitual residence may qualify that country as “one’s
own country,” and outweigh the mere formal tie with the country of na-
tionality. These views give rise to the question of whether an effective
bond with the country of refuge may affect the right to enter one’s country
of nationality.
It is submitted that such an effective bond with the country of ref-
uge—short of naturalization—cannot outweigh that of formal nationality,
and hence cannot be adduced by the country of origin to prevent entry;
the formal bond of nationality prevails.445 If this were not the case, the
paradoxical result would be that a refugee who successfully integrated into
the country of refuge—wholly in conformity with the substance of the
1951 Convention, which is geared toward enabling the refugee to build a
normal, economically independent life in the country of refuge—would be
barred from entering his country of nationality because of his special ties
to the country of refuge. It would also mean that the country of refuge
would have to accept the refugees it hosts indefinitely since return would
cease to be an option even when the circumstances in the country of origin
would allow return, justifying cessation of refugee status446 and subse-
444. Of course, the views of the Human Rights Committee were preceded by the deci-
sion of the ICJ in Nottebohm. in which the formal nationality of Liechtenstein—the state
that moreover exercised diplomatic protection—was superseded by the effective—not for-
mal— nationality of Guatemala. See Nottebohm, Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 23.
445. The right of entry in cases of minor children who did not perchance acquire the
nationality of the country of their parents in exile must be construed in terms of the right to
family life and the best interests of the children. Cf. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 23(1) (stating
that the family unit is “entitled to protection by the society and the State”); Convention on
the Rights of the Child arts. 3(1), 9(1), 10(1), 16, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasizing
that the best interests of the child shall be a “primary consideration” in all State action);
However, in practice this right may be frustrated by evidentiary problems that may occur due
to non-registration of children. It is estimated, for instance, that 70% of the Syrian children
who are born in Lebanon are not registered. Jannie Schipper, Als je in de chaos wordt
geboren, besta je niet [If you are born in the chaos, you do not exist], NRC Handelsblad (Aug.
15, 2016), https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/08/14/als-je-in-de-chaos-wordt-geboren-besta-je-
niet-3746927-a1516239.
446. On cessation, 1951 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1C (5) and (6) provide:
“This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of
section A if:
[. . .]
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exit, continue to refuse to avail him-
self of the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph
shall not apply to a refugee falling under Section A(1) of this article who can in-
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quent enforced return,447 provided it takes place on an individual basis,448
to the country of nationality. This would be contrary to the object and
purpose of the 1951 Convention of ensuring protection only for the dura-
tion of risk in the country of origin.449 The relevant cessation clauses ac-
cordingly assume return: when the circumstances in connection with which
the refugees had been recognized as refugees cease to exist, they can no
longer continue to refuse to avail themselves of the protection of their
country of nationality.
Loss of status and the prospect of return may cause considerable hard-
ship for the (former) refugee. UNHCR’s Executive Committee has there-
fore recommended that asylum states consider an appropriate status “for
those persons who cannot be expected to leave the country of asylum, due
to a long stay in that country resulting in strong family, social and eco-
nomic links there,”450 as a result of which they are more closely connected
with the population of the country of refuge than their formal country of
voke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail
himself of the protection of his country or nationality;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in con-
nection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able
to return to the country of his former habitual residence; Provided that this para-
graph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article who is
able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing
to return to the country of his former habitual residence”.
447. Cf. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Status of Uruguayans Abroad (Nov. 13,
1984) (“As far as UNHCR is concerned, persons . . . have in principle ceased to be refugees.
Former refugees who still find themselves outside Uruguay will henceforth have the status of
ordinary aliens whose continued stay in the asylum country will depend upon the authoriza-
tion of the Government concerned”); see also, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Status
of Argentines Abroad (Nov. 13, 1984), http://www.refworld.org/docid/44c7878e4.html; U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, Applicability of the Cessation Clauses to Refugees From
Chile (Mar. 28, 1994), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4165716d10.html; U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, Applicability of the Cessation Clauses to Cite as Refugees From the Re-
publics of Malawi and Mozambique (Dec. 31, 1996), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4165775d4.html; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Declaration of Cessation - Timor
Leste (Dec. 22, 2002), http://www.refworld.org/docid/41657a7e4.html.
448. The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited, see generally JEAN-MARIE HENCK-
AERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 8-49 (1995);
JUAN FERNANDO DURÁN ALBA, Prohibition on the Collective Expulsion of Aliens (Article 4
of Protocol 4), in EUROPE OF RIGHTS: A COMPENDIUM ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 629 (Javier Garcı́a Roca & Pablo Santolaya eds., 2012); Protocol No. 4 to the
1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4,
Sept. 16, 1963, ETS 46. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica,” art. 29(9), Nov. 22, 1969, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36510.html; Organisa-
tion of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, “Banjul Char-
ter,” art. 12(5), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (June 27, 1981).
449. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 119, ¶ 111; U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on their Application, ¶ 1 (Apr. 1999),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3c06138c4.pdf. See also HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 115,
at 447.
450. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusion Executive Committee No. 69
(XLIII) Cessation of Status, § e (1992).
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nationality. In more adversarial terms: a former refugee subject to repatri-
ation could contest his removal from the country of refuge based on his
effective ties to this country.451 However, such a claim should not ordina-
rily prevail since article 12(4) of the ICCPR only prohibits the arbitrary
deprivation of the right to enter (which implies the right to remain in) his
own country.452 The repatriation of a person whose refugee status has
ceased in accordance with the requirements of the 1951 Convention can-
not, as indicated earlier, be qualified as an arbitrary deprivation of the
right to remain in the sense of article 12(4) in view of the object and pur-
pose of the Convention to ensure protection only for the duration of risk
in the country of origin rather than altogether relinquishing immigration
control.453
The situation of refugees who were habitual residents of the country
of origin without the nationality of that country is more complex,454 since
their effective ties to the country of origin, which were not saved—and
arrested, for that matter— in the nationality of that state, may over time
be outweighed by those that are developed with the country of refuge.
This may not be the case for first-generation refugees in non-protracted
refugee situations, but could be the case for refugees whose exile is of a
protracted nature, and even more so for those who are second- or third-
generation refugees from forbears who were themselves merely habitual
residents rather than nationals of the country of origin. Past ties may fade
along with the passage of time and give way to new ties, which point to the
country of refuge as the country of habitual residence.
Like refugees who have—and retained—the nationality of their coun-
try of origin, stateless refugees are supposed to return when the cessation
clauses pertaining to changed circumstances are applicable. However, in
the case of stateless refugees - and their offspring -, this particular clause
requires that they are able to return to their country of former habitual
451. Factors that could be taken into consideration are the length of stay in the country
of refuge, the age of the refugee when arriving in the country of refuge, whether he speaks
the language of his country of nationality, and so on.
452. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 19.
453. For the text of the cessation clauses on ceased circumstances—arts. 1C (5) and
(6)—see supra note 446. Worth adding is that states do not consider themselves bound to
refrain from applying the exception comprised in those two clauses (regarding compelling
reasons arising out of previous persecution) to other refugees than those defined in Art. A(1)
(Statutory refugees) as has been suggested by UNHCR. U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status Under Article 1C
(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [hereinafter “Ceased
Circumstances Clauses”], U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/03, ¶ 21 (Feb. 10, 2003). See also In Re B
(FC) (Appellant); Regina v Special Adjudication ex parte Hoxha (FC) [2005] UKHL 19,
[2002] EWCA Civ. 1403 (appeal taken from Eng.).
454. Particularly tragic in this respect is the plight of the Rohingya, stateless habitual
residents of Myanmar but denied the nationality of Myanmar and forced to flee. The Com-
mittee of the Rights of the Child expressed its deep concern about the prohibition on the
return of Rohingya people, including children who fled Myanmar, and strongly recommends
that they be allowed to return to Myanmar. U.N. CRC, 59th Sess., ¶¶ 79-80, U.N. Doc. CRC/
C/MMR/CO/3-4 (Mar. 14, 2012).
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residence.455 This condition is arguably only fulfilled when that country
makes known its willingness to re-admit them.456 The next question is
whether that country has a legal obligation to make known its willingness
to re-admit its former habitual residents and their children and actually
allow return. In the absence of nationality, which entails the obligation to
receive one’s (expelled) nationals,457 any such obligation can only be con-
strued in terms of state responsibility, as an obligation of the country of
origin owed to the country of refuge.458
In practice, the lack of relevant ties with the country of origin, which
could frustrate entry, may be overcome by voluntary repatriation opera-
tions459—that is about return preceding the application of the cessation
clauses pertaining to changed circumstances—in particular those that are
governed by agreements concluded between the country of refuge, the
country of origin, and UNHCR.460 It is remarkable in this context that
these agreements tend not to focus explicitly on questions of legal ties to
the country of origin, but rather assume the entitlement to return of the
entire community that fled from the country of origin including genera-
tions of offspring.461 Possibly this practice is related to the fact that volun-
tary repatriation operations usually follow on, or are connected with, a
political solution to the root cause of flight.462
In this respect, reference should be made to the fact that there are
refugees who properly speaking, do not have a country of origin anymore,
455. For the text of the relevant cessation clause, see supra note 446. UNHCR’s Guide-
lines on Cessation, supra note 453, do not address this requirement.
456. 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
REFUGEE CHARACTER, 406 (1966); see also HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 115, at 488–89
(arguing that refugees do not have the responsibility to find out whether their state of nation-
ality is now safe to return to). UNHCR emphasizes that, apart from the changed circum-
stances in his country of former habitual residence, the person must be able return there, and
adds “This, in the case of a stateless person, may not always be possible.” Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, supra note 119, ¶ 139.
457. JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 190, at 858.
458. Following a breach of the customary principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas: a state must not use its territory, or knowingly allow it to be used, in such a way that
causes significant harm to another state. This principle was adduced already in 1949 by Sir
Robert Jennings in the context of the flooding of other states with refugees from Nazi Ger-
many. See Robert Y. Jennings, Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question, 20
Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 98, 112 (1939); see also Alan Dowty & Gil Loescher, Refugee Flows as
Grounds for International Action, 21 INT’L SEC. 43, 71 (1996). On the legal status of this
principle, cf. JENNINGS & WATTS supra note 190, at 408 (“one of those general principles of
law recognized by civilized states which the International Court of Justice is bound to apply
by virtue of Article 38 of its Statute”).
459. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 19 (“The right to return is of the
utmost importance for refugees seeking voluntary repatriation.”).
460. See ZIECK, supra note 77.
461. Cf. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook Voluntary Repatriation: In-
ternational Protection, Annex 4 (1996) (making no reference to the applicant’s nationality).
462. See ZIECK, supra note 77, 23–26; see also Marjoleine Zieck, Voluntary Repatria-
tion: Paradigm, Pitfalls, Progress, 23 Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33, 46 (2004).
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that is, in the common sense of the term, in that their exile is connected to
a root cause related to issues of statehood and the resulting impossibility
of return: Palestinian and Western Saharan refugees are cases in point.
Their return is consequently wholly dependent on a political solution to
the root cause at hand.463
C. Constraints on Return to the Country of Origin
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary deprivation of the right
to enter one’s country. The first question is, what this particular prohibi-
tion means, and the second whether it allows a state to prevent refugees
from returning when large numbers of returnees would threaten its politi-
cal or economic fabric, or when it simply does not have sufficient absorp-
tion capacity to cater for a large-scale return and is as a result incapable of
meeting the basic needs of the returnees and securing their basic rights.464
The background of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of the right
to enter one’s country in article 12(4) is lawful exile as punishment for a
crime.465 After the proposed prohibition of exile was struck down in the
463. See generally supra note 423 (discussing Palestinian refugees); Danielle van Brunt
Smith, Western Sahara, Forced Migration Online (Aug. 2004), http://www.forcedmigration.
org/research-resources/expert-guides/western-sahara/alldocuments (last visited Aug. 2, 2017)
(addressing Western Sahara refugees); Randa Farah, Sovereignty on Borrowed Territory:
Sahrawi Identity in Algeria, 11 GA. J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS 59, 63 (2010) (discussing Sahrawi
refugees).
464. Illustrative for such a situation is the current (forced) return of Afghan refugees
from Pakistan to Afghanistan, on which see Human Rights Watch, supra note 128 (explaining
the current forced return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan to Afghanistan). On the limited
absorption capacity of Afghanistan, see Fazal Muzhary, Resettling Nearly Half a Million Af-
ghans in Nangrahar: The consequences of the mass return of refugees, Afghanistan Analysts
Network, (May 12, 2017), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/resettling-nearly-half-a-mil
lion-afghans-in-nangrahar-the-consequences-of-the-mass-return-of-refugees/; see also U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, Repatriation of Afghan Refugees From Pakistan: Supple-
mentary Appeal. September - December 2016, 4-5, http://www.unhcr.org/581713917.pdf (“The
resulting high levels of vulnerability of refugee returnees are adding to the already over-
stretched absorption capacity in Afghanistan, especially in urban centers. This is coupled with
the challenges returnees face in accessing basic services, securing land tenure, and adequate
shelter and job opportunities, particularly for youth”). It therefore does not come as a sur-
prise that the tripartite commission governing the repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghan-
istan “underscored the importance of gradual voluntary return in a context of enduring
conflict and limited absorption capacity in Afghanistan.” Conclusions of the 18th Tripartite
Commission Meeting Between the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Afg.-Pak.-
UNHCR, Feb. 15, 2017, UNHCR, ¶ 2, http://unhcrpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Con-
clusion-of-the-28th-Tripartite-Commission-meeting-Feburary.pdf; Another example is the
pending closure of camp Dadaab, and the consequent return of about quarter of a million
Somali refugees from Kenya to a politically and otherwise very fragile Somalia. see Nowhere
Else to Go: Forced Returns of Somali Refugees from Dadaab Refugee Camp, Kenya, 21-23,
Amnesty Int’l., (2016), http://www.refworld.org/docid/582b17bf4.html; see also, U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, Position Paper on Returns to Southern and Central Somalia (Up-
date I), May 30, 2016, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/573de9fe4.pdf.
465. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 283. During the drafting process, the observation was
made that the Covenant did not contain a single article on the right to political asylum, and
merely comprised the prohibition of arbitrary exile without stating where a person could be
exiled if such exile was not arbitrary, a “grave oversight,” according to the representative of
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drafting process, a solution had to be found to accommodate the fact that
some states still provided for this form of punishment.466 The solution was
found in the present wording of article 12(4), which signifies, according to
Nowak, that “there can be no doubt that the limitation on the right to
entry expressed with the word ‘arbitrarily’ (‘arbitrairement’) is to relate
exclusively to cases of lawful exile as punishment for a crime, whether this
is accompanied by loss of nationality or not,”467 who added that every
other restriction on the right to entry would represent a violation of article
12(4).468 This strict interpretation would entail that everyone has the right
to enter his country except when lawfully exiled as punishment for a
crime. In its General Comment, the HRC considers “that there are few, if
any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own
country could be reasonable.”469
The HRC had to address the issue of exile in a few cases.470 From
these cases, the inference can be drawn that denying entry as a penalty for
a crime to the state that qualifies de facto as one’s own country on account
of strong ties to that country, even where the person has the formal na-
tionality of another state, is disproportionate (to the legitimate aim of
preventing the commission of further crimes) and therefore arbitrary.471
This means that even when exile is lawfully imposed as punishment for a
crime, its legality founders on the fact that its execution results in perma-
nently severing the effective ties with the state concerned and is therefore
arbitrary. These views of the HRC are consequently tantamount to out-
lawing exile altogether.
The HRC reviewed two cases that specifically concerned the return of
refugees from exile. The first case concerned a citizen of Cameroon, an
opponent of the one-party system in his country.472 Despite the fact that
the Philippines, UN doc. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 199th mtg. ¶ 122, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
SR.199 (May 31, 1950).
466. NOWAK, supra note 12, at 283.
467. Id. (emphasis in original).
468. Id. at 284.
469. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 21.
470. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Jama Warsame v. Canada, Comm. No. 1959/2010,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010 (Sept. 1, 2011); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Nystrom v.
Australia, Comm. No. 1557/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (Sept. 1, 2011); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Stewart v. Canada, supra note 438; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Canepa v. Canada, Comm. No. 558/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997);
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Madafferi v. Australia, Comm. No. 1011/2001, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (July 26, 2004).
471. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Jama Warsame v. Canada, supra note 470, ¶ 8.6
(on the effective ties with the country of habitual residence); see also U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Nystrom v. Australia, supra note 470, ¶ 7.6 (on the effective ties with the country of
habitual residence). These views constitute a change from earlier ones, see e.g., U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Stewart v. Canada, supra note 438; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Canepa v.
Canada, supra note 470; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Madafferi v. Australia, supra note 470.
472. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, Comm. No.
458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (Aug. 10, 1994).
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he had been arrested several times and subjected to inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, the Committee concluded that he had not been “forced into
exile by the State party’s authorities in the summer of 1990 but left the
country voluntarily, and that no laws or regulations or State practice pre-
vented him from returning to Cameroon.”473 In fact, he was able to return
from exile in April 1992, so the conclusion was drawn that there had been
no violation of article 12(4) of the ICCPR.474 The second case concerned a
national from Colombia, living in exile since 1988.475 The author claimed
inter alia a violation of article 12(4); “although there is no express ban by
the Colombian authorities on his entering the country, he is denied this
right as he constitutes a military objective.”476 The Committee concluded
that article 12(4) was violated since there were no effective domestic rem-
edies allowing him to return from involuntary exile in safety, as a result of
which “the State party has not ensured to the author his right to remain in,
return to and reside in his own country.”477 Both cases do not add or de-
tract from the conclusion drawn earlier regarding the outlawing of exile.
The second question is whether states are allowed, under article 12(4),
to prevent return, or rather, require a phased return, based on the number
of returnees and/or the state’s limited absorption capacity. Although it
cannot be excluded that such - temporary - denial could qualify as “rea-
sonable,”478 article 12(4) is not about a temporary denial of entry. Moreo-
ver, in conformity with its peculiar background of a penalty for a crime, it
is predicated on individuals rather than a collective. Any temporary dero-
gation from article 12(4) can only be justified in the context of ICCPR
article 4(1), which allows derogation in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation, provided it has been proclaimed pub-
licly.479 Either the mass return poses a threat to the life of the nation in
the sense of ICCPR article 4(1) or, more convincingly, the state of the
infrastructure is in a condition that cannot support a major population in-
crease, for instance, when the basic infrastructure has been decimated by
war480 and the country of origin is hence not able to meet the basic needs
473. Id., ¶ 9.10.
474. Id.
475. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, Comm. No. 859/1999,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/859/1999 (Mar. 25, 2002).
476. Id. ¶ 3.5.
477. Id. ¶ 7.4.
478. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 1, ¶ 21.
479. On Art. 4(1), see supra Sections I.A, I.C and V.C.
480. See the examples given in supra note 464. The extent of destruction in Syria is
illustrative and it is hard to imagine how that state can sustain any return, let alone the return
of the presently more than 5 million Syrians in exile. Nonetheless, the de-escalation agree-
ment that was concluded on 4 May 2017 between Russia, Iran, and Turkey means to attract
return, Memorandum on the Creation and De-Escalation Areas in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Iran-Russ.-Turk., art. 2, May 6, 2017, R.D.M., and appears to invite advocacy of return on the
part of a few host states, see Shaza Zafer Al Jundi, UNs position on refugees return to Syria,
Ahewar, (July 14, 2017), http://www.ahewar.org/eng/show.art.asp?aid=2390; see also David
Enders, Return of Syrian refugees signals shift in Lebanese policy, NATIONAL (Aug. 2, 2017),
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and observe the human rights of the returnees. Such a derogation would
be of a temporary nature and would not justify an indefinite bar to entry.
It would, of course, prolong the involuntary exile of the refugees con-
cerned, and it would preclude the country of asylum from applying the
cessation clauses as long as the derogation entails the impossibility that the
refugees re-avail themselves of the protection of the country of their na-
tionality, and the inability of former habitual residents to return.481
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The contemporary legal framework pertaining to the status of refu-
gees started with the adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which included the right to seek and enjoy asylum from
persecution. It was followed by the first human rights treaty, the 1951 Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees. Yet a gap between the two in-
struments remained, for the first constituted a non-binding common
standard of achievement—and its right to asylum a mere right to ask—and
the second was initially only applied to those who found themselves mirac-
ulously within the territory of another state,482 the country of refuge. This
framework was supplemented, years later, by the 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, not written specifically for refugees but for “every-
one.” Even though their plight is unusual, refugees exercise the right to
freedom of movement just like everybody else. Put differently, many of
their needs correspond with a larger legal framework than those that are
specifically covered by the 1951 Convention, for which the right to free-
dom of movement is illustrative.
If the spatial journey of refugees is viewed from the perspective of the
applicable law, it starts with the right provided by the ICCPR: the right to
leave one’s country. It continues with entering a country of refuge, and,
once there, with freedom of movement upon arrival, internal freedom of
movement, and external freedom of movement: three phases that are cov-
ered by both instruments. It ends with the right to return to the country of
origin, where the applicability of the 1951 Convention fades out.483 Two
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/return-of-syrian-refugees-signals-shift-in-lebanese-
government-policy-1.616451. On the state of destruction in Syria, see generally Ishaan
Tharoor, The Destruction of a Nation: Syria’s War Revealed in Satellite Imagery, TIME (Mar.
15, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/03/15/the-destruction-of-a-nation-syrias-war-revealed-
in-satellite-imagery/; Sam Webb, Bombed to Oblivion: Incredible satellite images show the
staggering scale of destruction in Aleppo after four years of brutal street fighting and air strikes,
SUN (Dec. 23, 2016) https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2465593/incredible-satellite-images-
show-the-staggering-scale-of-destruction-in-aleppo-after-four-years-of-brutal-street-fighting-
and-air-strikes/; see also generally Maps and Data, UNITAR, http://www.unitar.org/unosat/
maps/SYR (providing graphics and statistics on the extent of the damage and shelters in
Syria).
481. For the text of the relevant cessation clauses, see supra note 446.
482. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
483. Although the cessation clauses do or do not apply, and in that sense, there is no
question of “fading out,” it should be added that mere return—preceding cessation on ac-
count of changed circumstances in the country of origin, does not necessarily entail loss of
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basic questions should be raised at this point: does this legal framework
that consists of categorically different instruments—a generic one and a
specific one—constitute a seamless whole with respect to the freedom of
movement of refugees? If not, what gaps can be identified? Second, does
the dual applicability enhance the right to freedom of movement, and
hence reinforce the legal position of refugees?
As far as the first question is concerned—whether the two instruments
form a normative continuum with respect to freedom of movement of ref-
ugees—the answer must be negative in the sense that they do in all re-
spects with the exception of entry: the right to leave one’s country does
not correspond with the right to entry elsewhere, nor, more specifically,
the right to seek asylum does not correspond with the right to be granted
asylum for those who satisfy the 1951 Convention definition of refugee.
Asylum is still only secured by means of negative obligations, such as in
particular the prohibition of refoulement as set out in the 1951 Convention
and comparable prohibitions in human rights instruments.
As far as the second question is concerned, the dual applicability en-
hances the rights pertaining to freedom of movement included in the 1951
Convention and consequently reinforces the legal position of the refugee.
The right to freedom of movement is not an absolute right but is subject,
in both instruments, to restrictions. The restrictions are in most cases more
precise and delimited in the ICCPR in the sense that they need to satisfy
quite clear criteria, also in time of a public emergency, including non-inter-
national and international armed conflict. Those criteria contribute to
safeguarding aspects of the right that are included in the 1951 Convention,
not in the least by the obligation states have under the ICCPR to ensure
that any person whose rights or freedoms are violated has an effective
remedy, to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative, or legisla-
tive authorities, and to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.484
refugee status. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1C(4) (“He has voluntarily re-established
himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecu-
tion”). Art. 1C(4) is clearly about re-establishment, and hence requires an animus manendi.
484. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(3) (The complete text is as follows:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To Ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or
by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted”.).
Beyond Art. 2(3), there is the possibility of communications from individuals claiming to be
victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant under the (First) Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR in case the state is party to this Protocol, see supra note 404.
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This background paper is about the state of the relevant law. How-
ever, from the state practice that was adduced, it is clear that many states
fail to live up to the obligations they have incurred and instead close their
borders, build walls, erect barbed wire fences on a massive scale, and de-
tain and warehouse refugees, sometimes indefinitely, in camps.485 It seems
that the reason why the 1951 Convention was once drafted and adopted—
”born out of the Holocaust,” as one High Commissioner summarized
it486—has been forgotten; the result is that the extent to which refugees
actually enjoy freedom of movement falls far too short of that to which
they are legally entitled.
485. A survey performed by Lilla Dittrich (research master’s student, Amsterdam Law
School) of encampment policies of states suggests there are a variety of ways in which states
restrict the right of refugees to move and live where they choose. For the survey, “camp” was
defined as any location where refugees reside overseen or managed, in whole or in part, by
an entity other than the refugees, where there is some degree of reliance by the refugees on
the body overseeing or managing the camp, and the camp is not of a transitory nature. About
40 countries have such camps, and only few of those give refugees freedom—in law and
practice—to live out of camps and move freely such as Ghana, Niger, and Burkina Faso, see
e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Submission by the UNHCR for the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report—Universal Periodic Review
(2012), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/5756ed787/submission-by-the-united-na-
tions-high-commissioner-for-refugees-for-the.html; see also Refugees, UNITED NATIONS IN
GHANA (2016), http://gh.one.un.org/content/unct/ghana/en/home/our-work/cross-cutting-
themes/refugees.html; see also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Niger,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper (92%
of refugees live outside of camps or settlements); see also see also Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2016:Burkina Faso, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper. Many states practice some form of encampment or de-
tention: e.g. Zambia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe follow policies of encampment where the gov-
ernment is authorized to determine where refugees reside, the conditions under which they
may leave, and to detain them if found outside of camps. See e.g., UNHCR, “Beyond Deten-
tion: A Global Strategy to support governments to end the detention of asylum seekers and
refugees,” 2016 at 83; see also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Sudan,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper; see
also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Zimbabwe, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper. These camps are either ex-
plicitly forms of detention or differ little from it. Other states - Kenya, Ethiopia and Thailand
- follow unofficial encampment policies but incentivize camp-based living; either by arresting
those residing in urban areas or providing essential services and documentation in camps.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Thailand, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper; see also Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2016: Kenya, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/
rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper; see also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2016: Ethiopia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsre-
port/#wrapper. It is common for refugee movements to be tightly controlled; both Kenya and
Ethiopia require refugees to obtain permission to leave the camp, granting it on limited
grounds such as education, specialized medical care, or security needs, and the imposition of
curfews is not uncommon. The survey shows that there appears to be—increasingly—a trend
toward encamping and detaining refugees.
486. Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, United Nations Preventing Fu-
ture Genocide and Protecting Refugees, Address at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wash-
ington D.C. (Apr. 30, 1997).
